The Wandering Officer by Grunwald, Ben & Rappaport, John
 1676 
B E N  G R U N W A L D  &  J O H N  R A P P A P O R T  
The Wandering Officer 
abstract.  “Wandering officers” are law-enforcement officers fired by one department, some-
times for serious misconduct, who then find work at another agency. Policing experts hold dispar-
ate views about the extent and character of the wandering-officer phenomenon. Some insist that 
wandering officers are everywhere—possibly increasingly so—and that they’re dangerous. Others, 
however, maintain that critics cherry-pick rare and egregious anecdotes that distort broader reali-
ties. In the absence of systematic data, we simply do not know how common wandering officers 
are or how much of a threat they pose, nor can we know whether and how to address the issue 
through policy reform. 
 In this Article, we conduct the first systematic investigation of wandering officers and possibly 
the largest quantitative study of police misconduct of any kind. We introduce a novel data set of 
all 98,000 full-time law-enforcement officers employed by almost 500 different agencies in the 
State of Florida over a thirty-year period. We report three principal findings. First, in any given 
year during our study, an average of just under 1,100 officers who were previously fired—three 
percent of all officers in the State—worked for Florida agencies. Second, officers who were fired 
from their last job seem to face difficulty finding work. When they do, it takes them a long time, 
and they tend to move to smaller agencies with fewer resources in areas with slightly larger com-
munities of color. Interestingly, though, this pattern does not hold for officers who were fired ear-
lier in their careers. Third, wandering officers are more likely than both officers hired as rookies 
and those hired as veterans who have never been fired to be fired from their next job or to receive 
a complaint for a “moral character violation.” Although we cannot determine the precise reasons 
for the firings, these results suggest that wandering officers may pose serious risks, particularly 
given how difficult it is to fire a police officer. We consider several plausible explanations for why 
departments nonetheless hire wandering officers and suggest potential policy responses to each. 
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introduction 
With all that has been said and written about the tragic death of twelve-year-
old Tamir Rice in Cleveland, one fact attracts less attention than it should: the 
officer who fired the fatal shot had been “allowed . . . to resign” from his previ-
ous job in Independence, Ohio, after suffering a “dangerous loss of composure” 
during firearms training.
1
 According to his supervisors, Tim Loehmann “would 
not be able to substantially cope, or make good decisions” in stressful scenarios.
2
 
A year or so later, however, the Cleveland Police Department failed to review 
Loehmann’s personnel file before giving him a gun.
3
 Another Ohio department 
later hired Loehmann after he killed Rice and was fired by Cleveland.
4
 
This story is not unique. Consider what happened in tiny Tulia, Texas. In a 
massive early-morning raid on July 23, 1999, police arrested a full fifth of Tulia’s 
black adults.
5
 After parading them across the courthouse lawn in their night-
clothes, Tulia authorities charged the arrestees—roughly forty out of fifty of 
whom were black—with felony drug offenses. The evidence in each case con-
sisted of the testimony of a single undercover narcotics officer, Tom Coleman. 
Coleman claimed he had purchased drugs, mostly powder cocaine, from each of 
the defendants—over one hundred buys in total. Most were convicted, their sen-
tences ranging from 20 to 361 years. The State crowned Coleman “Lawman of 
the Year.” 
 
1. Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by Cleveland Police,  
Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/in-tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by 
-police-then-a-fatal-one.html [https://perma.cc/QY2N-Y3ML]. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Matthew Haag, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Is Hired by an Ohio Police Department, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/timothy-loehmann 
-tamir-rice-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/V379-SDT2]. Loehmann ended up withdraw-
ing his application, however, before commencing work. Amir Vera, Officer Who Shot Tamir 
Rice Withdraws Application to Small Police Department in Ohio, CNN (Oct. 13, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/13/us/tamir-rice-officer-application/index.html [https://
perma.cc/TST3-BHKS]. He continues to contest Cleveland’s decision to terminate him. Jane 
Morice, Appeal Filed on Behalf of Cleveland Police Union to Overturn Firing of Timothy Loehmann, 
Ex-Cleveland Cop Who Fatally Shot Tamir Rice, CLEVELAND (Mar. 3, 2019), https:// 
www.cleveland.com/crime/2019/03/appeal-filed-on-behalf-of-cleveland-police-union-to 
-overturn-firing-of-timothy-loehmann-ex-cleveland-cop-who-fatally-shot-tamir-rice.html 
[https://perma.cc/U9FC-8KKW]. 
5. The following facts are drawn from NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND CORRUP-
TION IN A SMALL TEXAS TOWN (2005); and Vanita Gupta, Critical Race Lawyering in Tulia, 
Texas, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2055 (2005). 
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Under pressure from the media and postconviction litigation, Coleman’s 
cases later began to crumble. Coleman, it turns out, had never recorded his buys, 
nor were there any witnesses; most of the time, there was no corroboration of 
any sort. No drugs, money, or weapons had been seized during the raid. Cole-
man’s written reports were vague. He misidentified suspects, some of whom had 
rock-solid alibis. And marijuana and crack, not powder cocaine, were the preva-
lent vices in Tulia’s impoverished black community. By 2003, Coleman’s credi-
bility was shredded. He was indicted for perjury. Seeing the writing on the wall, 
the prosecutors eventually joined the trial judge in recommending that the con-
victions be vacated. In August 2003, the governor pardoned the Tulia defend-
ants. 
Much of what brought Coleman down stemmed from what the New York 
Times called his “wretched work history.”
6
 His first job was at a jail in the City 
of Pecos,
7
 where he was “lazy and inattentive at work and in constant danger of 
being fired.”
8
 He “abruptly quit” and left the state, only to return and find work 
as a deputy at the nearby Pecos County Sheriff’s Office.
9
 After five years there, 
Coleman again “abruptly left town . . . owing thousands of dollars in delinquent 
bills.”
10
 After a “brief stint as a jailer” in Denton County, Coleman became a 
sheriff’s deputy in Cochran County.
11
 He lasted about two years there, skipping 
town after the county attorney witnessed him stealing gas from the county 
pumps.
12
 He owed thousands of dollars to local businesses.
13
 The Cochran 
County Sheriff sent an angry letter about Coleman to the State. “Coleman 
should not be in law enforcement,” the sheriff wrote, “if he is going to do people 
the way he did this town.”
14
 
At this point, Coleman managed to join the regional task force that sent him 
to Tulia. The task force hired Coleman despite a background check revealing that 
he “was a discipline problem, that he was ‘too gung ho,’ that he had been accused 
of kidnapping his son in a custody battle, . . . and . . . that he had . . . ‘possible 
 
6. Bob Herbert, Kafka in Tulia, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07
/29/opinion/kafka-in-tulia.html [https://perma.cc/DDD2-R24X]. 
7. Nate Blakeslee, The Color of Justice, TEX. OBSERVER (June 23, 2000), https:// 
www.texasobserver.org/611-the-color-of-justice [https://perma.cc/65FX-LNVB]. 
8. BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 97. 
9. Id. 
10. Blakeslee, supra note 7. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.; see BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 85. 
13. BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 86. 
14. Blakeslee, supra note 7. 
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mental problems.’”
15
 During Coleman’s tenure with the task force, Cochran 
County indicted him for stealing the gas and notified Swisher County, where 
Tulia sits.
16
 The Swisher County Sheriff’s Office arrested Coleman—during the 
undercover operation—but he never faced trial and the charges were dropped.
17
 
Even after leaving Tulia, Coleman continued to bounce around. In the eighteen 
months after departing, Coleman worked for three different task forces. He was 
fired from the third, in Waxahachie, for sleeping with a sex worker who was an 
informant for his then-employer.
18
 
Coleman is the archetypal “wandering officer,” or what those in policing cir-
cles have called a “gypsy cop.” These are police officers who are fired or who 
resign under threat of termination and later find work in law enforcement else-
where.
19
 And although Coleman and Loehmann are prime examples, there are 
scores of others. Indeed, as the following examples show, wandering officers ap-
pear all over. 
 While William Melendez was working for the Detroit Police Depart-
ment in 1997, local prosecutors alleged that he had leveled false accusa-
tions of drug possession. The federal government later indicted him for 
planting evidence, filing bogus reports, and perjury (he was acquitted). 
Melendez was forced out of the department in 2007 after his license 
lapsed. Two other Michigan municipalities—Highland Park and then 
Inkster—put Melendez back on the street. In 2015, while in Inkster, 
Melendez brutally beat a motorist about the head, leading to a $1.4 mil-
lion civil settlement and two criminal convictions.
20
 
 While working for the St. Louis Police Department in 2006, Eddie Boyd 
III pistol-whipped a twelve-year-old girl; a year later, he struck another 
child in the face with his gun or handcuffs before falsifying a report. 
 
15. BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 329 (quoting Pecos County Chief Deputy Sheriff Cliff Harris). 
16. Id. at 86-87; Gupta, supra note 5, at 2061. 
17. BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 87. 
18. Id. at 233. 
19. See, e.g., TOM BARKER, POLICE ETHICS: CRISIS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 56 (3d ed. 2011); Gordon 
Dill, South Carolina Police Shortage Means Employment for “Gypsy” Officers, 7NEWS (Feb. 11, 
2016, 11:00 PM), https://www.wspa.com/news/south-carolina-police-shortage-means 
-employment-for-gypsy-officers/1018404454 [https://perma.cc/KT8S-VP72] (“A gypsy 
cop! That’s been termed an officer that will jump from agency to agency. They have maybe 
10 agencies under their belt within a 5 year period.” (quoting Florence McCants, South Car-
olina Criminal Justice Academy)). 
20. Jim Schaefer & Gina Kaufman, How Problem Cops Stay on Michigan’s Streets, DET. FREE PRESS 
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/07/09/how 
-problem-cops-stay-street/414813001 [https://perma.cc/6CRU-6HUB]. 
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Shortly after he resigned his position with St. Louis, Boyd was hired in 
St. Ann, Missouri, and later, again, in Ferguson.
21
 
 Nicholas Hogan, an officer with the Tukwila Police Department in 
Washington, pepper-sprayed a suspect who was restrained on a gurney 
in a hospital in 2011. Hogan was federally indicted for the act and 
Tukwila fired him. In 2012, the police department in nearby Snoqualmie 
hired him only to fire him later for having an affair with the wife of a 
fellow officer. He was also subsequently incarcerated for the pepper-
spray incident.
22
 
 New Orleans Police Department officer Carey Dykes was “sued for al-
leged brutality, accused of having sex with a prostitute while on duty 
and caught sleeping in his patrol car instead of responding to a shoot-
ing.”
23
 An internal affairs investigation found seventeen violations of de-
partment rules. New Orleans fired Dykes in 2001. Later the same year, 
Dykes found police work at the Delgado Community College in New 
Orleans and then the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office.
24
 
Additional examples abound, each as shocking as the last.
25
 Yet the scope and 
nature of the wandering-officer phenomenon are difficult to pin down. Some 
 
21. Timothy Williams, Cast-Out Police Officers Are Often Hired in Other Cities, N.Y. TIMES  
(Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/whereabouts-of-cast-out-police 
-officers-other-cities-often-hire-them.html [https://perma.cc/3DP8-WP6M]. 
22. Mike Carter, Jail Time for Ex-Tukwila Cop Who Pepper-Sprayed Handcuffed Man in Hospital, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/ex 
-tukwila-cop-sentenced-to-9-months-for-pepper-spraying-handcuffed-man-in-hospital 
[https://perma.cc/G6WV-Z26R]. 
23. Kimbriell Kelly et al., Forced Out over Sex, Drugs and Other Infractions, Fired Officers Find Work 
in Other Departments, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/investigations/forced-out-over-sex-drugs-or-child-abuse-fired-officers-find-work-in 
-other-departments/2017/12/22/e0512774-d3a7-11e7-95bf-df7c19270879_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/MCX4-8EXK]. 
24. Id. 
25. See, e.g., Anthony Cormier & Matthew Doig, Embattled Officers Land on Their Feet, HERALD-
TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.) (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20111208/special
-report-embattled-officers-land-on-their-feet [https://perma.cc/KF6X-CTTG]; Anthony L. 
Fisher, Why It’s So Hard to Stop Bad Cops from Getting New Police Jobs, REASON (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://reason.com/archives/2016/09/30/why-its-so-hard-to-stop-bad-cops-from-ge 
[https://perma.cc/MW5C-HFH6]; Jose Gaspar, McFarland’s Hiring of Four Police Officers 
Raises Questions, CALIFORNIAN (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.bakersfield.com/news/jose 
-gaspar-mcfarland-s-hiring-of-four-police-officers-raises/article_9dfdf646-d669-5618-a3c7
-85ff0eeedb4e.html [https://perma.cc/6CFQ-NDCE]; Gary A. Harki, Still in Uniform: Prob-
lem Police Rarely Lose Certification in West Virginia, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, W. 
Va.), Dec. 27, 2009, at A1; David Kroman, “Disqualifying Conduct” Rarely an Obstacle for Fired 
Police to Get Rehired, CROSSCUT (Apr. 5, 2016), https://crosscut.com/2016/04/fired-officers 
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experts, from their own experience, or from anecdotes like these, insist that wan-
dering officers are legion
26
—and possibly increasingly so.
27
 Others deny that 
wandering officers exist
28
 or discern an exaggerated narrative cobbled together 
 
-can-become-hired-officers [https://perma.cc/W5D2-MVK7]; Matt Lait, Convicted Cop 
Hired as Police Chief, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/02 
/local/me-maywood2 [https://perma.cc/KQA8-ZTGV]; Nomaan Merchant et al., Broken 
System Lets Problem Officers Jump from Job to Job, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 3, 2015), https:// 
www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-police-officer-sexual-misconduct 
-investigation-20151103-story.html [https://perma.cc/B2D8-7HD9]; Christopher N. Osher, 
Colorado Laws Allow Rogue Officers to Stay in Law Enforcement, DENV. POST (July 11, 2015), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2015/07/11/colorado-laws-allow-rogue-officers-to-stay-in 
-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/3NQM-SMEM]; Push to Keep “Gypsy Cops” with Ques-
tionable Pasts Off the Streets, CBS NEWS (Sept. 27, 2016, 6:46 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/gypsy-cops-with-questionable-pasts-hired-by-different-departments-lack-of 
-oversight-police [https://perma.cc/UC8N-UPT6]; Casey Toner & Jared Rutecki, The Re-
volving Door: Troubled Officers Get Frequent Career Chances, WBEZ (Jan. 8, 2018), http:// 
interactive.wbez.org/taking-cover/revolving-door [https://perma.cc/4QDT-4MX6]; Steven 
Yoder, How to Keep Bad Cops on the Beat, AM. PROSPECT (July 11, 2013), http://prospect.org
/article/how-keep-bad-cops-beat [https://perma.cc/96XR-DQ5T]. 
26. See, e.g., BLAKESLEE, supra note 5, at 206 (“Everybody’s talking about Tom Coleman—well, 
there are whole task forces of Tom Colemans out there.” (quoting Barbara Markham, former 
narcotics task force officer)); Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Cer-
tification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541, 545 (2001) (“Even 
when [unfit officers] are terminated, these officers often go to work for other departments 
within the state.”); Martha L. Shockey-Eckles, Police Culture and the Perpetuation of the Officer 
Shuffle: The Paradox of Life Behind ‘The Blue Wall’, 35 HUMANITY & SOC’Y 290, 300 (2011) (“In 
urban areas such as St. Louis, the officer who resigns rather than face licensure revocation 
typically finds employment in a neighboring municipality with relative ease.”); Richard Ab-
shire, Sheriff: Cases Show Staffers Not Above Law—Kaufman: He Faults Agencies That Let Officers 
Become “Gypsy Cops,” DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007, at 11B (“Sheriff Byrnes said too 
many law enforcement agencies have quietly dismissed problem officers and not prosecuted 
them for criminal conduct, enabling so called ‘gypsy cops’ to go from agency to agency, often 
taking trouble with them.”); Dill, supra note 19 (“It happens every day. It’s happened here. It 
happens everywhere.” (quoting Pacolet, South Carolina Police Chief Raymond Webb));  
Candice Norwood, Can States Tackle Police Misconduct with Certification Systems?, ATLANTIC  
(Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/police-misconduct 
-decertification/522246 [https://perma.cc/F8DF-X9YJ] (“There are many cases around the 
country where officers leave their departments because of misconduct and then they are re-
hired—sometimes knowingly, sometimes not—by other departments.” (quoting Professor 
Roger Goldman)). 
27. See, e.g., Schaefer & Kaufman, supra note 20 (describing former executive director of the Mich-
igan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards as conceding that the wandering-officer 
phenomenon is “a concern, and could be getting worse because of widespread cuts to police 
pay and benefits in recent years”). 
28. See, e.g., Sarah Childress, How States Are Moving to Police Bad Cops, FRONTLINE (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-states-are-moving-to-police-bad-cops 
[https://perma.cc/Q4CH-GBKD] (“Skeptics of certification . . . argue that no police chief or 
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from cherry-picked anecdotes that distort broader realities.
29
 When the rhetoric 
is swept away, “[i]t is unclear how far-reaching such problems may be.”
30
 As 
policing expert Samuel Walker has remarked: “It is believed to be a problem 
nationwide. The phrase ‘gypsy cops’ has come up. There’s not any solid research 
on that. We don’t know how common it is.”
31
 
The answer matters. If wandering officers are rampant and dangerous, iden-
tifying and stopping them should be a police-reform priority—especially be-
cause, by their nature, they touch new communities with each move. And 
“[p]oor communities,” writes Monica Bell, “are more likely to hire ‘gypsy 
cops’ . . . because their resource constraints make it more difficult for them to 
discriminate between good and bad officers.”
32
 The answer also matters because, 
for many individuals, policing represents—indeed, embodies—“the law.”
33
 Law-
enforcement officers interact with tens of millions of American residents each 
year,
34
 many of whom have little other contact with the state.
35
 And “[t]he be-
 
sheriff would hire an officer with a tarnished record . . . .”); Heather Goldin, Bill Seeks Licens-
ing for Massachusetts Police Officers, SENTINEL & ENTERPRISE (July 11, 2019), https:// 
www.sentinelandenterprise.com/2016/03/31/bill-seeks-licensing-for-mass-police-officers 
[https://perma.cc/J7Q9-D4SC]; id. (“It’s not possible for an officer [fired for misconduct] 
to get another job in civil service.” (quoting Ray McGrath, Legislative Director, International 
Brotherhood of Police Officers)); Yoder, supra note 25 (“[California] doesn’t need to cancel 
certificates . . . because its training program and standards for entering the profession are 
among the best in the country—rogue officers are kept out of the force from the get-go.”). 
29. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 25 (“Police representatives maintain that these anecdotes are cherry 
picked. [The International Brotherhood of Police Officers’ legislative director] says those who 
support a national database [of officer decertifications] ‘use these wild examples’ of ‘some-
what outlandish’ cases ‘that happened years ago.’”). 
30. Williams, supra note 21. 
31. Harki, supra note 25; see Schaefer & Kaufman, supra note 20 (citing former executive director 
of the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards as saying that the Commission 
“does not know how many problem cops there are in Michigan, let alone how many jump 
from job to job”). 
32. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 
2137 (2017). 
33. Montré D. Carodine, “Street Cred,” 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1583, 1593 (2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
34. See Elizabeth Davis et al., Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2015, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 
(Oct. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P4A 
-4XFU]. 
35. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION 
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 131 (2002). 
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havior of individual police officers” in these encounters “communicates infor-
mation to members of the public that they use to make judgments about the 
nature of legal authority within their society.”
36
 
If wandering officers are just scapegoats, however, they may distract from 
other, more pressing problems in policing. After all, just because some wander-
ing officers commit misconduct does not mean that, ex ante, they were any more 
likely to do so than their peers. Plenty of officers who have never been fired end 
up breaking the rules. In some other labor settings, experts have recognized that 
past experience does not predict future performance. “Malpractice claims against 
physicians,” for example, “are simply too stochastic to lend them much credence 
as an indicator of physician quality or risk.”
37
 
This Article brings much-needed data to the debate. It presents the first 
large-scale empirical investigation of the wandering-officer phenomenon and 
possibly the largest quantitative study of police misconduct of any kind.
38
 We 
conduct our analysis using a novel data set that begins with employment records 
of all 98,000 full-time law-enforcement officers employed in the State of Florida, 
covering nearly five hundred agencies, over a thirty-year period. Crucially, our 
data permits us to distinguish between officers who separated from their agen-
cies voluntarily and those who separated because they were fired. And for nearly 
two decades, it also identifies officers who resigned while under investigation. 
Although we cannot know precisely why all of these officers were pushed out—
 
36. Id. at 130. Tyler and Huo’s work “suggest[s] that personal experiences generalize to shape 
broader views about the law and legal institutions,” id. at 135, as well as one’s “status in the 
democratic community,” Vesla M. Weaver, The Only Government I Know: How the Criminal 
Justice System Degrades Democratic Citizenship, BOS. REV. (June 10, 2014), http:// 
bostonreview.net/us/vesla-m-weaver-citizenship-custodial-state-incarceration [https://
perma.cc/3FR3-XFNZ]; see also Bell, supra note 32, at 2067 (explaining how current policing 
regimes “can operate to effectively banish whole communities from the body politic”); Tom 
R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal 
Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 757 (2014) (asserting that “personal experiences 
with the police . . . are [a] key determinant of legal socialization,” which is “the developmental 
process by which individuals internalize the norms of the law”). Experiences with the police 
“are translated into common stories about who is an equal member of a rule-governed society 
and who is subjected to arbitrary surveillance and inquiry.” CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED 
OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 2 (2014). 
37. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for 
Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1616 (2002) (citing FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSUR-
ING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 176-78 (1991)). 
38. In a previous study, touted as “perhaps the largest study of police misconduct ever conducted 
in the United States,” Robert Kane and Michael White analyzed the careers of roughly 1,500 
New York City officers (plus a 1,500-officer comparison group) across a twenty-year period. 
See ROBERT J. KANE & MICHAEL D. WHITE, JAMMED UP: BAD COPS, POLICE MISCONDUCT, AND 
THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 3-5 (2013). As we explain, our study covers more 
officers, more jurisdictions, and more years than does the Kane and White study. 
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something that can be difficult to ascertain, even with access to an agency’s per-
sonnel records—we do have a general indication, such as whether the firing re-
lated to performance, training, or misconduct. The employment records also 
contain demographic information about each officer—such as age, race, sex, and 
education—enabling us to describe the wandering officer in detail. 
We report three principal findings. First, wandering officers—defined as of-
ficers who have been fired from a position in law enforcement or corrections be-
fore landing a law-enforcement job at another agency—are fairly common in ab-
solute terms. In any given year, roughly 1,100 full-time law-enforcement officers 
who had been previously fired were working for other Florida agencies. And for 
reasons we explain, we suspect that this is a low-end estimate, both for Florida 
and for what it implies about other jurisdictions. At the same time, when viewed 
in relative terms, the number appears more modest: no more than 3% of officers 
employed in a given year in Florida during the study period were wanderers. 
Second, assuming that many fired officers are seeking new law-enforcement 
work and are willing to move to another agency, they seem to face difficulty find-
ing employment. Officers who were fired from their immediately preceding job 
subsequently obtain work in Florida law enforcement at half the rate of officers 
who separate voluntarily, and the discrepancy is growing over time. Fired offic-
ers also take much longer to start another job and typically move to smaller agen-
cies with fewer resources in communities with slightly higher proportions of res-
idents of color. Interestingly, most of these discrepancies disappear for officers 
who were fired earlier in their career rather than from their immediately preced-
ing job. We hypothesize that agencies view these officers as having redeemed 
themselves. 
Third, wandering officers are far more likely—than both rookies and veter-
ans who have never been fired—to be fired from their next job. They are also 
more likely to receive complaints at the state licensing board for “moral character 
violations,”
39
 including complaints for violent or sexual misconduct and for in-
tegrity-related misdeeds. We cannot fully rule out the possibility that these ele-
vated risks are due to the characteristics of the agencies that hire wandering of-
ficers or to enhanced monitoring or discipline of these officers. Perhaps some 
agencies even hire wandering officers on a de facto “probationary” basis, intend-
ing simply to terminate them if problems arise. For reasons we discuss, however, 
we are doubtful that these are the principal explanations for our results. 
We also explore whether certain officer or agency characteristics—such as 
officer age or education or agency hiring and training requirements—predict 
 
39. As we describe in more detail below, “moral character violations” can include committing any 
felony or certain enumerated misdemeanors (regardless of criminal prosecution) or commit-
ting other specified acts such as using excessive force or making false statements in a court 
proceeding. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011(4) (2019). 
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which wandering officers are most likely to fail. The idea is that agencies might 
manage risk by screening for certain officer characteristics or adopting more 
stringent hiring or training requirements in the event that, for whatever reason, 
they choose to hire a wandering officer. Unfortunately, we find little reason for 
optimism on this front, although agencies may have information about officer 
or agency characteristics that is more predictive than what we can observe here. 
These findings present a puzzle: if wandering officers are so risky, why do 
agencies hire them? Our data do not permit us to isolate a single causal mecha-
nism, and the reality is that several are probably at play. First, agencies may hire 
wandering officers because they fail to identify them as such, either due to inad-
equate background checks or candidates’ deliberate concealment of their disci-
plinary history.
40
 The favored solution seems to be improving the existing na-
tional decertification database. This database records decisions by state agencies 
to “decertify” officers, which prevent them from working elsewhere in the same 
state. Coverage, however, is spotty. Likewise, in 2015, the President’s Task Force 
on
 
21st Century Policing recommended expanding the existing database into a 
comprehensive national register to address the problem of officers who are fired 
and decertified in one state and then move to another state and land a job in law 
enforcement there.
41
 We discuss the importance, but also the substantial limita-
tions, of the national decertification database as a tool to stop wandering officers, 
and we suggest potential improvements. 
Second, agencies might know they are hiring a wandering officer but be un-
aware that such officers are, in general, risky hires. Some agencies might, for 
example, think an officer who has been fired will be more conscientious than oth-
ers, if firing acts as a deterrent sanction. As one official put it, “You think it’s a 
second chance so they’ll try hard, which is what they’re telling you.”
42
 Moreover, 
most agencies probably hire too few wandering officers to notice that, as our data 
 
40. See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 549 (describing two officers hired by the West 
Palm Beach Police Department despite serious, undiscovered problems at their previous po-
lice departments); Ian Cohen, Questionable Hires, Low Morale Plague Palm Beach Police, PALM 
BEACH DAILY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20190322 
/exclusive-questionable-hires-low-morale-plague-palm-beach-police [https://perma.cc
/MK5P-USD6] (reporting that the Palm Beach Police Department “ignored or missed red 
flags in the applications of its officers, some of whom had applied [to] and were rejected with 
cause from multiple agencies before being accepted by Palm Beach”). 
41. See Final Report, PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 29-30 (2015), https://
cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SPA-DQT3] 
(quoting National Decertification Index—FAQs, INT’L ASS’N DIRECTORS L. ENFORCEMENT 
STANDARDS & TRAINING, https://www.iadlest.org/Portals/0/Files/NDI/FAQ/ndi_faq.html 
[https://perma.cc/5EAH-QAUQ]). 
42. Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (quoting Lieutenant David Hubbard of the Eustis, Florida 
Police Department). 
the wandering officer 
1689 
suggest, their actual pattern of behavior seems to cut the other way. In light of 
our new evidence, law-enforcement agencies should be cautious about hiring 
wandering officers. And agencies that do hire them might invest in enhanced 
monitoring and support or, alternatively, adopt recidivist penalties designed to 
deter misconduct in this high-risk population. 
Third, agencies may know that wandering officers are risky hires but lack 
any better alternatives—that is, the wandering officers they hire may be less risky 
than the alternative candidates. Consistent with our finding that wandering of-
ficers tend to move to agencies with fewer resources, cash-strapped agencies—
and particularly those in undesirable locations—may be unable to offer compen-
sation competitive enough to attract candidates of higher quality than the wan-
dering officers they hire. In that case, and assuming officers must be hired at all, 
the solution may be to improve the pool of candidates by raising salaries or re-
ducing barriers to entry. Certainly, if law-enforcement agencies were sophisti-
cated, for-profit entities that internalized the costs of bad hiring decisions, this 
story would be compelling. As we discuss in a moment, however, there are rea-
sons to think that agencies do not internalize these costs. 
Ideally, to test this third hypothesis, we would compare each wandering of-
ficer who was hired with the “marginal officer”—the officer the agency would 
have hired had it decided not to hire the wanderer. Unfortunately, we are unable 
to identify the actual marginal officer with our data. We make progress on this 
problem by isolating, for each wandering officer, a plausible candidate cohort—
a group of officers who were hired around the same time by nearby agencies with 
similar budgetary resources. We find that wandering officers are still riskier than 
this narrower comparator group, providing some evidence that this third hy-
pothesis is, at best, a partial explanation. 
Fourth, agencies may know that wandering officers are risky but hire them 
because of the unique benefits they are perceived to bring. Some agencies, for 
example, may actually seek out “cowboy” veteran officers to work the toughest 
beats. Given the “band of brothers” ethos that pervades American policing, some 
law-enforcement leaders, too, may feel a “warm glow” upon hiring officers who 
have been cast out by other agencies.
43
 This may explain the seemingly cavalier 
attitudes police chiefs sometimes express toward hiring officers who have been 
fired before. “We believe in redemption,” explained one police chief.
44
 “This 
 
43. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 453, 454 (2004) (describing how, “[i]n the face of outside criticism, cops tend to circle 
the wagons, adopting a ‘code of silence,’ protecting each other, and defending each other’s 
actions”). 
44. Schaefer & Kaufman, supra note 20 (quoting Police Chief Chester Logan of Highland Park, 
Michigan). 
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stuff is supposed to follow you forever?” another wondered. “For the rest of your 
career? Of course I’m going to give somebody a second chance.”
45
 Relatedly, 
agencies might hire wandering officers who are riskier than the alternatives if the 
cost is lower. Given that they typically have little if any discretion over salaries, 
it is unlikely that police administrators hire wandering officers because they are 
willing to accept lower salaries than similarly experienced candidates who have 
never been fired.
46
 But wandering officers may be cheaper than fresh recruits, as 
most Florida agencies pay police-academy tuition when they onboard rookie 
hires. Compared to rookies, wandering officers are able to hit the streets more 
quickly, too. 
Finally, agencies may externalize, and thus discount, the costs of hiring wan-
dering officers. Although agencies nearly always indemnify officers against fi-
nancial liability, the officers themselves enjoy qualified immunity, which, in 
practice, protects the agencies as well.
47
 Direct municipal liability for negligent 
hiring, moreover, is rare.
48
 And even when municipalities do end up paying for 
harms wandering officers have caused, whether agencies internalize those costs 
depends on the institutional and budgetary niceties of municipal governance.
49
 
If cost externalization contributes to the hiring of wandering officers, and we 
suspect it does, the appropriate response is to improve existing mechanisms of 
accountability. This is in some sense the central challenge of all civil-rights lia-
bility regimes, however; many have tried and failed to accomplish it. Barring 
successful accountability reforms, and if future research corroborates our find-
ings, states could consider following Connecticut and banning local agencies 
from hiring wandering officers altogether. 
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the law-
enforcement labor market. Part II reviews the pertinent literature. Part III de-
scribes our data in detail. Part IV presents our findings about the wandering of-
 
45. Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (quoting Police Chief Roberto Fulgueira of Sweetwater, Flor-
ida). 
46. See infra Section VI.D. 
47. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 
104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1519-24 (2016). 
48. See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT LAW AND LITIGATION § 4:16 (3d ed. 2016) 
(describing just how difficult it is for plaintiffs to make out a claim for municipal liability 
based on bad hiring). 
49. In some jurisdictions, for example, payments come from the general treasury and the agency 
is never held accountable. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, 
and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1148 (2016). 
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ficer. Part V examines whether we can predict which wandering officers are like-
liest to fail. Part VI considers potential causal mechanisms for the wandering-
officer phenomenon and corresponding reforms. 
i .  the law-enforcement labor market 
Every year, over fifteen thousand individual law-enforcement agencies, 
spread across fifty states, hire thousands of officers.
50
 Because of this segmenta-
tion, it is challenging to offer a comprehensive description of the law-enforce-
ment labor market or the features of the system that influence whether a local 
agency hires a wandering officer. In this Part, however, we sketch out general 
patterns in the labor market across the states and offer details on Florida—the 
site of the current study—as an illustrative example. 
A. Hiring 
The vast majority of law-enforcement officers work for county or municipal 
agencies; a small number work directly for the state.
51
 In nearly every state, to 
become a law-enforcement officer at any level, an applicant must first obtain cer-
tification—essentially an occupational license—from a state-level licensing en-
tity.
52
 In most states, this body is called the Peace Officer Standards and Training 
(POST) Board.
53
 Certification procedures vary widely from state to state.
54
 
In Florida, the certifying entity is the Criminal Justice Standards and Train-
ing Commission (CJSTC), which is part of the Florida Department of Law En-
forcement (FDLE).
55
 To obtain certification in the state, candidates must clear a 
 
50. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LOCAL POLICE DE-
PARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 2 tbl.1 (2015). 
51. Id. 
52. See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, POST AGENCY CERTIFICATION PRACTICES, 2015, at 1 (2016) (re-
porting that Hawaii does not have a POST board and the District of Columbia’s POST board 
does not certify officers). On July 10, 2018, Hawaii enacted legislation to create a POST board, 
which was scheduled to finalize its standards and certification process by July 1, 2019. See 2018 
Haw. Sess. Laws 741. 
53. See Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to Traditional Rem-
edies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45, 47-48 (1987). 
54. See Roger Goldman, Importance of State Law in Police Reform, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 363, 381 
(2016); Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 550-52. 
55. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.11, 943.12(3) (2019). 
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basic abilities test, graduate the police academy, and then pass a written certifi-
cation examination.
56
 They must also meet certain minimum qualifications re-
garding age, citizenship, and education.
57
 Once certified, officers must undergo 
continuing training and education to maintain their certification.
58
 
State law generally regulates the process by which agencies hire officers. In 
Florida, local agencies must conduct a background investigation and gather doc-
umentation to prove compliance with the statewide minimum qualifications.
59
 
State law specifies that background investigations “should include information 
setting forth the facts and reasons for any of the applicant’s previous separations 
from private or public employment or appointment, as the applicant under-
stands them.”
60
 Implementing regulations require that local agencies “ver-
ify . . . [p]rior criminal justice employments of the applicant and the facts and 
reasons for any prior separations of employment”
61
 by “[o]btain[ing] previous 
employment data from prior employers.”
62
 Local agencies are expected to con-
tact CJSTC to confirm prior employment and discipline.
63
 
As part of the background investigation in Florida, the hiring agency must 
confirm that the candidate has “good moral character.”
64
 Under Florida regula-
tions, moral-character violations can include committing any felony or certain 
misdemeanors (regardless of criminal prosecution), using excessive force, mis-
using an official position to secure a privilege or benefit, participating in sexual 
conduct while on duty, engaging in sexual harassment, making false statements 
during the job application process, subverting training and testing processes, 
and making false statements in a court proceeding.
65
 Regulations also provide 
that CJSTC is available to assist local agencies in examining moral character: 
 
56. Id. § 943.13(9)-(10); id. § 943.1397 (certification examination); id. § 943.14 (police academy); 
id. § 943.17 (basic abilities test). 
57. Id. § 943.13. 
58. Id. §§ 943.13(11), 943.135. 
59. Id. § 943.133(1)-(3); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.002(3) (2019) (documentation); id. r. 
11B-27.0022 (background investigation). 
60. FLA. STAT. § 943.133(3). 
61. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0022(1)(a). 
62. Id. r. 11B-27.0022(2)(a). 
63. See Employment Background Investigative Report, No. CJSTC-77, https://www.fdle
.state.fl.us/CJSTC/Documents/Rules-Forms/WordDoc/CJSTC-077-3-2013-7-2-13TR.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/LG7J-V2XE], cited in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.002(3)(a)(2). 
64. See FLA. STAT. § 943.13(7); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0022(1)(d); see also id. r. 11B-
27.0011(1). 
65. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011(4). 
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upon request, the CJSTC “shall evaluate the qualification of an applicant to de-
termine compliance with ‘good moral character’ pursuant to this rule section.”
66
 
The CJSTC’s assistance focuses on the applicant’s criminal history, especially 
out-of-state or federal court records.
67
 
Within the constraints set forth by state law, local agencies have fairly broad 
discretion over hiring. Such discretion is not absolute, however, as it is often 
subject to civil service requirements and sometimes to provisions of a collective-
bargaining agreement with a police officers’ union.
68
 To facilitate the hiring pro-
cess, most agencies designate certain hiring prerequisites, such as a minimum 
age or education level, and a set of screening exams, such as a physical fitness or 
driving test or a polygraph examination.
69
 Only candidates who satisfy the pre-
requisites and pass the exams are eligible to be hired. Local agencies may aug-
ment, but not diminish, state-law hiring prerequisites.
70
 The same is true for 
continuing education and training.
71
 
B. Discipline 
Each local agency also administers its own disciplinary process for officers 
who commit crimes or violate agency policy. As with hiring, the agency’s author-
ity over discipline may be circumscribed by civil-service laws or provisions of a 
collective-bargaining agreement. Collective-bargaining agreements frequently 
provide for arbitration of disciplinary decisions, including termination. Arbitra-
tors commonly order agencies to reinstate terminated officers.
72
 
 
66. Id. r. 11B-27.0011(3). 
67. Email from Terry Baker, Training & Research Manager, Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf’t, to John Rap-
paport (Aug. 7, 2018, 7:41 AM CDT) (on file with John Rappaport). 
68. See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA 115-21, 134 (9th ed. 2017). 
69. See id. at 135-39, 141-42. 
70. FLA. STAT. § 943.137 (2019). Florida law, for example, requires officers to be at least nineteen 
years old, id. § 943.13(1), but a local agency is free to raise the minimum age to twenty-one. 
71. Id. § 943.135. 
72. See Mark Iris, Unbinding Binding Arbitration of Police Discipline: The Public Policy Exception, 1 
VA. J. CRIM. L. 540 (2013); Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545 
(2019); Kimbriell Kelly et al., Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often Forced to Put Officers  
Fired for Misconduct Back on the Streets, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired [https://
perma.cc/4EQZ-82AB]. 
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In forty-five states, the government entity responsible for certifying officers 
also has the power to decertify upon certain conditions.
73
 Officers who have been 
decertified are prohibited from working in law enforcement anywhere in the 
state. As with certification, the criteria for decertification vary widely among the 
states. All states with decertification authority, for example, can decertify for fel-
ony convictions, but only 61% can decertify for failure to meet training or qual-
ification requirements, 57% for general misconduct, 39% for termination for 
cause, and 11% for any misdemeanor conviction.
74
 Like most of its counterparts, 
the CJSTC in Florida has the authority to decertify Florida officers.
75
 Decertifi-
cation can happen when an officer has committed a felony or a misdemeanor 
involving dishonesty (again, regardless of criminal prosecution) or fails to main-
tain good moral character.
76
 Note that this standard, detailed above, covers only 
fairly egregious types of misconduct. 
The CJSTC learns about potentially disqualifying activity through several 
channels, but two are particularly important. First, local agencies are required to 
notify the CJSTC whenever an officer separates from employment, “setting forth 
in detail the facts and reasons for such separation.”
77
 Second, local agencies must 
conduct an internal investigation when they have cause to suspect that an officer 
has committed a disqualifying crime or moral character violation.
78
 If the 
agency’s suspicion is substantiated, the agency must notify the CJSTC.
79
 Florida 
is one of the more active states in decertifying officers even though the substan-
tive scope of its decertification authority is not the broadest.
80
 
 
73. See HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 1 (reporting that forty-four states allow decertification of of-
ficers). After Hickman wrote, in October 2016, the responsible agency in New York promul-
gated regulations permitting it to decertify officers. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, 
§ 6065.6 (2019). New Jersey does not have an agency that decertifies officers. Certain criminal 
convictions, however, can trigger “forfeiture of office” by court order, which can, in some 
cases, entail permanent disqualification from holding any public office. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:51-2 (West 2019); State v. Hupka, 1 A.3d 640, 645-46 (N.J. 2010). 
74. HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 2. These figures do not cover New York, which adopted decertifi-
cation regulations after the report was written. See supra note 73. 
75. FLA. STAT. § 943.12(3). 
76. Id. § 943.1395(6)-(7); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.0011 (2019). 
77. FLA. STAT. § 943.139(2); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.002(5). 
78. FLA. STAT. § 943.1395(5); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.003(1). 
79. FLA. STAT. § 943.1395(5); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 11B-27.003(2)(b). 
80. While Florida is sometimes identified as the second-highest state (after Georgia) by number 
of decertifications, see HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 2, that observation misses a few key points. 
First, Florida is the third-largest state by population and therefore has more officers than most 
other states. Second, most officers decertified in Florida are corrections officers, not the law-
enforcement officers on whom we focus here. In 2011, for example, Florida decertified 72 law-
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Given all of these regulations, how do wandering officers still manage to find 
work? For starters, local agencies do not always conduct thorough background 
investigations before hiring.
81
 Even when they do, past employers are not always 
forthcoming and sometimes conceal the real reasons for an officer’s separation. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that officers who commit misconduct are often al-
lowed to resign, with a guaranteed positive work reference, in exchange for for-
going legal action.
82
 Similarly, local agencies do not always notify their state 
POST boards about officer misconduct. Even setting aside cases in which local 
agencies disregard mandatory disclosure obligations,
83
 reporting to POST is 
wholly voluntary in most states.
84
 Agencies are reportedly reluctant to disclose 
negative employment information—either to other local agencies or state POST 
boards—for fear of being sued for defamation.
85
 Even more important, as men-
 
enforcement officers at a rate of 1.6 decertifications per 1,000 officers, which made it the nine-
teenth-most-frequent decertifier per officer in the country. See Loren T. Atherley & Matthew 
J. Hickman, Officer Decertification and the National Decertification Index, 16 POLICE Q. 420, 431-
32 tbl.1 (2013). Still, Florida does decertify officers more frequently than other big states such 
as California, Texas, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Illinois, and Ohio. For examples of states 
with apparently broader decertification authority than Florida, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-
3-35(3) (2019), which permits decertification for officers who “have been discharged from 
employment for cause” or “have engaged in conduct unbecoming of a law enforcement of-
ficer”; and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.85(3)(cm) (West 2019), which authorizes the POST board 
to “[d]ecertify law enforcement . . . officers who terminate employment or are terminated.” 
81. See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548; Cohen, supra note 40; Dewan & Oppel, supra 
note 1; Williams, supra note 21. 
82. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 54, at 382; Cara E. Rabe-Hemp & Jeremy Braithwaite, An Ex-
ploration of Recidivism and the Officer Shuffle in Police Sexual Violence, 16 POLICE Q. 127, 140 
(2012); Williams, supra note 21. In Florida, specifically, see Anthony Cormier & Matthew 
Doig, Police Agencies Undermine System, HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.) (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:04 
AM), http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20111211/special-report-police-agencies 
-undermine-system [https://perma.cc/7QFA-8QEC]. 
83. See Cormier & Doig, supra note 82. 
84. See HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 5. 
85. See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548; Steven Puro et al., Police Decertification: 
Changing Patterns Among the States, 1985-1995, 20 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & 
MGMT. 481, 492-94 (1997); see also J. Hoult Verkeke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference 
Practices, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 135 (1998) (“Providing such negative information creates a 
risk of defamation liability while offering few clear benefits to the referring employer. Indeed, 
the available empirical evidence suggests that former employers are less likely to reveal em-
ployee misconduct than any other information about the employee.”). Florida law attempts 
to ameliorate this and several of the other problems mentioned. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
§ 943.133(3) (2019) (requiring background checks); id. § 943.134(1)(b)-(2)(a) (requiring 
prior employers to disclose disciplinary history and reasons for separation); id. § 943.134(5) 
(providing immunity for disclosure of employment information to a subsequent hiring 
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tioned earlier, many states define the scope of POST-reportable conduct nar-
rowly—twenty states, for example, require a criminal conviction before an officer 
can be decertified.
86
 In other words, not all “police misconduct” must be re-
ported even in mandatory-reporting states. In addition, local agencies some-
times learn about prior misconduct and hire the officers anyway.
87
 
Officer mobility across state lines introduces yet another layer of complexity. 
A significant problem with state-by-state certification is that an officer decerti-
fied in one state can move across state lines and obtain certification, and then 
employment, in another. In an effort to address this problem, the International 
Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training con-
structed a national database called the National Decertification Index (NDI).
88
 
State POST boards are encouraged to enter their decertification decisions into 
the database. When a decertified officer attempts to find employment in another 
state, that state’s POST board—or, in some cases, the local hiring agency—can 
query the database and review the prior decertification record. 
Unfortunately, the NDI is far from watertight. As mentioned, five states plus 
the District of Columbia—which collectively employ a significant share of all 
law-enforcement officers nationwide—have no decertification authority.
89
 
Among the majority of states that do decertify officers, reporting to the NDI is 
voluntary.
90
 In 2011, only thirty states contributed to the database; by 2015, that 
number rose to thirty-eight.
91
 On the back end, only 375 local agencies have per-
mission to query the NDI directly when hiring. The rest must rely on their state 
POST boards, only twenty-eight of which say they “always” or “frequently” 
 
agency); id. § 943.139(4) (providing immunity for disclosure to CJSTC). It is unclear how 
effective these provisions are and, in any event, many states have no analogs. 
86. Fisher, supra note 25; Merchant et al., supra note 25. 
87. See HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 7 (stating that “four POSTs reported that law enforcement 
agencies in their state have hired individuals as officers who had been decertified in another 
state”). Consider Tom Coleman as well. 
88. See Raymond A. Franklin et al., 2009 Survey of POST Agencies Regarding Certification Practices, 
NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. 3-4 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij
/227927.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJT7-R6K6]. 
89. See Goldman, supra note 54, at 382; sources cited supra note 73. 
90. Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law Enforcement Officers’ Licenses and Federal Criminal 
Prosecution: An Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 121, 125 
(2003); Merchant et al., supra note 25. 
91. HICKMAN, supra note 52, at 6. 
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query the NDI.
92
 In 2009, Florida reported that it “occasionally” queries the na-
tional database.
93
 
The confluence of all these legal and institutional forces is thought to channel 
wandering officers toward small, understaffed, and resource-strapped agen-
cies.
94
 Budget constraints impede thorough background checks. They also make 
wandering officers, who may be prepared to settle for modest salaries and more 
limited opportunities for professional advancement, more appealing—especially 
where agencies must otherwise foot the bill to put rookie hires through the police 
academy. And experienced wandering officers who are already trained and certi-
fied can hit the streets immediately. 
 
92. Id. at 7. 
93. Franklin et al., supra note 88, at 41. 
94. For versions of this narrative, see, for example, Atherley & Hickman, supra note 80, at 421 
(“[D]ismissal isn’t always the final word on the matter. Officers may be rehired by another 
jurisdiction, in which case the new jurisdiction inherits another jurisdiction’s problem. This 
can be a conscious decision by the hiring agency, especially in small jurisdictions where finan-
cial resources are limited and lateral officers are simply scarce.” (citation omitted)); Bell, supra 
note 32, at 2137 (“[T]he prevalence of very small departments in close proximity to each other 
increases the likelihood that an officer fired from one jurisdiction for serious reasons could 
find work as an officer in another. Poor communities are more likely to hire ‘gypsy cops,’ 
officers with spotty work histories who have been fired elsewhere, because their resource con-
straints make it more difficult for them to discriminate between good and bad officers.”); 
Goldman, supra note 54, at 373, 381, which describes the pressures faced by small departments 
that lead them to hire previously terminated officers; Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548 
(“Although it might seem unusual for a police department to hire an officer with a past record 
of misconduct, the second department is usually located in a poor community that cannot 
afford to pay high salaries to its police.”); Shockey-Eckles, supra note 26, at 299 (“These mu-
nicipalities, although well known for high crime rates and excessive violence, typically offer 
low pay and few benefits to their officers. Hence, they are the very communities willing to 
hire gypsy cops when other departments with more resources are unwilling to do so.”); Chil-
dress, supra note 28, which notes that “some departments still hire [wandering] officers, par-
ticularly those that are smaller and strapped for cash”; Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (“Vet-
erans in trouble often find second chances by heading down the career ladder, to smaller police 
forces in need of experience.”); Dill, supra note 19, which describes efforts to remedy a state 
shortage of police officers “while trying to avoid problem officers who bounce from depart-
ment to department”; Toner & Rutecki, supra note 25, which reports that “poorer communi-
ties” in the Chicago suburbs “are also places where officers with troubled histories and records 
of multiple shootings are often employed”; Williams, supra note 21 (“[S]maller departments 
and those that lack sufficient funding or are understaffed are most likely to hire applicants 
with problematic pasts if they have completed state-mandated training, which allows depart-
ments to avoid the cost of sending them to the police academy.”); and Yoder, supra note 25 
(“Even if a background check turns up past rogue behavior, a small department may go ahead 
anyway. Such agencies usually are in poor communities that can’t afford high salaries.”). 
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i i .  l iterature review 
At least two academic literatures provide helpful background on the wander-
ing-officer phenomenon. First, a number of studies, mostly in criminology, have 
examined the correlates of police misconduct. Second, a large literature in labor 
economics describes the dynamics of labor markets, largely for professions and 
industries other than policing. We summarize each literature in turn. 
A. Correlates of Police Misconduct 
Empirical research directly examining law-enforcement hiring and separa-
tion has been fairly limited. Perhaps the most pertinent study concerns the New 
York City Police Department (NYPD), the nation’s largest law-enforcement 
agency. Criminologists Robert Kane and Michael White examined all involun-
tary separations in the NYPD between 1975 and 1996. They identified 1,543 of-
ficers who were separated for so-called “career-ending misconduct” during that 
period—roughly 2% of the 78,000 individuals the NYPD had employed.
95
 They 
then compared these officers with randomly selected members of their respective 
police academy classes.
96
 
Using multivariate analyses, Kane and White identified differences between 
the study and comparison groups that served as both risk and protective factors 
for misconduct. In particular, black officers were significantly more likely than 
white officers to be terminated for misconduct.
97
 Prior criminal history, docu-
mented problems in prior jobs, civilian complaints, and assignment to busy pa-
trols also significantly predicted misconduct.
98
 Officers with associate’s or bach-
elor’s degrees, in contrast, were less likely to be fired for misconduct, as were 
officers who were older when hired or who were married.
99
 Kane and White 
concluded that “police departments should continue to invest heavily in pre-em-
ployment screening processes that exclude people who have demonstrated rec-
ords of criminal involvement and employee disciplinary problems” and embrace 
 
95. KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 8. 
96. See id. at 3-5. 
97. More precisely, black officers were more likely to be fired for two out of three types of mis-
conduct. Initially, the same was also true for Hispanic and Asian officers, but over time, their 
separation rates converged with that for white officers. See id. at 99. 
98. See id. at 93-94, 104. 
99. See id. at 101-02. 
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“racial/ethnic diversity and post-secondary educational requirements.”
100
 In-
formative as it is, Kane and White’s study was set entirely within a single law-
enforcement agency and does not speak to the lateral movement of officers 
among agencies, our primary interest in this Article. 
Kane and White’s findings are largely consonant with the broader literature 
examining officer-level correlates of police misconduct. Some additional re-
search has also found, for example, that past misconduct predicts future prob-
lems.
101
 Unlike Kane and White’s study, much of the research focuses specifically 
on officer use of force. Studies find that younger officers tend to use force more 
often.
102
 So do less experienced officers,
103
 although that may be precisely be-
cause they are younger.
104
 Research on female officers is mixed. Studies have 
found that female officers use less force than male officers in arrest situations
105
 
and are less likely to shoot suspects
106
 but use similar levels of force in general 
citizen encounters.
107
 
 
100. Id. at 105. 
101. See, e.g., Samuel Carton et al., Identifying Police Officers at Risk of Adverse Events, 2016 PROC. 
22ND ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 67, 72 
(“[O]fficers who are routinely found to have been engaged in an adverse event are likely to 
engage in another such event in the future.”); James P. McElvain & Augustine J. Kposowa, 
Police Officer Characteristics and the Likelihood of Using Deadly Force, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
505, 517 (2008) (“[P]revious history of shootings was a very strong predictor of future shoot-
ings.”); Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations to 
Predict Police Misconduct, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 225, 227 (2019) (finding that past civil-
ian allegations predict future misconduct). 
102. See, e.g., JOEL H. GARNER & CHRISTOPHER D. MAXWELL, UNDERSTANDING THE PREVALENCE 
AND SEVERITY OF FORCE USED BY AND AGAINST THE POLICE (2002); Steven G. Brandl et al., 
Who Are the Complaint-Prone Officers? An Examination of the Relationship Between Police Officers’ 
Attributes, Arrest Activity, Assignment, and Citizens’ Complaints About Excessive Force, 29 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 521, 521 (2001); Christopher Chapman, Use of Force in Minority Communities Is Related 
to Police Education, Age, Experience, and Ethnicity, 13 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 421, 433 (2012). 
103. See, e.g., Eugene A. Paoline, III & William Terrill, Police Education, Experience, and the Use of 
Force, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 179, 193 (2007); William Terrill & Stephen D. Mastrofski, 
Situational and Officer-Based Determinants of Police Coercion, 19 JUST. Q. 215, 242-43 (2002). 
104. See Chapman, supra note 102, at 433 (finding that, controlling for age, less experienced officers 
use less force). 
105. See GARNER & MAXWELL, supra note 102; Amie M. Schuck & Cara Rabe-Hemp, Women Police: 
The Use of Force by and Against Female Officers, 16 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 91 (2007). 
106. See McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 101, at 515. 
107. See Eugene A. Paoline, III & William Terrill, Women Police Officers and the Use of Coercion, 15 
WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 97, 107-08 (2004) (“[B]oth males and females choose not to invoke 
their coercive authority rather similarly (i.e., 44% of the female encounters resulted in no co-
ercion versus 42% for males).”). 
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Education, too, has received sustained attention. Studies have found that of-
ficers with more education use less force
108
 and are subject to fewer disciplinary 
allegations and founded complaints.
109
 In tension with Kane and White’s rec-
ommendation, however, agency-level studies have not found that minimum ed-
ucation requirements reduce misconduct or use of force.
110
 One possible explana-
tion is that educational requirements shrink the pool of eligible candidates, 
excluding otherwise-promising individuals.
111
 
Empirical scholars have also closely examined the relationship between cer-
tain hiring requirements and police misconduct. Perhaps the largest body of re-
search examines the capacity of psychological exams to predict officer perfor-
mance and, in particular, to identify candidates likely to have disciplinary 
problems. Many studies find that personality profiles predict performance,
112
 
 
108. See, e.g., McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 101, at 518; Jason Rydberg & William Terrill, The 
Effect of Higher Education on Police Behavior, 13 POLICE Q. 92, 110 (2010); Terrill & Mastrofski, 
supra note 103, at 242, 244. But see Brandl et al., supra note 102, at 527 (“None of the analyses 
conducted here would lead one to believe that officers’ race or level of education played a role 
in the receipt of excessive use of force complaints.”). 
109. See, e.g., Victor E. Kappeler et al., Police Officer Higher Education, Citizen Complaints and De-
partmental Rule Violations, 11 AM. J. POLICE 37, 50 (1992) (“Although officers with college de-
grees had fewer citizen-initiated complaints and fewer founded complaints for rudeness, they 
did not have significantly fewer department-generated complaints for violations of agency 
rules and procedures.”); Kim Michelle Lersch & Linda L. Kunzman, Misconduct Allegations 
and Higher Education in a Southern Sheriff’s Department, 25 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 161, 166 (2001). 
But see Donald M. Truxillo et al., College Education and Police Job Performance: A Ten-Year Study, 
27 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 269, 269 (1998) (reporting that police officers’ education levels 
had “an inconsistent relationship with measures of disciplinary action”). 
110. See, e.g., David Eitle et al., The Effect of Organizational and Environmental Factors on Police Mis-
conduct, 17 POLICE Q. 103, 118 (2014) (finding that “neither field training nor educational 
standards had a statistically discernible association with” police misconduct); Dale W. Willits 
& Jeffrey S. Nowacki, Police Organisation and Deadly Force: An Examination of Variation Across 
Large and Small Cities, 24 POLICING & SOC’Y 63, 72 (2014) (reporting that college requirements 
and training hours do not have a statistically significant relationship to deadly force inci-
dents). 
111. See, e.g., Lisa Kay Decker & Robert G. Huckabee, Raising the Age and Education Requirements 
for Police Officers: Will Too Many Women and Minority Candidates Be Excluded?, 25 POLICING: 
INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 789, 799 (2002) (“Not surprisingly, raising the educa-
tional requirements for sworn police applicants to require a four-year college degree would 
eliminate a large number of the traditionally successful police applicants.”). 
112. See, e.g., Ryan M. Roberts et al., Predicting Postprobationary Job Performance of Police Officers 
Using CPI and MMPI-2-RF Test Data Obtained During Preemployment Psychological Screening, 
J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 544 (2019) (finding correlations between prehire psychological 
test results in California and Minnesota and supervisor ratings for police officers); Anthony 
M. Tarescavage et al., Criterion Validity and Practical Utility of the Minnesota Multiphasic Person-
ality Inventory–2–Restructured Form (MMPI–2–RF) in Assessments of Police Officer Candidates, 
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though a fair number reach the contrary conclusion.
113
 Numerous studies have 
also identified particular psychological profiles that predict whether someone 
will be a “problem officer.”
114
 As with educational requirements, however, there 
is little evidence that psychological exams improve agency-level outcomes such 
as civilian complaints or deaths.
115
 
The empirical evidence on the effects of training is particularly conflicted. 
Various studies have found that training is negatively,
116
 positively,
117
 or simply 
not
118
 associated with adverse outcomes such as the use of force, civilian deaths, 
civilian complaints, and general misconduct. One plausible explanation is that 
the quality of training may matter more than the quantity. Researchers in one 
 
97 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 382, 382 (2015) (finding correlations between prehire psycho-
logical test results in Minnesota and supervisor ratings for police officers). 
113. See, e.g., Suzanne Daniels & Emily King, The Predictive Validity of MMPI-2 Content Scales for 
Small-Town Police Officer Performance, 17 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 54, 58 (2002); Beth A. 
Sanders, Using Personality Traits to Predict Police Officer Performance, 31 POLICING: INT’L J. PO-
LICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 129, 141 (2008). These studies often measure officer performance 
using ratings given by supervisors, an imperfect outcome measure. See Steven Falkenberg et 
al., An Examination of the Constructs Underlying Police Performance Appraisals, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 
351, 356 (1991). Additional studies using more objective outcomes—such as internal investi-
gations, involuntary termination, turnover, and disciplinary complaints—are similarly mixed. 
Compare, e.g., Martin Sellbom et al., Identifying MMPI-2 Predictors of Police Officer Integrity and 
Misconduct, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 985, 999 (2007), with, e.g., Jose M. Cortina et al., The 
“Big Five” Personality Factors in the IPI and MMPI: Predictors of Police Performance, 45 PERSON-
NEL PSYCHOL. 119, 138 (1992). 
114. See, e.g., Michael J. Cuttler & Paul M. Muchinsky, Prediction of Law Enforcement Training Per-
formance and Dysfunctional Job Performance with General Mental Ability, Personality, and Life His-
tory Variables, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 3, 19 (2006); Charles D. Sarchione et al., Prediction of 
Dysfunctional Job Behaviors Among Law Enforcement Officers, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 904, 909 
(1998). 
115. See, e.g., Liqun Cao et al., A Test of Lundman’s Organizational Product Thesis with Data on Citizen 
Complaints, 23 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 356, 367 (2000); Brad W. 
Smith, Structural and Organizational Predictors of Homicide by Police, 27 POLICING: INT’L J. PO-
LICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 539, 551 (2014). 
116. See, e.g., EMILY G. OWENS ET AL., PROMOTING OFFICER INTEGRITY THROUGH EARLY ENGAGE-
MENTS AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016); Cao et al., su-
pra note 115, at 367. 
117. See, e.g., William C. Bailey, Less-Than-Lethal Weapons and Police-Citizen Killings in U.S. Urban 
Areas, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 535, 543 (1996); Hoon Lee et al., An Examination of Police Use of 
Force Utilizing Police Training and Neighborhood Contextual Factors: A Multilevel Analysis, 33 PO-
LICING: INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 681 (2010). 
118. See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 117; Willits & Nowacki, supra note 110. 
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study, for example, found that roughly a quarter of the variation in officers’ com-
plaint rates was attributable to the identity of their field training officers, sug-
gesting that qualitatively bad training may hurt more than it helps.
119
 
B. Labor Economics 
Although it does not focus on policing, specifically, a large body of research 
in economics examines the dynamics of labor markets. A number of papers, for 
example, study the costs to employers of employee turnover or “churn.” These 
costs include the expense of temporarily covering the departing employee’s du-
ties, such as through overtime for other workers; replacement costs, such as 
screening new applicants; training costs, including on-the-job training and uni-
forms; lost productivity for the departing employee, who may spend his last days 
writing exit memos or laboring with reduced morale; damaged morale for other 
workers; and lost institutional knowledge.
120
 The costs of churn appear to vary 
by region and industry
121
 and may, in some settings, be partially or wholly offset 
by the benefits of hiring new workers.
122
 Nevertheless, one recent literature re-
view concludes that, on average, the cost of replacing an employee is roughly 
one-fifth of the employee’s salary (excluding the very highest-paid jobs).
123
 
High turnover costs may, therefore, discourage law-enforcement agencies from 
hiring and firing wandering officers. 
A related literature explores the employee-side costs of job separation and 
unemployment. One consistent finding concerns the “unemployment scar”: dis-
placed and nonemployed workers suffer long-term earnings losses.
124
 Such 
 
119. See Ryan M. Getty et al., How Far from the Tree Does the Apple Fall? Field Training Officers, Their 
Trainees, and Allegations of Misconduct, 62 CRIME & DELINQ. 821, 834 (2016). 
120. See Heather Boushey & Sarah Jane Glynn, There Are Significant Business Costs to Replacing Em-
ployees, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (Nov. 16, 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/16084443/CostofTurnover0815.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR22 
-YRCK]. 
121. See id. at 4-5. 
122. See Zeynep Ton & Robert S. Huckman, Managing the Impact of Employee Turnover on Perfor-
mance: The Role of Process Conformance, 19 ORG. SCI. 56, 57 (2008) (mentioning “improvement 
of matches between employees and firms over time” and increased effort by replacement em-
ployees). 
123. Boushey & Glynn, supra note 120, at 1. 
124. See, e.g., Louis S. Jacobson et al., Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 685, 
687 (1993) (finding that high-tenure workers who separate from distressed firms suffer 
longer-term earnings losses averaging 25% per year). See generally William J. Carrington & 
Bruce Fallick, Why Do Earnings Fall with Job Displacement?, 56 INDUS. REL. 688 (2017) (re-
viewing the literature). 
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workers, for example, may leave the work force or move to firms that pay lower 
wages.
125
 Unsurprisingly, earnings losses are greater for workers whom firms 
exercise discretion to fire than for workers displaced by, say, a plant closing—the 
former reveals important information about worker quality.
126
 Fired workers 
also experience longer unemployment spells.
127
 Based on these findings from the 
labor economics literature, we expect that wandering officers will take longer to 
land new jobs than other officers and that they will tend to move to less desirable 
agencies. 
The concept of “wandering workers” is not itself novel. Journalists have, for 
example, penned numerous stories about clergy or teachers who, following mis-
conduct, leave one parish or school and find work in another.
128
 As far as we can 
tell, however, the labor-economics literature has not focused on most of the core 
questions that concern us here: which firms hire displaced workers and how do 
those workers fare upon reemployment? The closest study of which we are aware 
examines the market for financial advisers.
129
 The authors find that seven per-
cent of working financial advisers have misconduct records, and roughly one-
third of these are repeat offenders.
130
 Approximately half of these advisers lose 
their jobs after misconduct, yet forty-four percent of them are rehired by other 
firms within a year—they are, in our terminology, “wandering financial advis-
ers.”
131
 This is true even though advisers with prior misconduct are five times as 
likely as the average adviser to commit misconduct in the future.
132
 Still, advisers 
 
125. See, e.g., Fatih Guvenen et al., Heterogeneous Scarring Effects of Full-Year Nonemployment, 170 
AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 369, 370 (2017) (finding heterogeneous scarring ef-
fects from one year’s nonemployment, resulting primarily from a higher incidence of future 
nonemployment rather than lower earnings conditional on working); Kristiina Huttunen et 
al., How Destructive Is Creative Destruction? Effects of Job Loss on Job Mobility, Withdrawal and 
Income, 9 J. EURO. ECON. ASS’N 840, 842 (2011) (finding that displacement increases the prob-
ability of leaving the labor force by 31% and, for workers who remain, moderately depresses 
earnings due to movement between firms). 
126. See Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz, Layoffs and Lemons, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 351, 375 (1991). 
127. Id. 
128. See, e.g., Tara Isabella Burton, Scathing Report Reveals 300 Pennsylvania Catholic Priests Sexually 
Abused over 1,000 Children, VOX (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17689994
/catholic-sex-abuse-priest-crisis-pennsylvania-report [https://perma.cc/G6EW-HZ2G]; 
Martha Irvine & Robert Tanner, Sexual Misconduct Plagues US Schools, WASH. POST  
(Oct. 21, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/21
/AR2007102100144.html [https://perma.cc/MH5D-527P]. 
129. Mark Egan et al., The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct, 127 J. POL. ECON. 233 (2019). 
130. Id. at 248, 251. 
131. Id. at 261. 
132. Id. at 254. 
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who commit misconduct do experience an elevated likelihood of industry exit, 
longer gaps between employment stints, and, for those who find new jobs, lower 
compensation at smaller, less desirable firms.
133
 Observing that some firms em-
ploy substantially more wandering advisers than others and that misconduct is 
more common in wealthy, elderly, and less educated counties, the authors hy-
pothesize that “misconduct may be targeted at customers who are potentially less 
financially sophisticated.”
134
 
To our knowledge, there is no prior quantitative empirical work on wander-
ing police officers. In the following parts, we report the results of the first sys-
tematic exploration of this phenomenon.
 
Where possible, we examine how the 
correlates of misconduct described above interact with wandering-officer status 
and other outcomes of interest. 
i i i .  data 
Our primary source of data is the Automated Training Management System 
(ATMS), a database constructed and maintained by the FDLE. We supplement 
ATMS with a range of other data sources, including an annual survey of Florida 
law-enforcement agencies, the United States Census, the Uniform Crime Re-
ports, and others. 
A. Automated Training Management System (ATMS) 
ATMS compiles information on employment, termination, complaints, dis-
cipline, and demographics for every law-enforcement and corrections officer 
hired in the State of Florida. Our ATMS extract runs up through June 2017. 
We rely on three ATMS data sets in particular. First, the “employment” data 
set is structured at the officer-employment level. This means that the same of-
ficer can appear in multiple rows, one for each job he has held. The raw employ-
ment data set has 543,874 observations. We drop a substantial number of them. 
First, given our focus on wandering law-enforcement officers, we drop all em-
ployment positions categorized by ATMS as “corrections,” “corrections proba-
tion,” “concurrent” (both law enforcement and corrections), “civilian,” “instruc-
tor,” and “auxiliary.”
135
 Doing so removes approximately 351,000 rows from the 
data. Second, we drop all rows for part-time officers, focusing only on full-time 
 
133. Id. at 267-72. The finding concerning the gap between employment stints is driven by advisers 
who are not rehired; conditional on being rehired, advisers recently disciplined for miscon-
duct find work marginally faster than other advisers. See id. at 269-70. 
134. Id. at 238; see id. at 275-81. 
135. When we include concurrent officers, the core results of the Article do not change. 
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employment. Third, we drop all employment associated with a very small num-
ber of officers whose full-time employment dates across two or more positions 
overlap by more than 30 days. Fourth, we drop all employment stints beginning 
after 2016 because we have only six months of data for 2017. Fifth, we exclude all 
employment stints that ended before 1988 due to concerns about whether ATMS 
is comprehensive in earlier years.
136
 Sixth, we drop all stints that end with offic-
ers “transferring within agency” to other full-time law-enforcement positions 
because these are not true separations for our purposes.
137
 Before dropping these 
stints, however, we assign their start dates to the subsequent employment stints 
(to which the officers transferred) to account for the full length of employment. 
After applying each of these sample restrictions, the employment data set 
contains the 128,616 full-time law-enforcement job stints that spanned at least 
one day between 1988 and 2016; they correspond to 98,169 unique officers. Most 
of our analyses, however, focus on the 100,768 of those stints that began in or 
after 1988 and that correspond to 76,279 unique officers in 490 unique agencies. 
Among those agencies, 321 are police departments, 67 are sheriffs’ offices, and 
102 are other agencies, which include state-level, university, school, port, and 
other kinds of law-enforcement agencies. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics 
at the agency-year level. The bottom row indicates that, on average, agencies 
were closed for operation in roughly fifteen percent of agency-years; we thus 
drop those agency-years from the rest of the descriptive statistics reported in the 
table.
138
 On average, agencies in the data set employed a mean of 98 and a me-
dian of 27 full-time officers on at least one day in each year. They hired a mean 
of 8.4 and a median of 4 full-time officers per year, and experienced a mean of 5 
separations and a median of 2. 
 
136. Our coverage concerns stem from a substantial increase in the volume of hirings in the years 
before 1988, which suggests that the database may not have been capturing all employment 
stints during that period. To be clear, although we exclude stints that ended before 1988 from 
our analytic data set, we still use those stints to determine officers’ firing histories. To illus-
trate, suppose a law-enforcement officer was fired from a job in 1987 and then found work 
again in 1988. For purposes of our analysis, this officer would have only one row in our data 
set—for the employment stint beginning in 1988—which would indicate that the officer had 
been previously fired. 
137. In contrast, when an officer transfers within agency from a full-time law-enforcement posi-
tion to a part-time or non-law-enforcement position, we keep the employment stint and treat 
it as a voluntary separation because the subsequent stint does not meet the eligibility criteria 
for our sample. In some cases, multiple full-time law-enforcement officers “transfer within 
agency” on the same day to full-time law-enforcement positions in a different agency, likely 
because the initial agency was absorbed by another agency. We assume that these are not true 
separations. We therefore assign the start date and other relevant information from the first 
stint to the second and drop the initial stint from the data. 
138. We assume an agency is closed in a given year if it has no full-time law-enforcement officers 
employed on any day in that year. 
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TABLE 1.  
agency-year-level descriptive statistics, 1988-2016 
 
Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Officers Employed 98.0 27 241.7 1 3,272 
Hirings 8.4 4 16.30 0 353 
Separations 5.0 2 8.90 0 237 
Voluntary Separations 4.2 2 7.20 0 125 
Firings 0.78 0 1.65 0 28 
Firings for Misconduct 0.54 0 1.18 0 20 
Complaints 0.61 0 1.94 0 85 
Agency Closed 0.15 0 0.36 0 1 
 
The employment database provides a range of information on each job, in-
cluding agency name, start and end date, and cause of separation. That last var-
iable is our principal variable of interest. A separation can be either voluntary or 
involuntary; it is simply the end of an employment stint, regardless of the rea-
son. We refer to involuntary separations as “terminations,” “involuntary termi-
nations,” or, more colloquially, “firings.” In total, the variable measuring cause 
of separation has thirty-seven different code values. Unfortunately, some of 
those values have not been used consistently over time. In consultation with the 
FDLE, we have grouped the codes to produce two cause-of-separation measures 
that correspond to salient separation categories—voluntary and involuntary sep-
arations, or quitting and getting fired—and minimize inconsistencies in data col-
lection over time.
139
 
To refine the broad category of involuntary separations, we develop two 
measures of firing. Our first, and narrower, measure captures terminations for 
“moral character violations” or violations of a local agency’s policy. For conven-
ience, we refer to these terminations as firings for “misconduct.”
140
 Agency pol-
icy violations may include things like insubordination or failing to follow orders. 
 
139. For the frequency distributions of these codes among law-enforcement positions beginning 
between 1988 and 2016 and their inclusion in our cause-of-separation measures, see infra Ta-
ble A1. 
140. There is no legal authority or academic consensus on the definition of “police misconduct.” 
See KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 20-28. 
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Theoretically, they can also include more minor offenses, such as not having 
one’s uniform pressed—agency policy manuals are hefty tomes. Generally speak-
ing, however, the types of agency policy violations that warrant termination are 
serious or represent the culmination of a pattern of misconduct. It is, after all, 
notoriously difficult to fire a police officer.
141
 The agencies we studied experi-
enced an average of 0.54 firings for misconduct per year, accounting for roughly 
10.8% of all separations. 
A second, and broader, measure captures all instances in which officers are 
fired for cause. This measure includes firings for misconduct, but it also includes 
terminations for training and performance problems. It does not, however, 
count involuntary separations due to downsizing or the dissolution of an agency, 
which together account for no more than 1.8% of all separations in the data. As 
Table 1 shows, the agencies in our data set saw an average of almost 0.78 firings 
for cause per year during the study period, accounting for roughly 15.6% of all 
separations. We define the remaining 84.4% of the separations as voluntary sep-
arations. 
One significant methodological problem in any study of police employment 
and misconduct is that officers who are under investigation are frequently al-
lowed to resign before being terminated involuntarily.
142
 Fortunately, at least af-
ter 1998, ATMS tracks officers who resign “in lieu of separation” or “while being 
investigated” for misconduct.
143
 We include these separations in our firing 
measures. 
The vast majority of employment stints are easy to define: they are cleanly 
marked by a start and an end date. But there are some edge cases that complicate 
that seemingly simple line. Perhaps most important, as mentioned earlier, in 
 
141. See, e.g., Kelly et al., supra note 72; Tess Owen, Why It’s Hard to Fire Cops, VICE NEWS (Oct. 
16, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjy8xw/why-is-it-so-hard-for-cops-to-get 
-fired [https://perma.cc/3YD9-RPSL]; Mike Riggs, Why Firing a Bad Cop Is Damn Near Im-
possible, REASON (Oct. 19, 2012), https://reason.com/2012/10/19/how-special-rights-for-law
-enforcement-m [https://perma.cc/SKQ5-R8WC]. 
142. See, e.g., Jeremy Gorner, 2 Chicago Cops Resign After Facing Firing for Off-Duty Traffic Dispute 
That Led to Gunfire, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com
/news/breaking/ct-met-chicago-cop-traffic-dispute-police-board-20180330-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/9VC3-W27U]; see also Cara E. Trombadore, Police Officer Sexual Miscon-
duct: An Urgent Call to Action in a Context Disproportionately Threatening Women of Color, 32 
HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 153, 167 (2016) (“Thus, an officer accused of sexual miscon-
duct can resign before an investigation is completed, and then be hired by another department 
where he may continue the behavior.”). 
143. We suspect that FDLE was already counting these cases under another, more generic firing 
code before 1998 because we do not observe any bump in the total number of firings and 
misconduct-related terminations in that year. 
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some cases a labor arbitrator will reverse a firing decision, forcing the agency to 
reinstate the fired officer—often months or years later. Unfortunately, there is no 
code in the ATMS database that indicates when a fired officer is reinstated after 
arbitration. Nevertheless, in a small number of cases—roughly 8% of all firings 
of full-time law-enforcement officers from 1988 to 2016—we do observe fired 
officers beginning their next employment stint in the same agency that fired 
them. Based on communications with FDLE staff, we suspect that many of these 
cases represent arbitral reversals.
144
 
Arbitral reversals pose not only a data challenge but also a conceptual one. 
For reinstated officers, is the initial term of employment—or what we call the 
“prefiring stint”—and the period after reinstatement—the “postfiring stint”—
one employment with a pause in the middle? Or is it two separate employments? 
Should the initial firing count as a firing when the department is ultimately 
forced to reinstate the officer? The answers likely vary depending on the research 
question we seek to answer. Accordingly, for each of our analyses, we indicate 
how we handle officers who are fired and then rehired by the same agency. 
We use our firing measures to construct professional-history variables, 
which indicate whether an officer was fired from his last job or from an earlier 
job. In constructing these variables, we include firings not only from law-en-
forcement positions but also from employment stints in corrections positions. 
That is, although our subject is law-enforcement officers, specifically—and we 
have dropped corrections officers from the employment data set—we use the 
corrections-related data to check whether the law-enforcement officers we study 
previously worked in corrections positions from which they separated involun-
tarily. 
In addition to the employment data set, we use an ATMS data set containing 
state-level “moral character” complaints against officers. Most of these com-
plaints were initiated and investigated by the local agencies that employed the 
officers named. Under Florida law, if an agency has cause to believe that an of-
ficer has committed a moral character violation, it must investigate. If the agency 
sustains the allegation, it must submit its findings to the FDLE, which will then 
initiate a state-level complaint. The consistency with which local agencies inves-
tigate and report complaints to FDLE likely varies.
145
 The FDLE also has the 
power to initiate complaints on its own, which are included in the data set. We 
use the ATMS complaint data to compute the number of complaints filed against 
officers during each of their employment stints. We do this using the date on 
 
144. See Email from Terry Baker, supra note 67. 
145. See Anthony Cormier & Matthew Doig, Special Report: How Florida’s Problem Officers  
Remain on the Job, HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.) (Dec. 4, 2011, 12:01 AM), https://
www.heraldtribune.com/article/LK/20111204/News/605219990/SH [https://perma.cc
/AW38-TJK6]. 
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which complaints were initiated, which will typically succeed the date on which 
the alleged misconduct occurred. That said, based on communications with the 
FDLE, we suspect that, in most cases, these two dates are close in time. These 
moral-character complaints are rare—agencies experienced an average of 
roughly 0.61 complaints per year. Each complaint in the data set is also tagged 
with “offense codes” that indicate the substantive nature of the misconduct al-
leged, and some complaints are associated with multiple offense codes. We use 
these codes to identify the subset of complaints that include any allegation of 
violent or sexual misconduct or misconduct that implicates the officer’s integrity. 
Finally, ATMS contains an officer-level database that provides demographic 
information including race, gender, age, and education. Officer race is desig-
nated as white, black, Hispanic, Asian, or other, and we use these terms through-
out. We merge these demographic data with the employment data. 
B. Supplemental Data Sources 
We supplement the ATMS database with several other data sources to lever-
age additional information on the agencies that employ wandering officers. To 
collect information on agency hiring and training requirements, we obtained 
from the FDLE all data from the Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP), an an-
nual survey of all law-enforcement agencies in Florida that has run from 1997 to 
2016.
146
 We extract from CJAP information on hiring and training requirements 
for all municipal police agencies and sheriffs’ offices in the state. We do not cap-
ture data for these variables for other law-enforcement agencies, such as those 
in schools, universities, or ports. In total, 358 unique police departments and 
sheriffs’ offices appear in at least one year of the survey. Some agencies are not 
present every year, either because they formed after 1997 or dissolved before 
2016, or because they did not respond to the survey. We create an agency-year 
panel data set in which every agency that appears at least once has a row for each 
of the twenty years of our study—7,160 rows in total. 
With respect to hiring prerequisites, CJAP gathers information on minimum 
age, minimum education, prior criminal-justice experience, and tobacco use. 
CJAP also collects information on whether each agency requires a driving his-
tory, an in-person interview, a physical fitness test, a polygraph examination, a 
psychological examination, a written exam, a swimming test, a vision test, or a 
voice-stress analysis. It also records the length of any probationary employment 
 
146. We are grateful to Guangya Liu for her heroic efforts to extract and process the relevant vari-
ables from CJAP. 
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period.
147
 To compute a rough estimate of each agency’s overall hiring strin-
gency in a given year, we create a composite measure combining these require-
ments.
148
 On average, agencies have a hiring-stringency score of 4.6 on our scale. 
The average score increased from 1997 to 2016, from 4.3 to 5.2. 
CJAP also collects information on ongoing training requirements. These in-
clude training on chemical agents, defensive tactics, driving, firearms, and first 
aid. In addition, CJAP records the length of the training period required of new 
officers under a field training officer (FTO).
149
 As with hiring, we combine the 
training requirements to create a composite measure of the stringency of an 
agency’s training regimen.
150
 On average, agencies have a hiring-stringency 
score of 2.9. Agencies’ average composite-training score increased from 1997 to 
2016, from 2.6 to 3.3. 
We also supplement the data with additional sources of information, which 
we describe in greater detail below. First, using Google Maps, we geocoded the 
longitude and latitude coordinates of law-enforcement agencies to measure the 
distance that wandering officers travel from one job to the next. Second, we ob-
tained agency-level annual crime data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. 
Third, we gathered county- and city-level information on the racial and ethnic 
composition of resident populations and unemployment rates from the United 
States Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, we obtained information 
on county- and city-level law-enforcement expenditures from the Florida De-
partment of Financial Services. 
C. Limitations 
Although our data is rich and reasonably comprehensive, there are important 
limitations worth noting. One substantive limitation is that the separation codes 
 
147. Descriptive statistics for these variables are available in Table A2. 
148. We construct our composite score by giving an agency one point for every hiring requirement. 
To maximize the length of our observation period, we do not include hiring variables that 
were excluded from one or more years of the survey. This leads us to drop driving history, 
voice-stress analysis, and the swimming test. Three variables—age, education, and probation-
ary period—are not binary. We therefore specify a threshold at which to assign an agency a 
point for these requirements. Based on the statistics reported in Table A2, we assign agencies 
a point for requiring officers to be older than nineteen, to have an associate’s degree or college 
credit, and to undergo more than twelve months of probationary employment. 
149. Descriptive statistics for these variables are available in Table A3. 
150. To construct the composite-training score, we give agencies one point for requiring training 
in chemical agents, defensive tactics, driving, firearms, or first aid every six months or year. 
We give them an additional point for requiring more than twelve months of training under 
an FTO. 
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we use to construct our cause-of-separation measures (listed in Table A1) reveal 
only the general reason for each separation, such as a failure to complete training 
requirements, budgetary constraints, misconduct, or a voluntary departure. 
Within the all-important category of firings for misconduct, we are not able to 
identify the specific nature of the misconduct, such as excessive force, embezzle-
ment, substance abuse, and so on. That said, even if we had more specific infor-
mation on the official reason for termination, it would remain difficult in many 
cases to determine reliably the actual, underlying conduct at issue. As just one 
example, NYPD officer Martin Tisdale shot and killed a woman during a strug-
gle over his firearm, fled the scene, and then disposed of the firearm. The official 
reason for his termination was recorded as “failure to safeguard a weapon.”
151
 
Other limitations relate to the geographic scope of our data, all of which are 
drawn from the State of Florida. We cannot, for example, observe officers who 
were fired out of state and then obtained law-enforcement work in Florida. That 
our data is limited to one state also raises questions about the external validity of 
our results—that is, the extent to which our conclusions generalize to other lo-
cations. It is certainly possible that law-enforcement labor markets vary from 
state to state in ways that implicate our research questions. Indeed, we note be-
low some reasons to believe that wandering officers may be relatively more prev-
alent in some other states,
152
 except for Connecticut, which bans their hiring al-
together.
153
 At the same time, we are unaware of any reason to think that Florida 
is idiosyncratic in pertinent respects. 
A national study, it bears noting, would not be practicable at this time. Alt-
hough we have not conducted an exhaustive survey, we are unaware of any other 
state that collects and makes available the type of data contained in Florida’s 
ATMS. There are, moreover, methodological advantages to working within a 
single state. For one thing, any state-level covariates, such as state law or other 
state characteristics, are held constant, simplifying statistical analysis and reduc-
ing the risk of omitted variable bias. In addition, that a single entity (a state 
agency) collects all of the critical data significantly mitigates concerns about data 
consistency. 
iv.  describing the wandering officer 
Thousands of law-enforcement officers begin and end jobs in Florida each 
year. Some are hired for the first time; some for the third or fourth. Some sepa-
 
151. KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 1-3. 
152. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
153. See infra Section VI.E. 
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rate voluntarily to retire or change careers; others are fired for grievous miscon-
duct. Section IV.A presents an overview of the law-enforcement labor market in 
Florida, describing hiring patterns and then separations. Section IV.B details the 
prevalence, characteristics, movement patterns, and behavior of wandering of-
ficers. 
A. The Law-Enforcement Labor Market in Florida
1. Hirings
The law-enforcement labor market in Florida is large. As the black line in 
Figure 1 reveals, Florida agencies hired between 2,000 and 4,000 full-time offic-
ers in most years between 1988 and 2016.
154
 In general, trends in hiring appear 
to track conditions in the wider American economy. The number of officers hired 
each year dropped dramatically during the economic recession in 1990 and 1991. 
It then began rising again until it peaked in the late 2000s and fell during the 
Great Recession, from 2007 to 2009. Since then, the number has been steadily 
rising. 
154. To give a complete picture of the ATMS database over time, all of the data we report in this
subsection include both the pre- and postfiring terms for officers who were fired and then
rehired by the same agency for their next job. As noted, the postfiring term likely represents
an employment stint resulting from an arbitrator’s decision to reinstate the officer. See supra
Section III.A.
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FIGURE 1. 
total number of law-enforcement officers hired and separated, 1988-2016 
Men held the vast majority of full-time law-enforcement jobs in Florida from 
1988 to 2016—roughly 85%. Most jobs also went to white officers—73%—with 
11% to black officers and 15% to Hispanic officers. Educational information is 
available for about 60% of the jobs in the employment database. Of those, 18% 
were held by officers with only a high school education. Another 24% were held 
by officers with an associate’s degree and 50% by officers with a bachelor’s de-
gree. Just 8% were held by officers with a master’s degree.
155
2. Separations
Turning to separations, Figure 1 shows that, in most years from 1988 to 2016, 
about 2,000 to 3,500 officers separated from their jobs, whether voluntarily or 
involuntarily. Unsurprisingly, the number of separations tracks the number of 
hires, rising in most years except during recessions, when fewer jobs are availa-
ble. 
155. Although our data identify Asian officers and officers with doctoral degrees, we do not report 
them here because they are too scarce. We also decline to report figures where officer charac-
teristics are unknown or where officer race is coded as “Other.” 
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In Figure 2, we disaggregate separations by cause.
156
 From 1988 to 2016, an 
average of 13% of separations were involuntary—meaning that the officer was 
fired—while the remaining 87% were voluntary. The proportion of involuntary 
separations fell in the 1990s, from roughly 19% to 12%, but has remained rela-
tively stable since then. The same basic pattern characterizes firings for miscon-
duct, specifically. 
FIGURE 2.  
proportion of separations by cause of separation, 1988-2016 
Table 2 breaks down by demographic characteristics the proportions of sep-
arations that were firings and firings for misconduct, respectively. The most 
striking observation is that black officers were most likely to be fired, both in 
general and for misconduct: 22% of all separations involving black officers were 
firings and 15% were firings for misconduct. Those rates were substantially 
higher than the rates for Hispanic officers—who were fired 18% of the time and 
fired for misconduct 11% of the time—and white officers—who were fired 12% 
of the time and fired for misconduct 9% of the time. To be clear, these figures do 
156. To give a complete picture of separations in the ATMS database, throughout this subsection
we count all involuntary separations, including those in the pre- and postfiring terms for of-
ficers who were fired and then rehired by the same agency for their next job.
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not necessarily imply any problem with the relative performance of black offic-
ers. Black officers, for example, may be fired more often due to discrimination in 
the disciplinary process
157
 or because they are disproportionately assigned duties 
that present elevated opportunities for misconduct.
158
Educational background is also correlated with involuntary termination, at 
least within the 60% of employment stints for which education data are availa-
ble. Officers with only a high school education are most likely to be fired, and 
the rate of firing generally decreases with higher educational attainment. Officers 
without a four-year college degree are also most likely to be fired for misconduct. 
TABLE 2.  
cause of separation by demographic groups, 1988-2016 
Demographics n Fired
Fired for 
Misconduct 
Race 
White 69,103 11.7% 8.6%
Black 8,228 21.6% 14.8%
Hispanic 8,323 17.8% 11.7%
Gender 
Male 75,946 13.3% 9.7%
Female 11,155 13.4% 7.6%
Education 
High School 4,028 16.9% 8.8% 
Associate’s 12,728 12.1% 8.5%
Bachelor’s 22,503 9.5% 6.3%
Master’s 3,637 7.2% 4.7%
Overall 87,116 13.3% 9.5%
157. See, e.g., KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 34, 99-101 (discussing possible heightened scrutiny
of black officers due to “tokenism”); Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839,
878-80 (2019).
158. See KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 34; see also James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force: Re-
search and Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165, 196 (1988) (“Disparities in on-duty shooting rates were
attributable largely to racial differences in rank and assignment.”); William A. Geller & Kevin
J. Karales, Shootings of and by Chicago Police: Uncommon Crisis—Part I: Shootings by Chicago
Police, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1813, 1859 (1981) (similar). 
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B. The Wandering Officer 
Despite the salience of wandering officers, we have remarkably little system-
atic data about them. In this Section, we attempt to answer four basic questions 
that frequently arise in public discourse about police misconduct. First, how 
common are wandering officers? Second, how easy is it for them to land new 
jobs? Third, where do they go? And fourth, are they really a problem, in the sense 
that they cause more harms than other officers to the communities they police? 
We take each of these questions in turn. 
Before we begin, a brief definitional note. There is no legal or even informal 
consensus definition to tell us who, exactly, counts as a wandering officer. We 
therefore adopt an expansive definition: a wandering officer is someone who was 
fired from at least one full-time law-enforcement or corrections position in the 
State of Florida and later lands another full-time law-enforcement job in the 
state. At times, we also break wandering officers into two smaller groups—those 
who were fired from their last job and those who were fired from a job earlier in 
their employment history—because the results for these groups differ in im-
portant respects. 
1. How Common Are Wandering Officers? 
In absolute numbers, wandering officers are fairly common. From 1988 to 
2016, an average of roughly 1,100 full-time law-enforcement officers who had 
previously been fired, and just under 800 officers who had been fired for mis-
conduct, were employed by new agencies in any given year.
159
 Figure 3 depicts 
the number of wandering officers employed over time. As the dark and light gray 
lines show, the number of wandering officers employed throughout the state in 
any given year has been relatively stable over time, with a slight decrease in re-
cent years. The black line also shows that the number of all officers—divided by 
ten to depict all three lines on the same axis—has been increasing steadily over 
time. In 2016, just under 1,000 full-time officers had been previously fired and 
just over 600 had been fired for misconduct. To be clear, these counts include 
only wandering officers, not all officers who worked in law enforcement after hav-
ing been fired. If we include officers who were rehired by the same agency that 
fired them, the counts are even higher: from 1988 to 2016, on average, roughly 
1,500 and 900 officers were employed who had previously been fired or fired for 
misconduct, respectively. 
 
159. In this Section we exclude from our officer counts the post-firing stints of officers who were 
fired and then rehired by the same agency (before being hired at any other agency). While 
these officers have previously been fired, they are not wandering officers because they have 
not, as of yet, moved to another agency. 
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FIGURE 3.  
number of employed officers by professional history, 1988-2016 
When viewed in relative terms, the prevalence of wandering officers seems 
more limited. Almost 3% of all officers employed in any given year were wander-
ing officers previously fired and just 2% were wandering officers previously fired 
for misconduct. As Figure 4 shows, the relative proportion of wandering officers 
has fallen gradually over time. This is partly because—as we observed Figure 3—
the total number of officers employed has increased. By 2016, just over 2% of all 
officers employed were wandering officers who had ever been fired and 1.4% 
were wandering officers who had been fired for misconduct. 
FIGURE 4. 
percent of all employed officers who are wandering officers, 1988-2016 
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Whether there are many wandering officers or few, therefore, may be in the 
eye of the beholder. In absolute terms, Florida law-enforcement agencies employ 
many wanderers: in recent years, roughly 1,100 wandering officers who had pre-
viously been fired and about 800 who had been fired for misconduct. In total, 
these officers likely interact with hundreds of thousands of civilians each year.
160
Yet when viewed in relative terms, we see that the proportion of wandering of-
ficers is small and decreasing gradually over time. 
Still, we suspect that our figures underestimate the actual number of wan-
dering officers for at least three reasons. First, because our data is limited to Flor-
ida agencies, we are unable to identify wandering officers who were previously 
fired from law-enforcement agencies in other states. Second, a small number of 
officers may successfully obscure their employment history, even within the 
Florida market. Some who have been fired may simply lie and get away with it. 
Others may have negotiated an apparently “voluntary” separation in exchange 
for separating without a legal fight.
161
 Third, other states may have more wan-
dering officers than Florida does. Florida has a robust statewide data system 
tracking officer employment and requires hiring agencies to investigate appli-
cants’ employment history. Although it may be possible for an applicant to con-
ceal a prior firing, it is probably not easy. Florida also decertifies more officers 
than many other states, and a decertified officer cannot subsequently gain em-
ployment with any Florida agency. Because our estimate of the volume of wan-
dering officers is likely a lowball—both for Florida, specifically, and for other 
states—it is hard to conclude that wandering officers are a negligible phenome-
non. 
2. How Easily Do Wandering Officers Find New Work?
A second core question is how much difficulty officers have finding work af-
ter being fired.
162
 In this Section, we probe this question along several dimen-
sions, including how often fired officers land a new job, how long it takes them 
to do so (assuming they are looking for work), how far they have to travel, and 
how many different jobs they tend to hold. We count as reemployment only full-
160. Drawing upon official Florida data and prior academic research, Jordan Blair Woods recently
estimated that law-enforcement officers in Florida have conducted between 4.6 million and
13.8 million traffic stops annually during the past decade. See Jordan Blair Woods, Policing,
Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117 MICH. L. REV. 635, 676 (2019). If wandering
officers conducted a proportional number of these stops—three percent—they would have
conducted between 138,000 and 414,000 stops each year. 
161. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Shockey-Eckles, supra note 26, at 300 (asserting that fired officers who resign rather
than face license revocation find work “with relative ease”).
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time law-enforcement jobs in public agencies in Florida. We exclude jobs that 
end with a firing followed immediately by reemployment with the same agency, 
a pattern that, as mentioned earlier, likely reflects reinstatement by an arbitrator 
rather than the officer’s efforts and success on the job market. 
a. Reemployment Rates 
First, do officers who have been fired obtain law-enforcement work less often 
than officers who have not been? Interestingly, the answer depends on when 
during their careers they were fired. To explore this issue, we exclude all employ-
ment stints ending after 2013 to allow all officers in the data at least three years 
to obtain a new position. 
As the bottom row of Panel A in Table 3 reports, from 1988 to 2013, 39% of 
officers who separated and had never been fired obtained a new full-time law-
enforcement position in Florida. In contrast, just 17% of officers who were fired 
from their last job secured a new position, which represents a statistically signif-
icant difference.
163
 Yet officers who were fired further back in their employment 
history obtained a new job at a rate similar to officers who had never been 
fired.
164
 The rest of Table 3 shows that the same basic results hold across officer 
characteristics and when, in Panel B, we group officers by their history of firings 
for misconduct, specifically.
165
  
 
163. p < 0.001. All of the statistical tests in Section IV.B.2 are two-sided t-tests clustered at the 
person and agency level. 
164. While the difference is substantively small, it is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Ideally, 
we would also calculate rehiring rates while excluding officers who have decided to retire, to 
concentrate on the subset of separated officers who were most plausibly looking for law-en-
forcement work. We do not have data on retirements for fired officers, however. As an imper-
fect alternative, we exclude officers who were over fifty years of age at the time of separation; 
in a separate analysis, we exclude officers with at least twenty-five years of full-time service at 
the time of separation. The basic pattern of results for both analyses is substantively similar 
to the results we report in the text. 
166. Sample sizes are shown in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3.  
rehiring rates by demographic groups and professional history, 1988-2013166 
 
 
 
  
 
166. Sample sizes are shown in parentheses. 
  
Panel A: Fired Panel B: Fired for Misconduct 
  
Never 
Fired 
Fired, 
Last Job 
Fired, 
Earlier 
Job 
Never 
Fired 
Fired, 
Last Job 
Fired, 
Earlier 
Job 
R
a
c
e
 
White 
37% 
(51,538) 
18% 
(6,702) 
41% 
(2,498) 
37% 
(53,908) 
15% 
(5,177) 
42% 
(1,653) 
Black 
40% 
(5,073) 
14% 
(1,451) 
48% 
(414) 
40% 
(5,626) 
12% 
(1,074) 
44% 
(238) 
Hispanic 
49% 
(5,164) 
19% 
(1,123) 
51% 
(304) 
47% 
(5,607) 
17% 
(795) 
52% 
(189) 
G
e
n
d
e
r
 Male 
39% 
(54,841) 
17% 
(8,283) 
44% 
(2,928) 
39% 
(57,692) 
15% 
(6,431) 
45% 
(1,929) 
Female 
35% 
(7,926) 
16% 
(1,151) 
32% 
(311) 
34% 
(8,506) 
13% 
(717) 
27% 
(165) 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
High 
School 
56% 
(1,664) 
19% 
(284) 
60% 
(60) 
54% 
(1,813) 
19% 
(160) 
60% 
(35) 
Associate’s 
36% 
(9,359) 
20% 
(1,249) 
40% 
(453) 
36% 
(9,816) 
17% 
(940) 
42% 
(305) 
Bachelor’s 
41% 
(16,996) 
21% 
(1,657) 
45% 
(596) 
41% 
(17,732) 
18% 
(1,174) 
45% 
(343) 
Master’s 
52% 
(2,739) 
31% 
(187) 
55% 
(126) 
52% 
(2,849) 
24% 
(136) 
58% 
(67) 
A
l
l
 
 
39% 
(62,780) 
17% 
(9,436) 
43% 
(3,239) 
38% 
(66,212) 
15% 
(7,149) 
44% 
(2,094) 
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We next examine reemployment rates over time. Figure 5 shows the propor-
tion of officers who obtained a new job within three years, conditional on their 
professional history of firings.
167
 We limit our rehiring measure to three years to 
address a potential censoring problem: officers who separated in the last few 
years had less time to secure a new job. If we did not limit the rehiring measure 
in this way, censoring might severely deflate the rehiring rate in the last few years 
relative to years prior. 
As Figure 5 shows, the lower reemployment rates we observe for fired officers 
date back at least to the late 1980s. Moreover, the reemployment rate for officers 
fired from their last job fell in the early 1990s, from 25% to roughly 15%. That 
number fell again around 2009, probably because—as we showed above—law-
enforcement hiring generally fell throughout the state during the Great Reces-
sion. Since then, the reemployment rate for fired officers appears to have in-
creased slightly and may continue to do so if the 2009 drop was driven primarily 
by the economic downturn. 
FIGURE 5.  
proportion of separations in which officer obtains subsequent employment 
within three years, by professional history of firing, 1988-2013 
167. See Figure A1 for similar results on firings for misconduct, specifically. 
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We cannot be sure why reemployment rates are so different for officers who 
were fired from their most recent job versus officers who were fired from a job 
further back in their employment history. One possible explanation is that the 
subset of officers who landed an intervening job were initially fired for conduct 
that, on average, was less egregious than the officers who were fired from their 
last job. Another possibility is that wandering officers who voluntarily separated 
from their last job seek employment in law enforcement at higher rates than 
those who were fired from their last job. A third potential explanation is that 
law-enforcement agencies believe at least some previously fired officers are “re-
deemed” if they have held at least one other job in the intervening period without 
having been fired. We interrogate this “redemption” story in further detail be-
low. 
b. Time to Reemployment 
To assess how much fired officers may struggle to obtain new employment, 
we also consider how long it takes them to secure their next job. Folk wisdom 
says not long. Our data, however, show something different. 
As the bottom row of Table 4 reports, officers who were fired or fired for 
misconduct from their most recent job who later obtain another job take sub-
stantially longer to do so, on average, than officers who have never been fired or 
fired for misconduct—more than 300 days longer.
168
 In Table A4, we report the 
median time to reemployment rather than the mean. The same basic pattern is 
present, but the difference is even starker.
169
 These findings are driven, at least 
partially, by the fact that officers who separate voluntarily often do not leave until 
they have another job lined up.
170
 Once again, as the rest of Table 4 shows, fir-
ings further back in time are substantially less important and there is relatively 
little variation in these patterns across demographic groups. 
  
 
168. p < 0.001. 
169. The median time for officers fired (350 days) or fired for misconduct (450 days) from their 
previous job is over 20 times longer than for officers who have never been fired (17 days) or 
fired for misconduct (18 days). 
170. We can see, for example, that many officers who separate voluntarily begin a new employment 
stint the day after finishing the last one. 
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TABLE 4.  
mean time to new employment by demographic groups and professional 
history, 1988-2013171 
  Panel A: Fired Panel B: Fired for Misconduct 
  
Never 
Fired 
Fired, 
Last Job 
Fired, 
Earlier 
Job 
Never 
Fired 
Fired, 
Last Job 
Fired, 
Earlier 
Job 
R
a
c
e
 
White 
400 
(19,280) 
685 
(1,175) 
443 
(1,024) 
402 
(19,977) 
782 
(800) 
454 
(702) 
Black 
317 
(2,049) 
703 
(210) 
209 
(198) 
325 
(2,224) 
729 
(129) 
213 
(104) 
Hispanic 
316 
(2,519) 
787 
(212) 
402 
(154) 
322 
(2,649) 
910 
(137) 
473 
(99) 
G
e
n
d
e
r
 Male 
378 
(21,451) 
694 
(1,441) 
407 
(1,288) 
380 
(22,327) 
785 
(986) 
428 
(867) 
Female 
430 
(2,750) 
767 
(180) 
355 
(98) 
435 
(2,892) 
886 
(92) 
402 
(44) 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
High 
School 
416 
(937) 
859 
(55) 
665 
(36) 
423 
(977) 
1,038 
(30) 
789 
(21) 
Associate’s 
370 
(3,401) 
674 
(247) 
483 
(179) 
372 
(3,538) 
785 
(162) 
535 
(127) 
Bachelor’s 
375 
(6,982) 
686 
(347) 
295 
(270) 
378 
(7,236) 
760 
(210) 
286 
(153) 
Master’s 
440 
(1,436) 
774 
(58) 
586 
(69) 
439 
(1,491) 
897 
(33) 
854 
(39) 
A
l
l
 
 
384 
(24,205) 
703 
(1,621) 
403 
(1,386) 
386 
(25,223) 
794 
(1,078) 
426 
(911) 
 
171. Sample sizes are shown in parentheses. 
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c. Distance Traveled for Reemployment 
We also probe how much wandering officers may struggle to find new work 
by examining how far they travel to obtain their next job. The conventional wis-
dom is that wandering officers obtain jobs at agencies that are relatively far away 
and so have less (often informal) information about their past conduct. Surpris-
ingly, we find little evidence of such differential movement.
172
 
Among officers who have never been fired, those who separate and find new 
employment move to an agency that is, on average, forty-two miles away from 
their last job. Similarly, officers who were fired from their last job or some job 
further back in their employment history move to agencies that are, on average, 
forty-four and forty-five miles away, respectively. The difference in median dis-
tances was just slightly larger.
173
 We also find little difference in the movement 
patterns of officers who were fired for misconduct, specifically, either from their 
most recent job or earlier. 
d. Number of Subsequent Jobs 
Finally, we examine how many full-time jobs wandering officers hold over 
the course of their careers and, perhaps more important, after their first firing. 
As a baseline for comparison, Figure 6 shows the proportion of officers who, 
over the course of an entire career, worked a particular number of full-time 
jobs.
174
 One thing is clear: most officers move around very little. The vast ma-
jority hold no more than one full-time job, and virtually all of them—roughly 
94%—hold no more than two. 
  
 
172. To obtain geographic coordinates, we geocoded the names of each agency using an R package 
called “ggmaps” that automatically runs queries on Google Maps. In total, we were able to 
obtain geographic coordinates for 89% of the agencies in our sample. Most of the agencies we 
could not geocode are state-level agencies with ambiguous (and potentially multiple) geo-
graphic locations. In total, we are missing geographic distance information for 17% of all em-
ployment stints from which an officer separated and later obtained another job. 
173. Officers who have never been fired move a median of fourteen miles. Officers who were fired 
from their last job move a median of twenty miles, while officers fired further back in their 
employment history move a median of seventeen miles. 
174. We do not count the postfiring stint for officers who were fired and then rehired by the same 
agency. 
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Of course, not all officers who work more than one job are wandering offic-
ers; many were never fired at all. The top panel of Figure 7 shows the proportion 
of officers who, after having been fired, worked a particular number of subsequent 
full-time jobs; the bottom panel presents the same information for officers who 
were fired for misconduct. Both are consistent with what we already know: the 
vast majority of fired officers—around 81%—never secure another job. Moreo-
ver, very few—fewer than 6%—obtain more than one additional full-time job. 
Virtually none obtain more than three. Wandering officers “jump[ing] from 
agency to agency” who “may have 10 agencies under their belt within a 5 year 
period” therefore appear to be exceedingly rare, if not apocryphal, at least as far 
as our data can detect.
175
FIGURE 6. 
number of full-time positions held by unique officers, 1988-2016 
175. Dill, supra note 19.
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FIGURE 7.  
number of full-time positions held by unique officers after being fired for 
the first time, 1988-2016 
Taken together, our data suggest that officers who were fired from their most 
recent job may face significant challenges in securing new law-enforcement work 
in Florida. They are half as likely as other officers to obtain a new position and 
it takes them twice as long to do so. Moreover, the vast majority of officers who 
were fired hold a very small number of full-time positions throughout their ca-
reer—virtually all of them have fewer than three. Interestingly, we also find evi-
dence that firings from earlier in an officer’s career appear to pose a much smaller 
obstacle to finding a new job. 
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3. Where Do Wandering Officers Go? 
If fired officers struggle to find work, they might seek employment at smaller 
agencies, which may have fewer resources, or at agencies that serve socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged communities of color with higher crime. Various ac-
counts advance these hypotheses.
176
 To test them empirically, we compare, for 
each wandering officer, characteristics of the previous agency in the year of sep-
aration to characteristics of the hiring agency in the year of hiring. We exclude all 
years prior to 1996 because, for most of our agency-level variables, we lack data 
before then. As in the previous Section, we also exclude jobs that end with a 
firing followed by reemployment with the same agency, which likely reflects re-
instatement by an arbitrator rather than the discretionary decisions of officers 
and agencies on the market. 
Our data bear out some, but not all, of the hypotheses about the movement 
patterns of wandering officers. In particular, we find that wandering officers tend 
to migrate to agencies with fewer resources in communities with slightly higher 
proportions of residents of color. Officers who were just fired tend to move to 
smaller agencies as well. We find no evidence, however, that wandering officers 
move to areas with more unemployment or crime. 
a. Agency Size 
Officers who were fired from their last job move to smaller agencies on aver-
age. We calculate agency size using the ATMS employment data set by counting 
the number of unique full-time law-enforcement officers employed in each 
agency each year. From 1996 to 2013, officers who had never been fired and who 
landed a new job moved, on average, from agencies with roughly 368 officers to 
agencies with roughly 384 officers—representing a relative increase of nearly 4%.
 
In contrast, officers who were fired or fired for misconduct from their previous 
job and who obtained a new position moved from agencies with 343 and 331 of-
ficers to agencies with 194 and 136 officers, respectively—relative decreases of 
43% and 59%. These differences between the increase experienced by officers 
who had never been fired, on the one hand, and the decreases experienced by 
wandering officers, on the other, are both large and statistically significant.
177
 
Officers who were fired at some point before their most recent separation 
actually move in the opposite direction. These officers went from agencies with, 
 
176. See sources cited supra note 94. 
177. p < 0.001. All of the statistical tests in Section IV.B.3 are two-sided t-tests clustered at the 
person and agency level. 
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on average, 213 officers to agencies with 285 officers—a relative increase of 
roughly 34%. This increase is statistically significantly different from the change 
in agency size experienced by officers who had never been fired.
178
 Note, how-
ever, that officers who were fired at some point continue to work at smaller agen-
cies, on average, than officers who had never been fired. 
b. Agency Resources 
Wandering officers appear to migrate toward agencies with fewer resources. 
To examine this issue, we collected data on law-enforcement expenditures by 
every county and municipality in Florida from the Florida Department of Finan-
cial Services from 1996 to 2016. The data set, therefore, contains information 
only on municipal police departments and sheriffs’ offices and not state-level, 
university, school, or port agencies.
179
 Our expenditure figures include “personal 
services” and “operating costs”—which cover salaries and benefits—but exclude 
“capital outlays.”
180
 
Officers who had never been fired and landed a new job moved, on average, 
from agencies with operating budgets of $46.2 million to agencies with budgets 
of $55.8 million—a relative increase of 21%. In contrast, officers who were fired 
from their last job moved, on average, from agencies with $43.6 million budgets 
to agencies with $23.2 million budgets—which represents a 47% decline that is 
statistically significantly different from the change experienced by officers who 
had never been fired.
181
 Similarly, officers who were fired for misconduct from 
their last job moved, on average, from agencies with $38.2 million budgets to 
agencies with $15.7 million budgets—a 58.9% decline that is statistically signifi-
cantly different from the change experienced by officers who had never been 
 
178. p < 0.05. When we do the same comparison for firings for misconduct, however, the results 
are not statistically significantly different. 
179. We are missing expenditure data for roughly 30% of all employment stints, but nearly all of 
those missing observations—almost 90%—involve an officer moving to or from a law-en-
forcement agency that is neither a sheriff’s office nor a police department. Another limitation 
of our data is that they are reported by municipalities and counties, not by the law-enforce-
ment agencies themselves. Some municipalities contract with other municipalities or counties 
for policing services. Our estimates of agency budgets may exclude funds provided to an 
agency by another municipality. 
180. We exclude capital outlays because they are spiky over time and because, while they poten-
tially support an agency for many years, we observe only the year in which the money was 
spent and not the years in which the benefits of the purchase actually accrued. 
181. p < 0.001. 
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fired for misconduct.
182
 As before, the experience of officers who were fired fur-
ther back in their employment history more closely resembles that of officers 
who had never been fired. Officers who were fired further back in their career 
moved, on average, from agencies with $26.9 million-dollar budgets to agencies 
with $40.9 million-dollar budgets—a relative increase of 52% that is not statis-
tically significantly different from the change experienced by officers who had 
never been fired. 
The same basic patterns emerge when we examine agencies’ budgetary dol-
lars per officer, though the differences are smaller in magnitude.
183
 Officers who 
had never been fired and obtained a new job moved, on average, from agencies 
with $90,000 per officer to agencies with $96,000 per officer—a relative increase 
of 7%. In contrast, officers fired from their last job moved, on average, from 
agencies with $87,000 per officer to agencies with $78,000 per officer—a relative 
decline of 10%, which is statistically significantly different from the change ex-
perienced by officers who had never been fired.
184
 Similarly, officers fired for 
misconduct from their most recent job moved, on average, from agencies with 
$82,000 per officer to agencies with $73,000 per officer—a relative decline of 11% 
that is statistically significantly different from the change experienced by officers 
who had never been fired.
185
 Yet again, the behavior of officers who were fired 
further back in their employment history more closely resembles the behavior of 
officers who had never been fired. Officers who were fired at some point further 
back in their employment history moved, on average, from agencies with 
$75,000 per officer to agencies with $85,000 per officer, which is not statistically 
significantly different from the increase experienced by officers who had never 
been fired. 
c. Racial Composition 
Our data suggest that wandering officers tend to move to areas with slightly 
higher proportions of residents of color. We use municipal measures of race and 
ethnicity from the Census for municipal agencies, and county-level measures for 
 
182. p < 0.001. 
183. For this measure, we divide the agency’s budget by the total number of officers employed in 
that same year. Because some law-enforcement agencies also employ correctional officers, we 
include these officers in this estimate of agency size. We also find the same basic patterns when 
we examine budgetary dollars per resident rather than per officer. 
184. p < 0.001. 
185. p < 0.001. 
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all other agencies.
186
 Although county-level estimates are available annually, mu-
nicipal estimates are not. We therefore use decennial measures from 1990, 2000, 
and 2010. We apply the data from each of those Census years to all subsequent 
years until the next decennial census.
187
 
From 1996 to 2013, officers who had never been fired and found new work 
moved, on average, from agencies in areas with black populations averaging 
17.2% to agencies in areas with black populations averaging 15.4%—a relative de-
crease of 10%. By contrast, officers who were fired from their last job and found 
new work moved, on average, from agencies in areas with black populations of 
16.8% to agencies in areas with black populations of 18.8%—a relative increase 
of 12%, which is a statistically significant difference from the change experienced 
by officers who had never been fired.
188
 Similarly, officers who were fired for 
misconduct moved from agencies in areas with black populations of 17.6% to 
agencies in areas with black populations of 19.2%—a relative increase of 9%, 
which is statistically significantly different from the change experienced by offic-
ers who had never been fired for misconduct.
189
 There is no statistically signifi-
cant difference between the movement patterns of officers who were fired further 
back in their career—whether or not for misconduct—and officers who had never 
been fired. The same basic patterns emerge if we examine population data for 
Hispanic residents.
190
 
As we have shown so far, our data support certain aspects of the conventional 
wisdom about wandering officers—many move to smaller agencies, with fewer 
resources, in communities with slightly more residents of color. But not every 
 
186. Our race data is missing for roughly 25% of all employment stints because it is mostly limited 
to municipal police departments and sheriffs’ offices. Indeed, roughly 93% of all the missing 
observations come from employment stints in which an officer moves from or to an agency 
that is neither a municipal police department nor a sheriff’s office. 
187. In other words, we assign 1990 data to all years between 1997 and 1999; we assign 2000 data 
to all years between 2000 and 2009; and we assign 2010 data to all years after 2010. 
188. p < 0.001. 
189. p < 0.05. 
190. Officers who had never been fired moved, on average, from agencies in areas with 14% His-
panic populations to agencies in areas with 13.5% Hispanic populations—a relative decrease 
of 4%. Officers who were fired from their last job moved in the other direction, from agencies 
in areas with 13.6% Hispanic populations to agencies in areas with 15.2% Hispanic popula-
tions—a relative increase of 12%, which is statistically significantly different from the change 
experienced by officers who had never been fired (p < 0.05). Similarly, officers fired for mis-
conduct for their last job moved from agencies in areas with 14.5% Hispanic populations to 
agencies in areas with 16.1% Hispanic populations—a relative increase of 11%, which is not 
statistically significantly different from the change experienced by officers who had never been 
fired for misconduct. And once again, officers who were fired further back in their employ-
ment history behaved similarly to officers who had never been fired. 
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element of the conventional wisdom is borne out by the data. We turn to those 
other elements next. 
d. Unemployment 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find little evidence that wandering 
officers move to agencies in communities with higher unemployment, which we 
use as a rough proxy for socioeconomic well-being.
191
 This result might appear 
at odds with our earlier finding that wandering officers move to agencies in areas 
with larger communities of color, but the magnitude of the change in racial com-
position was quite small. 
We use two measures of unemployment rates, which produce similar 
(though not identical) results. Our first measure is annual county-level unem-
ployment rates from 1996 to 2013, which are available from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Current Population Survey.
192
 During that period, officers who had 
never been fired and secured a new position moved, on average, from agencies 
in counties with an unemployment rate of 5.6% to agencies in counties with a 
rate of 5.7%. Officers who were fired from their most recent job and secured sub-
sequent employment moved from agencies in counties with an unemployment 
rate of 5.4%, on average, to agencies in counties with a rate of 5.7%—a change 
that is statistically significantly different from the change experienced by officers 
who had never been fired.
193
 Officers who were fired for misconduct experienced 
a similar increase, moving from agencies in counties with an unemployment rate 
of 5.4%, on average, to agencies in counties with an average rate of nearly 5.8%—
a change that is also statistically significantly different from that of officers who 
had never been fired.
194
 While these changes are statistically significant, they are 
 
191. See, e.g., John P. Crank, The Influence of Environmental and Organizational Factors on Police Style 
in Urban and Rural Environments, 27 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 166, 170 (1990) (using unem-
ployment rate as one of two measures of community economic conditions in examining their 
relationship with policing style); Vickie L. Shavers, Measurement of Socioeconomic Status in 
Health Disparities Research, 99 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 1013, 1016-17 (2007) (listing unemploy-
ment rate as a “commonly used” measure of community socioeconomic status in public-health 
research); see also Bell, supra note 32, at 2137 (asserting that “[p]oor communities are more 
likely to hire ‘gypsy cops’”). 
192. Our unemployment data is missing for roughly 20% of all employment stints because it is 
limited to municipal police departments and sheriffs’ offices. Indeed, roughly 97% of all the 
missing cases come from employment stints in which an officer moves from or to an agency 
that is neither a municipal police department nor a sheriff’s office. 
193. p < 0.05. 
194. p < 0.05. 
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substantively very small.
195
 When we look at the data for firings further back in 
an officer’s career, once again we find little difference between officers who have 
and have not been fired. If anything, officers who were fired earlier in their career 
appear to go to agencies in counties with slightly lower unemployment. 
Our county-level estimates of unemployment, however, may mask variation 
within counties, especially as municipal agencies, which serve municipalities, 
make up the majority of all agencies in our data set. To address this problem, we 
construct a second measure of unemployment that assigns municipal-level un-
employment data to municipal agencies. Unfortunately, municipal-level data is 
available only back to 2009. We therefore assign all agencies the relevant county-
level or municipal-level unemployment rate from 2009 for all years.
196
 This ap-
proach is not ideal, as it requires the strong assumption that any changes in the 
unemployment rate over time are constant across all localities. In other words, 
in unmasking spatial variation in unemployment rates within counties, we are 
forced to mask temporal variation. Still, we think the analysis useful as a check 
on our results above. 
Based on this second measure, officers who had never been fired and landed 
another job moved, on average, from agencies in localities with an unemploy-
ment rate of 8.6% to agencies in localities with an unemployment rate of 8.9%. 
Officers who were fired from their last job moved, on average, from agencies in 
localities with an unemployment rate of 8.5% to agencies in localities with a rate 
of 8.6%, while officers who were fired for misconduct from their last job moved 
from agencies in localities with a rate of 8.6% to those with a rate of 8.7%. Nei-
ther of these latter changes is statistically significantly different from the change 
experienced by officers who had never been fired. Finally, officers who were fired 
or fired for misconduct further back in their career moved from agencies in lo-
calities with roughly 9.3% unemployment to agencies in localities with the same 
rate. 
Thus, our first and second measures of unemployment point to similar an-
swers. The first measure suggests that wandering officers migrate toward agen-
cies in communities with very slightly more unemployment than other officers—
from about 5.3% to 5.6%—while our second measure finds no evidence at all of 
any difference in migration patterns for wandering officers. 
 
195. Indeed, a 0.3% or 0.4% change in the county-level unemployment rate is well within the or-
dinary range of annual fluctuations for the counties in our data set. 
196. Our measure of unemployment data is missing for 24% of all employment stints from 1996 
to 2013. Roughly 96% of the missing cases come from employment stints in which an officer 
moves from or to an agency that is neither a municipal police department nor a sheriff’s office. 
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e. Crime 
We also find little evidence that wandering officers are more likely than other 
officers to migrate toward areas with more crime. We measure crime using data 
from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports that capture “offenses known to the po-
lice” from 1997 to 2013.
197
 As it turns out, both wandering and non-wandering 
officers tended to move to agencies with less crime, and, if anything, wandering 
officers tended to experience larger decreases in crime from one job to the next—
although the difference in the size of these drops was not statistically significant. 
From 1997 to 2013, officers who had never been fired and landed a new job 
moved, on average, from an agency with 2,210 violent crimes per 100,000 resi-
dents annually to an agency with 1,970 such crimes—a relative decrease of 11%. 
Officers who were fired from their last job moved, on average, from an agency 
with 2,410 violent crimes per 100,000 residents to an agency with 2,050 such 
crimes—a relative decrease of 15%, which is not statistically significantly differ-
ent from the decrease experienced by officers who had never been fired. Officers 
who were fired for misconduct from their last job experienced an even greater 
decrease, moving from agencies with 2,460 violent crimes per 100,000 residents 
to agencies with 2,030 such crimes—a relative decrease of 17%, which is also not 
statistically significantly different from the change experienced by officers who 
had never been fired for misconduct.
198
 Once again, officers who were fired from 
a job earlier in their employment history behaved similarly to officers who had 
never been fired.
199
 Taken together, these results suggest that wandering officers 
do not move to agencies in communities with more crime. 
 
197. Our crime data begin in 1997 because a large number of agencies did not report crime data in 
1996. Even between 1997 and 2013, we are missing crime data for roughly 34% of our employ-
ment stints. But nearly all of those missing observations—84%—involve an officer moving to 
or from a law-enforcement agency that is neither a sheriff’s office nor a police department. 
Both the crime and population data are at the agency level. 
198. We observe a similar pattern using property crime. Officers who had never been fired and 
found a new job moved from an agency with 1,870 property crimes per 100,000, on average, 
to an agency with 1,640 such crimes, a relative decrease of 12%. Officers who were fired from 
their most recent job moved from agencies with 1,990 property crimes per 100,000 to agen-
cies with 1,720 such crimes—a relative decrease of 14%. Similarly, officers who were fired for 
misconduct from their last job and found new work moved from agencies with an average of 
2,150 property crimes per 100,000 to agencies with 1,680—a relative decrease of 22%. 
199. Officers who were fired further back in their career moved, on average, from an agency with 
2,260 violent crimes per 100,000 to an agency with 1,980 such crimes—a relative decrease of 
12%, which is similar to the decrease experienced by officers who had never been fired. And 
officers who were fired for misconduct at some point before their most recent job moved from 
agencies with an average of 2,310 violent crimes per 100,000 to agencies with 1,990—a relative 
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4. Do Wandering Officers Engage in More Misconduct? 
Many worry that when wandering officers move, they “tak[e] trouble with 
them.”
200
 In the absence of systematic data, however, analysts have not known 
whether this fear is justified. In this Section, we examine employment and dis-
ciplinary data to assess whether wandering officers seem to pose heightened risks 
to the communities they are hired to serve. We find that they do. We then con-
sider potential explanations for these findings. 
Because one goal of our analysis is to enable critical evaluation of the choice 
to hire wandering officers, we focus on employment stints in which agencies ac-
tually exercise their discretion to bring an officer onto the force. Throughout this 
Section, therefore, we drop the post-firing employment stint for officers who are 
fired and then rehired by the same agency. As noted, many of these stints likely 
represent cases in which an arbitrator forced the agency to reinstate the officer 
against its will. 
a. Firing 
We consider first whether wandering officers are fired more often than other 
officers. We begin by examining firing rates across groups of officers with differ-
ent professional histories.
201
 As Panel A in Table 5 shows, from 1988 to 2013,
202
 
officers who had never been fired and who secured a new position were subse-
quently fired 8.7% of the time and fired for misconduct 6.6% of the time.
203
 In 
contrast, officers who were fired from their most recent position and landed a 
new job were fired and fired for misconduct, respectively, 18.4% and 13.8% of the 
time. This is more than twice as often, and the difference is statistically signifi-
cant.
204
 Officers who voluntarily separated from their last position but who had 
been fired at some point earlier in their career were subsequently fired and fired 
for misconduct 14.7% and 11.1% of the time, respectively. This is roughly 50% 
more often than officers who had never been fired, and the difference is again 
 
decrease of 14%, which is not statistically significantly different from the change experienced 
by officers who had never been fired for misconduct. 
200. Abshire, supra note 26, at 11B. 
201. We do not break out these firing rates by demographic categories due to small sample sizes. 
202. We exclude stints that began after 2013 to ensure we have at least three years of follow-up for 
every observation. The results are substantively similar if we start our analysis in 1996 rather 
than 1988, as we did in the previous Section due to data limitations. See Table A5. 
203. The denominator includes both employment stints that have ended and those that have not 
yet ended. 
204. p < 0.001. 
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statistically significant.
205
 Because wandering and non-wandering officers may 
remain in their jobs for different lengths of time, we also report firing rates 
within three-year windows (as well as one- and five-year windows in Table A6), 
and the results are substantively similar. The same basic pattern holds in Panel 
B when we examine officers’ history of firings for misconduct, specifically.
206
 
TABLE 5.  
subsequent firing by professional history, 1988-2013207 
  
 
205. p < 0.001. 
206. Officers who had never been fired for misconduct and who secured a new position were sub-
sequently fired 9% of the time and fired for misconduct just 6.7% of the time. In contrast, 
officers who were fired for misconduct from their most recent position were fired 20% of the 
time and fired for misconduct 15.3% of the time—more than twice as often as officers who had 
never been fired (p < 0.001). Officers who voluntarily separated from their last position but 
had been fired for misconduct at some point earlier in their career were subsequently fired 
15% of the time and fired for misconduct 11.2% of the time—roughly 50% more often than 
never-fired officers (p < 0.001). Once again, the same pattern emerges when we examine fir-
ings within three-year windows (and one- and five-year windows in Table A6). 
207. As noted earlier, although our focus is on law-enforcement officers, our variables measuring 
whether an officer was previously fired include any past firings from a position in corrections 
as well. A very small number of law-enforcement rookies—officers who are working for the 
first time in a law-enforcement position—were previously fired from corrections positions. 
We count these officers as rookies when we estimate firing rates in Table 5, but excluding them 
has very little effect on the result. 
     
Fired 
Fired for 
Misconduct 
   
n Ever 
3 
Years 
Ever 
3 
Years 
Panel A:  
Firings 
Never 29,888 8.7% 4.5% 6.6% 3.0% 
Fired, last job 1,969 18.4% 11.2% 13.8% 7.9% 
Fired, earlier job 1,631 14.7% 7.5% 11.1% 5.6% 
Panel B:  
Firings for 
Misconduct 
Never 31,182 9.0% 4.7% 6.7% 3.1% 
Fired, last job 1,297 20.0% 12.2% 15.3% 9.0% 
Fired, earlier job 1,009 15.0% 8.1% 11.2% 6.2% 
Panel C:  
Rookie 
  
54,476 10.5% 5.8% 7.2% 3.2% 
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Earlier, we found that officers who have been fired are far more likely to se-
cure a new job if they voluntarily separate from at least one intervening position. 
We hypothesized that hiring agencies might view these officers as rehabilitated. 
The results just reported, however, imply a story of only partial redemption: of-
ficers who were fired from a job further back in their career are less likely to be 
fired than officers who were fired from their most recent position. Perhaps this 
is unsurprising, as these officers have been double-screened: two different agen-
cies have made the decision to hire them since they were fired. Still, these officers 
are substantially more likely to be fired than officers who have never been fired 
before. 
Of course, when hiring, law-enforcement agencies do not simply choose 
among veteran officers. They might also decide to hire a rookie who has never 
had a full-time job in law enforcement before. Officers hired as rookies therefore 
offer another potentially helpful performance benchmark. As Table 5 reports in 
Panel C, rookies are fired 10.5% of the time and fired for misconduct 7.2% of the 
time. This makes them substantially less risky than wandering officers—both 
those who were fired from their most recent job and those who were fired from 
an earlier one.
208
 Officers hired as rookies tend to be slightly riskier than veterans 
who have never been fired, but the differences are not consistently statistically 
significant across our specifications. 
So far, we have compared the firing rates of wandering officers to those of all 
veterans who have never been fired and all officers hired as rookies. Yet 
employment markets may vary across both space and time. To account for such 
potential local variations, we next narrow our analysis both geographically and 
temporally. The idea is to capture, as best we can, the subset of officers who may 
have applied for each job, or at least to approximate the type and quality of 
officers who were likely to have been in the candidate pool. 
Our approach is to match each wandering officer with all nonwandering 
officers who were hired within 50 miles and up to 90 days after the wandering 
officer’s hiring date.
209
 The results are similar when we change the time window 
to 180 days or 1 year and the geographic limit to 20 or 100 miles. We exclude all 
 
208. All but one of the differences between officers hired as rookies and wandering officers are 
statistically significant. The sole exception is when we compare firings within one year for 
officers hired as rookies and officers who had been fired prior to their most recent job. 
209. We do not allow officers from the same agency to serve as comparators for each other. Each 
wandering officer is matched, on average, to roughly one hundred comparators. Because some 
wandering officers are matched with more comparator officers than others, we weight each 
comparator officer by the inverse of the number of comparator officers assigned to the same 
wandering officer. In other words, for a wandering officer with twenty-five comparators, we 
weight each of the comparators 1/25. 
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observations for the 51 law-enforcement agencies for which we were unable to 
obtain geographic coordinates.
210
 As a result, the data set we use for this analysis 
differs somewhat from the data set used previously. 
In Table 6, Panel A presents firing rates based on professional history. As a 
basis for comparison, the first row reports firing rates for all officers who had 
never previously been fired. Overall, these officers were fired 10% of the time. 
The next row reports firing rates for wandering officers who had been fired from 
their immediately preceding job. Similar to our results in Table 5, these officers 
ended up being fired 18.6% of the time—almost 90% more often. More 
important, the following row reports the firing rate for the never-fired officers 
who were chosen as matched comparators based on location and timing. These 
officers were fired 10.8% of the time—slightly more than all officers who had 
never been fired, but still far less than the wandering officers.
211
 Matching 
comparator officers to wandering officers based on geography and timing thus 
appears to have slightly increased the firing rate of the comparison group, but 
the comparator officers are still fired at rates much lower than the wandering 
officers are. 
The remaining rows in Panel A conduct the same analysis for wandering 
officers who were fired from a job further back in their employment history. The 
results are substantively similar.
212
 In the remaining columns of Panel A, the 
same basic pattern also appears for firings within a three-year window and 
subsequent firings for misconduct. Panel B shows similar results when we define 
wandering officers as officers who had been fired for misconduct, specifically. 
  
 
210. The vast majority of these agencies are state-level agencies for which assigning a specific lo-
cation is not straightforward. 
211. The statistical significance tests we report here are two-sided t-tests based on cluster-robust 
standard errors clustered at the person level. The difference in firing rate between these wan-
dering officers and matched comparators is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
212. The difference in firing rate between these wandering officers and matched comparators is 
again statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
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TABLE 6.  
subsequent firing by professional history for matched comparators based 
on timing and geography, 1988-2013 
   
Fired Fired for Misconduct 
   
Ever 3 Years Ever 3 Years 
P
a
n
e
l 
A
:
 
F
ir
in
g
s
 
Never 
 
10.0% 5.4% 7.1% 3.3% 
Fired,  
last job 
Wanderer 18.6% 11.1% 14.0% 8.0% 
Comparator 10.8% 6.0% 7.9% 3.8% 
Fired, 
earlier job 
Wanderer 14.6% 7.4% 11.1% 5.7% 
Comparator 10.2% 5.6% 7.1% 3.3% 
P
a
n
e
l 
B
:
 
F
ir
in
g
s
 f
o
r
  
M
is
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
 
Never 
 
10.1% 5.5% 7.2% 3.3% 
Fired,  
last job 
Wanderer 20.2% 12.1% 15.7% 9.2% 
Comparator 10.9% 6.0% 8.1% 3.9% 
Fired, 
earlier job 
Wanderer 15.3% 8.3% 11.5% 6.5% 
Comparator 10.5% 5.7% 7.4% 3.5% 
 
We can narrow our comparator pool even further if we assume that 
applicants similarly evaluate the desirability of working at specific agencies and 
that agencies similarly evaluate the desirability of job applicants. If so, at least 
within local labor markets, more desirable candidates are likely to be hired by 
more desirable agencies.
213
 Under this logic, we can further narrow our analysis 
to the pool of candidates who were likely vying for the same job by matching 
wandering officers not only based on timing and geography but also based on 
whether they were hired by a similarly desirable agency. 
Designing an objective measure of agency desirability poses two challenges. 
The first is that we need to know what agency characteristics officers value. 
Unfortunately, there is little relevant empirical evidence in the policing literature. 
Moreover, different officers may value agency characteristics differently. As just 
one example, some officers may prefer to work at agencies with high levels of 
 
213. See David Card et al., Workplace Heterogeneity and the Rise of West German Wage Inequality, 128 
Q.J. ECON. 967, 980-83 (2013) (finding that more educated workers in Germany tend to be 
hired by higher-paying employers and that this correlation increased over time from the 1980s 
to the late 2000s). 
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crime—to be close to the action—while others may prefer agencies in safer areas. 
The second challenge is that we need observable measures of agency 
characteristics—measures that ideally vary over time, given the longitudinal 
nature of our study. 
Given these constraints, we proxy for agency desirability using annual 
expenditures per officer. The assumption is that job candidates prefer to work at 
agencies with more money to spend on each officer—for salaries, benefits, perks, 
and other organizational resources.
214
 Because the expenditure data start in 
1996, we drop all employment stints that began before that year. We then use 
agency expenditure data to compute, within each year,
215
 the percentile rank of 
each agency in terms of expenditures per officer. We group the agencies into 
quintiles—with the bottom twenty percent in the first quintile, the next twenty 
percent in the second quintile, and so on, until the fifth quintile, which includes 
the top twenty percent in each year. We then use these quintile scores to select 
comparator officers who were hired within ninety days and fifty miles of the 
wandering officer by an agency within the same desirability quintile.
216
 As we 
show in Table A7, our basic results do not change when we match on agency 
desirability. 
This geographic, temporal, and agency-desirability matching process helps 
us get closer to capturing a picture of the “marginal officer”—the officer the 
agency would have hired had it not hired the wandering officer. Ideally, we 
would compare wandering officers and marginal officers more directly. Without 
data on job applicants,
217
 however, it is impossible to identify the actual marginal 
officers, and we cannot probe this question any more closely. 
The foregoing analysis has revealed consistent evidence that wandering 
officers are fired at significantly higher rates than both veterans who have never 
 
214. To obtain a comprehensive measure of the number of officers employed by an agency, we 
count both law-enforcement officers and correctional officers. 
215. Because some agencies’ expenditures vary substantially from year to year, we also calculated, 
for each agency, average expenditures per officer over the entire period, 1996 to 2013. We then 
reran our analysis using this time-invariant measure of agency desirability. The results are 
similar. 
216. Because matching on desirability quintiles substantially reduces the pool of potential compar-
ator officers, 326 out of the 2,186 wandering officers who were hired from 1996 to 2013 who 
had previously been fired were not matched with any comparators. Also, 193 of the 1,355 of-
ficers hired during this period who had previously been fired for misconduct did not receive 
a match. We drop these unmatched wandering officers from this analysis. The remaining 
wandering officers were matched with an average of about twenty-one comparators. 
217. We did not try to collect applicant data because it would require obtaining sensitive personnel 
records from each of the hundreds of law-enforcement agencies in Florida, likely an impossi-
ble task. 
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been fired and rookies. One lingering question is whether this relationship—
between wandering-officer status and firing rates—is mediated by other 
observable officer characteristics. Might it be, for example, that wandering 
officers tend to be young and that youth predicts a higher firing rate? If so, what 
appears to be a “wandering-officer effect” might really be a “youth effect.” 
To explore this possibility, Table 7 reports a series of linear probability 
models, at the employment-stint level, on our variable measuring firings within 
three years.
218
 Model 1 essentially replicates the results in Table 5 because it 
contains only the professional-history variables: whether an officer was fired 
from his last job, was fired from a job further back in his employment history, 
or was hired as a rookie. Veterans who have never been fired are the comparison 
group. The model confirms that officers who were fired from their last job and 
officers fired further back in their employment history are subsequently fired 6.7 
and 2.9 percentage points more often, respectively, than officers who have never 
been fired. 
In Model 2, we add some officer-level demographic variables: age and 
gender.
219
 The addition of these variables has little effect on the coefficients for 
either type of wandering officer, meaning that the predictive power of being a 
wandering officer is not merely driven by these demographic characteristics. 
Model 3 adds educational attainment to the model, but this step is, 
unfortunately, more complicated because the variable is frequently missing. The 
coefficient for officers who were fired from their last job falls slightly, while the 
coefficient for officers who were fired from an earlier job falls dramatically, by 
roughly two-thirds. It is possible, however, that dropped observations due to 
missing data, rather than the predictive power of educational attainment, are 
driving these differences. To test this possibility, in Model 4 we replicate Model 
2 but drop all observations for which we lack education data. The results are 
similar to Model 3. This shows that the change in coefficients we observed in 
Model 3 is likely due to the loss of observations from missing data rather than to 
the effect of the education variables.
220
 In the end, therefore, we find little 
evidence that observable officer-level variables mediate the heightened firing rate 
that wandering officers experience. 
 
218. We report the results of linear probability models (or linear regressions) because the magni-
tudes of their coefficients are easy to interpret. The results are substantively similar, however, 
when we use logistic regression, which better fits the binary structure of the dependent vari-
able. The results are also substantively similar when we fit the model on our variable measur-
ing firings for misconduct within three years. 
219. We divide age by ten so that the coefficients are not rounded to zero. 
220. The fact that the results change dramatically thus suggests that the education variable is not 
missing randomly. 
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TABLE 7.  
regression models on firing within three years, 1988-2013221 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  
0.045** 
[0.002] 
0.053** 
[0.006] 
0.044** 
[0.007] 
0.025** 
[0.005] 
Fired from 
Last Job 
 
0.067** 
[0.007] 
0.067** 
[0.007] 
0.063** 
[0.010] 
0.064** 
[0.010] 
Fired from 
Earlier Job 
 
0.029** 
[0.007] 
0.030** 
[0.007] 
0.011 
[0.009] 
0.011 
[0.009] 
Rookie  
0.012** 
[0.002] 
0.011** 
[0.002] 
0.010** 
[0.002] 
0.011** 
[0.002] 
Age  
 
-0.002 
[0.001] 
0.004** 
[0.001] 
0.004** 
[0.001] 
Male  
 
-0.002 
[0.003] 
-0.007* 
[0.003] 
-0.005 
[0.003] 
 
Associate’s 
  -0.009* 
[0.005] 
 
   
Education Bachelor’s 
  
-0.024** 
[0.004] 
 
   
   
 
Master’s 
  -0.034** 
[0.005] 
 
   
n 87,964 87,948 46,974 46,974 
b. Complaints 
As an alternative measure of officer performance, we also consider com-
plaints filed with the state licensing board—the CJSTC—alleging “moral char-
acter violations” as defined by Florida law. As detailed above,
222
 these complaints 
typically begin as civilian or internal affairs allegations investigated by a local 
 
221. An asterisk (*) denotes an estimate that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level; two aster-
isks (**) denote an estimate that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. While our thresh-
old of statistical significance throughout the paper is 0.05, we also note estimates that are 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level with a dagger (†). Cluster-robust standard errors clus-
tered at the person- and agency-level are reported in brackets. 
222. See supra Section III.A. 
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agency. If the local agency sustains the allegation and the offense implicates the 
officer’s “moral character,” the agency must submit its findings to the FDLE, 
which opens a “complaint” and begins an independent disciplinary process. The 
FDLE also has the power to initiate complaints on its own, which are included 
in the data set. Once again, our results suggest that wandering officers may pose 
significant risks. 
Table 8 shows the rate at which officers received complaints conditional on 
their professional history. Because the FDLE appears to have begun consistently 
recording complaints in 1993, our analyses of complaints include only employ-
ment stints beginning between 1993 and 2013. As in our analysis of firings, we 
exclude job stints in which an officer is employed by an agency that had fired the 
officer in his immediately preceding job. Panel A shows that officers who had 
never been fired and who secured a new position received an average of 0.07 
complaints during their next job. In contrast, officers who were fired from their 
last job received an average of 0.13 complaints, almost ninety percent more, a 
difference that is statistically significant.
223
 Officers who voluntarily separated 
from their previous job but had been fired at some point earlier in their career 
received an average of 0.12 complaints, which is also statistically significantly 
more than officers who had never been fired.
224
 
  
 
223. p < 0.001. 
224. p < 0.001. 
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TABLE 8.  
number of complaints by professional history and type, 1993-2013 
   
All 
Violent/ 
Sexual 
Integrity 
  
n Ever 
3 
Years 
Ever 
3 
Years 
Ever 
3 
Years 
P
a
n
e
l 
A
:
 
F
ir
in
g
s
 
Never 24,711 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Fired,  
last job 
1,394 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 
Fired,  
earlier jobs 
1,295 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 
P
a
n
e
l 
B
:
 
F
ir
in
g
s
 f
o
r
 
M
is
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
 Never 25,686 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Fired,  
last job 
934 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03 
Fired,  
earlier jobs 
780 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 
P
a
n
e
l 
C
:
 
R
o
o
k
ie
 
 
44,584 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
 
One question is whether the additional complaints that wandering officers 
receive concern the types of misconduct the public finds most troubling. While 
we are constrained by the relatively small number of complaints in the data, we 
are able to break complaints into broad categories based on the character of the 
misconduct alleged. Almost a quarter of the complaints are for violent or sexual 
conduct (including implied violence), the most common allegations of which are 
“excess force,” “assault,” “battery – domestic violence,” and “sex offense.”
225
 An-
other third are integrity-related complaints, the most common allegations of 
which are “false statements,” “perjury,” “misuse of public position,” and 
 
225. In our primary specification, we exclude from this category complaints concerning prostitu-
tion, sex on duty, intimidation, harassing communication, sexual harassment, resisting an of-
ficer, unprofessional relationships, and the manufacture, possession, or transportation of ob-
scene materials. The results, however, are substantively similar when we include these 
complaints. Details of the coding scheme are available from the authors upon request. 
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“fraud.”
226
 We also create a category for drug-related allegations, which account 
for just 10% of the complaints. This is too few to support any reliable results, 
but also indicates that our general results, reported above, are not driven by 
drug-related offenses. 
As Table 8 shows, officers who had never been fired and who secured a new 
position received an average of 0.02 complaints for violent or sexual conduct 
during their next job. In contrast, officers who were fired from their last job re-
ceived an average of 0.04, roughly twice as many, a difference that is statistically 
significant.
227
 Officers who voluntarily separated from their previous job but had 
been fired at some point earlier in their career received an average of 0.03 com-
plaints for violent or sexual conduct, which is statistically significantly different 
from officers who had never been fired.
228
 We find a similar pattern of results for 
integrity-related complaints. 
Because employment stints vary in length, Table 8 also reports the average 
number of complaints against officers within a three-year window, and the re-
sults are similar (as are the results within one- and five-year windows, reported 
in Table A8).
229
 Furthermore, as Panel B of Table 8 shows, all of these same pat-
terns hold if we examine officers who have been fired for misconduct instead. 
Here, too, officers hired as rookies provide another useful performance 
benchmark for wandering officers. As shown in Panel C of Table 8, officers hired 
as rookies receive a roughly similar number of complaints as veterans who have 
never been fired
230
—and fewer than wandering officers.
231
 
As before, we next match each wandering officer with the nonwandering 
officers who were hired within 50 miles and fewer than 90 days after the 
 
226. We exclude traditional theft offenses and offenses involving stolen property, which do not 
necessarily implicate truthfulness or the abuse of an official position. 
227. p < 0.001. 
228. p < 0.05. 
229. The one exception is that, for violent and sexual complaints, the difference between officers 
who have never been fired and officers who voluntarily separated from their last job but who 
were fired earlier in their career is not statistically significant within a one-, three-, or five-
year window. 
230. When we count all complaints, all violent or sexual complaints, or all integrity-related com-
plaints incurred during the employment stint, officers hired as rookies receive statistically sig-
nificantly more complaints than veterans who have never been fired, at a threshold of p < 0.05, 
though the differences are substantively small. In the time-limited comparisons, most of the 
differences are not statistically significant. 
231. The differences are always statistically significantly different for officers who were fired from 
their last job (p < 0.05). They are also statistically significant for officers who were fired fur-
ther back in their employment history when we count all complaints and integrity-related 
complaints (p < 0.05), but not when we count only violent or sexual complaints. 
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wandering officer’s hiring date.
232
 The results, reported in Table 9, follow the 
now-familiar pattern: wandering officers receive, on average, 0.14 complaints—
about 75% more than all officers with no prior history of firing (0.08 complaints) 
and the comparator officers (0.08 complaints).
233
 The same pattern of results 
holds for wandering officers who were fired from a job earlier in their 
employment history, for complaints received within a three-year window, and 
for wandering officers who were fired for misconduct, specifically. The same 
patterns also hold when we count only violent or sexual complaints or integrity-
related complaints.
234
 And, as reported in Table A9, the same basic pattern holds 
when we match comparator officers not only on timing and geography but also 
on agency desirability. 
TABLE 9.  
number of complaints by professional history for matched comparators 
based on timing and geography, 1993-2013 
   
All Violent/Sexual Integrity 
   
Ever 
3 
Years 
Ever 
3  
Years 
Ever 
3 
Years 
P
a
n
e
l 
A
:
  
F
ir
in
g
s
 
Never 
 
0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Fired,  
last job 
Wanderer 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 
Comparator 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Fired,  
earlier job 
Wanderer 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 
Comparator 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
P
a
n
e
l 
B
:
 F
ir
in
g
s
  
f
o
r
 M
is
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
 Never 
 
0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Fired,  
last job 
Wanderer 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.03 
Comparator 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Fired,  
earlier job 
Wanderer 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.02 
Comparator 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
 
232. The results are similar when we expand the time window to 180 days or one year and when 
we expand the geographic limit to 50 or 100 miles. 
233. The statistical significance tests we report here are two-sided t-tests based on cluster-robust 
standard errors clustered at the person level. The difference in complaints received by these 
wandering officers and their matched comparators is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
234. The differences are not always statistically significant, however, for violent and sexual com-
plaints within a three-year window. 
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Finally, as with our firing measures, we consider whether the higher number 
of complaints against wandering officers is mediated by other observable officer 
characteristics. Table 10 reports a series of linear-regression models that mirror 
those described in Table 7.
235
 The basic results are the same: we find no evidence 
that adding officer age, gender, or education to the models decreases the size of 
the coefficient on the professional-history variables. Differences in coefficients 
among the models appear to be due to the loss of observations from missing data 
rather than to the effect of the independent variables. We therefore find no 
evidence that observable officer-level characteristics mediate the heightened risk 
associated with hiring wandering officers. 
TABLE 10.  
regression models on number of complaints within three years, 1993-2013236 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
 0.024** 
[0.001] 
0.033** 
[0.003] 
0.025** 
[0.004] 
0.019** 
[0.004]  
Fired from 
Last Job  
 
0.044** 
[0.008] 
0.043** 
[0.008] 
0.038** 
[0.010] 
0.039** 
[0.010] 
Fired from 
Earlier Job  
 
0.023** 
[0.007] 
0.024** 
[0.006] 
0.01 
[0.009] 
0.01 
[0.009] 
Rookie 
 0.002 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.002] 
0 
[0.002] 
0.001 
[0.002]  
Age 
  
-0.005** 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
-0.001† 
[0.001] 
  
Male 
  0.007** 
[0.002] 
0.004† 
[0.002] 
0.005* 
[0.002]   
  
 
235. We report the results of linear models because the magnitudes of their coefficients are easy to 
interpret. The results are substantively similar, however, when we use negative binomial re-
gression. 
236. An asterisk (*) denotes an estimate that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level; two aster-
isks (**) denote an estimate that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. While our thresh-
old of statistical significance throughout the paper is 0.05, we also note estimates here that are 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level with a dagger (†). Cluster-robust standard errors clus-
tered at the person- and agency-level are reported in brackets. 
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Education 
Associate’s 
  -0.001 
[0.003] 
 
   
Bachelor’s 
  -0.008** 
[0.002] 
 
   
Master’s 
  -0.011** 
[0.003] 
 
   
n 
 
71,984 71,971 40,436 40,436 
c. Explanations 
Taken together, our results suggest that wandering officers are significantly 
more likely than comparable officers—either officers hired as rookies or veterans 
who have never been fired from a Florida law-enforcement agency—to be fired 
and to incur complaints of serious misconduct. What explains these findings? At 
least four hypotheses strike us as plausible. 
First, agencies may scrutinize wandering officers more rigorously than other 
officers by monitoring them more closely or applying a lower threshold for ini-
tiating the disciplinary process. To put the point most forcefully, agencies might 
even hire wandering officers on a de facto “probationary” basis, intending simply 
to fire them if problems arise. Although this is possible, it strikes us as unlikely 
that it could fully explain the sizable gaps in the rates at which officers are fired 
and incur complaints. 
As an initial matter, employee turnover, or “churn,” is typically expensive: a 
recent review of the labor economics literature found that the median cost of 
replacing a worker is roughly one-fifth of the worker’s salary.
237
 This makes less 
plausible the notion that agencies would hire wandering officers on a probation-
ary rationale, particularly as the agencies that hire wandering officers tend to be 
more poorly resourced. At the same time, the literature emphasizes that the costs 
of turnover vary by industry, region, and other factors, and they may be lower 
for Florida law enforcement than this general evidence suggests.
238
 
 
237. See Boushey & Glynn, supra note 120, at 1. We have not found any research on the cost of 
turnover in law enforcement specifically. For potential analogs, see GARY BARNES ET AL., THE 
COST OF TEACHER TURNOVER IN FIVE SCHOOL DISTRICTS: A PILOT STUDY 4-5 (2007) (estimat-
ing the cost of teacher turnover in five school districts in 2007 at $4,366 to $17,872); and 
Michelle I. Graef & Erick L. Hill, Costing Child Protective Services Staff Turnover, 79 CHILD 
WELFARE 517, 528 (2000) (estimating the cost of turnover for a child protective services 
worker in a midwestern state in 1995 at $10,000). 
238. Where labor requires “knowledge exploitation” (i.e., implementation, execution) rather than 
“knowledge exploration” (i.e., discovery, innovation), however—as seems generally true of 
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To probe this first hypothesis more closely, we consider a series of additional 
empirical checks. None of these checks is conclusive on its own but, collectively, 
they suggest that heightened scrutiny cannot fully explain our results. To begin 
with, we found earlier that wandering officers receive not only more complaints 
in general, but also more complaints specifically about violent or sexual miscon-
duct. While certainly possible, it seems less likely that heightened scrutiny could 
drive those results, as agencies presumably take violent and sexual conduct more 
seriously than other misconduct regardless of which officers are accused. 
Our complaint data offer another way to test the heightened-scrutiny hy-
pothesis. The FDLE, a statewide entity independent from the local agencies that 
employ law-enforcement officers, itself initiates roughly one-third of the com-
plaints in our data set. These include complaints opened in response to an of-
ficer’s arrest, a news report, a verified citizen complaint tendered to the FDLE 
directly, or a problem FDLE staff discovered while auditing local-agency rec-
ords.
239
 If heightened scrutiny by employing agencies explained why wandering 
officers receive more complaints, we would expect the gap in complaint rates to 
disappear in this subset of the data (because, again, the employing agencies do 
not trigger these complaints). The data does not bear this out. We reran our 
analysis of complaints on the FDLE-initiated subset. As Table A11 shows, the 
results are substantively similar to when we use all complaints: across each of the 
specifications, wandering officers were roughly twice as likely as officers who had 
never been fired to receive a complaint initiated by the FDLE.
240
 
Next, we examine firing and complaint rates across agencies of varying size. 
What little has been written on the topic suggests that smaller agencies are less 
 
policing—the average net effects of turnover are expected to be negative. See Ton & Huckman, 
supra note 122, at 57-58, 65. 
239. The ATMS database contains seven codes that define the source of a complaint: affidavit of 
separation, arrest hit notification, FDLE staff documentation, internal investigation, newspa-
per, other, and verifiable complaint. Based on conversations with the FDLE, we define a com-
plaint as initiated by the FDLE (and not the officer’s agency) if its code is anything other than 
affidavit of separation or internal investigation. As noted, see supra Section III.A, we have data 
only on the date a complaint was opened and not the date on which the alleged misconduct 
occurred. It is possible that, in some cases, there is a nontrivial gap between the date a com-
plaint was opened and the date of the alleged misconduct. 
240. The difference between never-fired officers and officers who were fired from their last job is 
statistically significant across all comparisons at p < 0.01. The difference between never-fired 
officers and officers who were fired further back in their employment history is significant 
across all comparisons at p < 0.05. 
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likely than their larger counterparts to have the resources and organizational ap-
paratus to closely monitor and remediate particular officers.
241
 Thus, if wander-
ing officers are fired more frequently or receive more complaints than other of-
ficers because they face heightened scrutiny, we would expect these gaps to 
narrow or disappear in smaller agencies.
242
 We therefore reran our analyses of 
firing and complaints after breaking the data into two groups of agencies, by 
size: agencies that employed fewer than sixty-two officers—the smallest quartile 
of employment stints—and agencies that employed sixty-two officers or more. 
We then reran the analysis again using even smaller thresholds: thirty-one offic-
ers and fifteen officers. Across all of these comparisons, our results were substan-
tively similar.
243
 In both large and small agencies, officers who were fired from 
their last job were roughly twice as likely to be fired,
244
 be fired for miscon-
duct,
245
 or receive a complaint
246
 than officers who had never been fired before. 
 
241. See, e.g., STEVEN G. BRANDL, POLICE IN AMERICA 41 (2017) (“[L]arger police departments tend 
to have more rules and policies than smaller ones.”); PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CEN-
TURY POLICING, supra note 41, at 28-29 (reporting that “small forces often lack the resources 
for training and equipment accessible to larger departments” and encouraging consolidation); 
David N. Falcone et al., The Small-Town Police Department, 25 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRAT-
EGIES & MGMT. 371, 374 (2002) (“Given the low number of [full-time employees] for small-
town police departments, and the near absence of organizational differentiation, all officers, 
regardless of rank, must carry out general patrol functions.”); Kevin Johnson, Lack of Training, 
Standards Mean Big Problems for Small Police Departments, USA TODAY (June 23, 2015, 4:39 
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/23/small-police-departments
-standards-training/28823849 [https://perma.cc/8YFL-LEJG] (“[Q]uestions about leader-
ship, training and basic competence track an array of unmet public safety needs that threaten 
small-town policing operations in communities across the country.”); cf. Casey Toner & Jared 
Rutecki, 113 Suburban Cop Shootings, Zero Discipline, WBEZ (Jan. 8, 2018), https://interac-
tive.wbez.org/taking-cover/zero-discipline [https://perma.cc/C5V9-WLTT] (“The investi-
gation found little evidence that suburban police agencies do any self-reflection or post-mor-
tem reviews aimed at retraining officers involved in deadly shootings, a practice often 
employed at larger departments.”). 
242. Alternatively, it is possible that police chiefs in smaller agencies are better able to monitor 
wandering officers closely. Our results run contrary to this prediction, too. 
243. See infra Table A12. To reduce the size of the table, we present only the results for agencies that 
are bigger and smaller than fifteen officers at the time the officer was hired and for firings (but 
not firings for misconduct). The results are substantively similar when we break up agencies 
based on the thirty-one-officer and sixty-two-officer thresholds and when we examine firings 
for misconduct. 
244. p < 0.001. 
245. p < 0.001. 
246. p < 0.05. 
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While officers who were fired further back in their employment history also ex-
perienced heightened rates of firing and complaints—both in small and large 
agencies—the differences were only sometimes statistically significant. 
Finally, we probe the heightened-scrutiny hypothesis by examining the tim-
ing of firings and complaints. If wandering officers are, like probationary em-
ployees, scrutinized more closely than others, this heightened monitoring is 
probably not indefinite. Indeed, monitoring can be costly and its expected re-
turns may diminish with time. It seems likely, then, that wandering officers 
blend in with the rest of the workforce at some point. We therefore calculate the 
average rate at which officers are fired and receive complaints during their fourth 
through seventh years of employment.
247
 As Table A13 shows, wandering offic-
ers continue to experience higher rates of firings
248
 and complaints
249
 even dur-
ing those later years, though the gap between wandering and nonwandering of-
ficers is somewhat smaller during this period than during years one through 
three. 
A second potential explanation for the elevated rates of firing and complaints 
that wandering officers receive is that, even if wandering officers are not treated 
differently within agencies, they may, on average, take jobs at agencies that are 
better at detecting misconduct or more likely to initiate the disciplinary process. 
We are doubtful this hypothesis is correct. If anything, agencies that are better 
at detecting misconduct or more likely to initiate the disciplinary process are, 
because of their high quality, probably less likely to hire wandering officers in the 
first place. While we cannot directly observe the stringency of an agency’s disci-
plinary process, our composite measures of agencies’ hiring and training re-
quirements provide useful proxies. In our data, officers who were fired from 
their last job and land a new position tend to move to agencies with less stringent 
 
247. We also examine the data in one-year increments. The basic results are substantively similar 
but noisy due to the limited number of firings and complaints within each period. In calcu-
lating the firing and complaint rates in years four through seven, we count in the denominator 
all officers who had left the agency in years one through three. If instead we drop these officers 
from the analysis, the difference in firing rates between wandering and nonwandering officers 
is even larger. 
248. The firing rate for officers fired from their last job is statistically significantly different from 
that of officers who were never fired at a threshold of 0.01. For officers fired earlier in their 
employment history, the difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level for all compari-
sons except when we measure both professional history and subsequent firings using firings 
for misconduct. 
249. The number of complaints for officers fired from their last job is only marginally statistically 
significantly different from the number of complaints for officers who have never been fired, 
at the 0.10 level. For officers fired further back in their employment history, the difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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hiring and training requirements than officers who have never been fired.
250
 This 
suggests that, as we expected, wandering officers are not moving to agencies 
with more stringent disciplinary processes than other agencies. 
Third, wandering officers may take jobs at agencies where, due to differences 
in culture, leadership, or beat assignment, they are exposed to conditions con-
ducive to further misconduct. Although we did not find any evidence that wan-
dering officers move to agencies in higher-crime jurisdictions, many move to 
smaller agencies with relatively fewer resources. For this reason, we think this 
third hypothesis warrants further investigation. 
We test the hypothesis in two ways.
251
 First, we assess whether observable 
agency-level variables reduce the predictive power of officers’ professional-his-
tory variables. Table 11 presents a series of linear probability models where the 
dependent variable is whether an officer was fired within three years.
252
 Because 
some of our agency-level variables begin in 1997, we restrict our analysis to em-
ployment stints that began between 1997 and 2013. Model 1 contains only the 
professional-history variables and shows that, during that period, officers who 
were fired from their last job and officers fired further back in their employment 
history were subsequently fired 6.6 and 2.9 percentage points more often, re-
spectively, than veterans who had never been fired, the comparison group. 
In Model 2, we add a number of agency-level variables (as of the date the 
officer’s employment began): total number of officers employed by the agency, 
agency expenditures per full-time officer, violent crimes per 100,000 residents, 
 
250. Our hiring and training scores begin in 1997. We are also missing a substantial number of 
observations within our sample. As a result, we lack hiring-requirement and training-require-
ment data for 33% and 40% of observations from 1997 to 2013, respectively. Most of these 
missing cases—82% and 68% of the missing hiring and training observations—concern moves 
from or to agencies that are neither municipal police departments nor sheriffs’ offices. Officers 
who have never been fired, who separated from their previous job voluntarily, and who land 
a new job move from agencies that, on average, have hiring and training scores of 5.2 and 3.2 
to agencies with scores of 5.3 and 3.4—almost no change at all. Similarly, officers who were 
fired earlier in their employment history but voluntarily separated from their last job and 
found new work moved from agencies with hiring and training scores of 4.4 and 2.9 to agen-
cies with scores of 4.6 and 3.1. In contrast, officers who were fired from their last job and 
obtain new work tend to move to agencies with lower hiring and training scores; indeed, they 
move from agencies with average scores of 5.2 and 3.3 to agencies with scores of 4.6 and 2.9 
(p < 0.001). 
251. As in the rest of our analyses of professional history and firings, we exclude job stints in which 
an officer is employed by an agency that had fired him in his immediately preceding job. 
252. As before, we report the results of linear probability models (or linear regressions) because 
the magnitudes of their coefficients are easy to interpret. The results are substantively similar, 
however, when we use logistic regression, which better fits the binary structure of the depend-
ent variable. 
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property crimes per 100,000 residents, unemployment, proportion of the pop-
ulation that is black, and proportion of the population that is Hispanic. Adding 
these variables decreases the coefficient both for officers who were fired from 
their last job and for officers who were fired further back in their employment 
history by 10% to 15%. Because we are missing data for at least one of the agency-
level variables in roughly 17% of employment stints from 1997 to 2013, it is once 
again possible that missing data—rather than the introduction of the agency-
level variables—explain the change in results from Model 1 to Model 2. We assess 
this possibility in Model 3 by replicating Model 1 while dropping any observa-
tions for which we are missing some agency-level data. The coefficients both for 
officers fired from their last job and for officers fired from an earlier job are 
roughly similar to those in Model 1, suggesting that the addition of the agency-
level variables is responsible for much of the modest decrease in the coefficient 
from Model 1 to 2. Taken together, these models suggest that the agency-level 
variables may reduce the predictive power of the professional-history variables 
but only very slightly. 
Second, we test whether unobservable agency-level characteristics reduce the 
predictive power of the professional-history variables. More specifically, we in-
troduce agency fixed effects to assess whether the heightened rates at which wan-
dering officers are fired stem from their moving to agencies with higher rates of 
firing and complaints in general. As Model 4 in Table 11 shows, adding these 
fixed effects has little impact on the size of the coefficients for either type of wan-
dering officer. This provides further evidence that this third hypothesis has lim-
ited explanatory power. 
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TABLE 11.  
regression models on firing within three years with agency characteristics, 
1997-2013253 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
0.039** 
[0.002] 
0.052** 
[0.006] 
0.041** 
[0.002] 
 
Fired from Last Job 
0.066** 
[0.009] 
0.055** 
[0.009] 
0.060** 
[0.009] 
0.056** 
[0.009] 
Fired from Earlier Job 
0.029** 
[0.008] 
0.026** 
[0.009] 
0.029** 
[0.009] 
0.024** 
[0.009] 
Rookie 
0.015** 
[0.003] 
0.018** 
[0.002] 
0.015** 
[0.003] 
0.016** 
[0.002] 
Number of Officers  
(In Hundreds) 
 -0.002** 
[0.000] 
 0.002 
[0.002]   
Expenditure Per Officer 
(In Thousands) 
 0 
[0.000] 
 0 
[0.000]   
Violent-Crime Rate  
(Per 100 Residents) 
 0.005** 
[0.001] 
 0.002 
[0.003]   
Property-Crime Rate 
(Per 100 Residents) 
 -0.003† 
[0.002] 
 0 
[0.002]   
County-Level  
Unemployment Rate 
 0.024 
[0.059] 
 -0.063 
[0.058]   
Proportion Black 
 -0.008 
[0.014] 
 -0.053 
[0.061]   
Proportion Hispanic 
 -0.015 
[0.010] 
 -0.042 
[0.060]   
Agency Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
n 59,861 49,687 49,687 49,687 
 
The fourth and final hypothesis is the most straightforward: holding all else 
constant, wandering officers may simply behave worse than officers who have 
 
253. Asterisks (*) denote estimates that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level; two asterisks 
(**) denote estimates statistically significant at the 0.01 level. While our statistical signifi-
cance threshold is 0.05, we note estimates statistically significant at the 0.1 level with daggers 
(†). Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the person- and agency-level are in brackets. 
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never been fired. On top of that, they tend to be hired by smaller agencies with 
fewer resources, which may be unable to provide them with the policies, train-
ing, and supervision that could help them stay in line. Because the other hypoth-
eses largely fail, and because this explanation is consistent with anecdotal ac-
counts, we suspect that this is, in the end, the most plausible explanation of the 
higher rates of firing and complaints against wandering officers. 
v. predicting which wandering officers get fired again 
Before we turn to potential legal reforms for the problems just identified, we 
examine one final empirical question: whether certain agencies, or certain wan-
dering officers, pose greater or lesser risks than others. More specifically, should 
certain agencies be especially wary of hiring wandering officers? Do agencies’ 
hiring or training requirements affect the risk that wandering officers pose? Are 
there observable characteristics that mark some wandering officers as more or 
less risky than others? 
To examine these questions, we fit a series of linear probability models on a 
data set containing an observation for every time, from 1988 to 2013, an agency 
hired a wandering officer.
254
 The dependent variable indicates whether the of-
ficer was fired within three years. We include a range of independent variables 
measuring characteristics of the officer, as well as the law-enforcement agencies 
he moved from and to, in order to estimate whether any of these characteristics 
is associated with a lower probability that the officer’s separation was involun-
tary. As in the earlier analyses of firings, we exclude job stints in which an officer 
is employed by an agency that had fired the officer in his immediately preceding 
job. 
Table 12 presents the results.
255
 Model 1 includes one independent variable: 
whether the officer was fired from his most recent job. It shows that such officers 
are 3.7 percentage points more likely to be fired than other wandering officers. 
Model 2 adds various officer-level independent variables, including the number 
of jobs worked, gender, age (at start of employment), and a dummy for prior 
complaints. The only statistically significant variable is whether the officer was 
fired from his most recent job. 
 
254. We report the results of linear probability models (or linear regressions) because the magni-
tudes of their coefficients are easy to interpret. The results are substantively similar, however, 
when we use logistic regression, which better fits the binary structure of the dependent vari-
able. 
255. We report cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the agency and officer level. 
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In Model 3, we add a variable reflecting the officer’s educational attainment 
to see whether education is associated with the likelihood that a wandering of-
ficer is fired. Because education data is missing for many officers, we lose a sig-
nificant proportion of our observations. We find no statistically significant evi-
dence that officer education makes a difference here, but we caution that our 
estimates are noisy, at least partially due to the decreased sample size. 
Finally, in Model 4, we examine whether any agency characteristics are cor-
related with whether a wandering officer will be fired again. We add several char-
acteristics of the hiring agency for the year the officer was hired, including the 
proportion of the agency’s jurisdiction that is black, the proportion that is His-
panic, the violent and property crime rates per 100,000 residents, county-level 
unemployment rates, and agency expenditures per officer. We also test whether 
the agency’s hiring or training requirements are correlated with whether the 
agency will fire a wandering officer it hires by adding two composite scores, de-
scribed in Section III.B, that measure the stringency of the hiring agency’s re-
quirements. The idea is that stricter hiring requirements might direct agencies 
toward the least risky wandering officers and that rigorous training require-
ments might keep wandering officers on the right path. Finally, the model also 
contains two variables capturing the number of full-time officers employed by 
the agencies the officer moved to and from divided by 100 (to ease interpretation 
of the results). Because some of these agency-level variables are available only 
starting in 1997, we exclude all employment stints that began before that year. 
We also lose some additional observations due to missingness on some of the 
agency-level variables. 
In this model, the variable indicating whether an officer was fired from his 
most recent job (rather than a job further back in his employment history) de-
creases in size and is no longer statistically significant. More important, the only 
agency-level variables that are statistically significant relate to agency size; they 
show that officers who move from and to agencies that are smaller tend to be 
fired less frequently. Otherwise, we find little evidence of any statistical associa-
tion between the agency variables and firing. When we examine firing rates 
based on wandering officers’ history of firings for misconduct, specifically, we 
find a similar pattern of results.
256
 Because Model 4 is restricted to hirings from 
1997 to 2013, however, the number of observations is substantially reduced, 
which may partly explain the null results. 
 
256. See Table A10. 
the yale law journal 129:1676  2020 
1756 
TABLE 12.  
predicting whether wandering officers are fired again, 1988–2013257 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
 
0.074** 
[0.007] 
0.103** 
[0.023] 
0.075† 
[0.042] 
0.194** 
[0.049] 
Fired from  
Last Job 
 
0.037** 
[0.010] 
0.035** 
[0.013] 
0.043* 
[0.020] 
0.025 
[0.020] 
Job Number 
2 
 
0.009 
[0.017] 
-0.002 
[0.030] 
-0.008 
[0.029] 
3          
 
0.005 
[0.017] 
-0.016 
[0.029] 
-0.003 
[0.030] 
4+ 
 
0.015 
[0.019] 
-0.002 
[0.032] 
-0.024 
[0.030] 
Age  
(At Start) 
  
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0 
[0.001] 
0 
[0.001] 
Male 
  
-0.028 
[0.018] 
-0.031 
[0.025] 
-0.091** 
[0.031] 
Any Past 
Complaints 
  
0.006 
[0.014] 
-0.007 
[0.019] 
-0.011 
[0.018] 
Education 
Associate’s 
  
0.005 
[0.028] 
 
Bachelor’s 
  
0.014 
[0.027] 
 
Master’s/ 
Doctorate 
  
-0.011 
[0.032] 
 
  
 
257. An asterisk (*) denotes an estimate that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level; two aster-
isks (**) denote an estimate that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. While our thresh-
old of statistical significance throughout the paper is 0.05, we also note estimates that are 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level with a dagger (†). Cluster-robust standard errors clus-
tered at the person-level are reported in brackets. 
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Hiring  
Agency 
Proportion Black 
   
-0.025 
[0.050] 
Proportion  
Hispanic 
   
-0.062 
[0.041] 
Violent-Crime 
Rate  
(Per 100,000) 
   
0 
[0.000] 
Property-Crime 
Rate  
(Per 100,000) 
   
0 
[0.000] 
County-Level 
Unemployment 
Rate 
   
0.031 
[0.313] 
Expenditures Per 
Officer (2008) 
   
0 
[0.000] 
Hiring Re- 
quirement Score 
   
0.003 
[0.005] 
Training Re-
quirement Score 
   
-0.007 
[0.006] 
No. of Officers 
   
-0.003* 
[0.001] 
Separating 
Agency 
No. of Officers 
   
-0.003** 
[0.001] 
n 
 
3,533 3,533 1,390 1,451 
 
Taken together, what should we make of these results? Assuming a law-en-
forcement agency will hire a wandering officer, are there ways to reduce the 
risks? Our models provide little optimism on this front. Most of the models sug-
gest that, among wandering officers who are hired again, those who have sepa-
rated voluntarily from at least one job since their last firing are less likely to be 
fired again. The models also suggest that officers coming from or going to 
smaller agencies may be slightly less likely to be fired. Beyond that, however, the 
regression models provide little consistent evidence about how to predict which 
wandering officers will be fired again. 
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vi.  mechanisms and reforms 
We have found that an average of over one thousand wandering officers were 
working in full-time Florida law-enforcement jobs in any given year between 
1988 and 2016. Many of these officers found work by migrating to smaller, less 
desirable agencies—measured by resources per officer—than the agencies that 
fired them. They were then fired and subjected to complaints alleging “moral 
character violations” at higher rates than officers who had never been fired be-
fore, even when we restrict the latter group to officers who were hired around 
the same time and place by similarly desirable agencies. Although we cannot be 
sure why wandering officers experienced these adverse outcomes, after a review 
of several hypotheses, we think the most straightforward explanation is also the 
most plausible one: wandering officers simply behave worse than officers who 
have never been fired. These results appear generally consistent with the perti-
nent labor economics literature and, in particular, with the closest study on 
point, which concerns the labor mobility and behavior of financial advisers who 
commit misconduct.
258
 
If wandering officers are so risky, one might reasonably ask, why do police 
chiefs keep hiring them? Our data do not permit us to isolate a single mecha-
nism, and we doubt that there is only one cause in any event. In this final Part, 
we consider five plausible explanations along with the policy implications of 
each. In Section A, we examine the possibility that agencies may not know they 
are hiring wandering officers. In Section B, we consider whether agencies may 
not appreciate the risks that wandering officers pose. In Section C, drawing upon 
our empirical analysis in Section IV.B.4, we discuss whether wandering officers 
are simply the best available candidates—that is, if they are hired when no 
stronger candidate is available. In Section D, we explore the benefits that might 
make wandering officers attractive notwithstanding their risks. Finally, in Sec-
tion E, we discuss the possibility that agencies are not concerned about the risks 
of hiring wandering officers because, generally speaking, they do not bear the 
costs of any resulting harms. 
A. Poor Information 
In some instances, an agency may hire a wandering officer simply because it 
does not know about the officer’s past. Indeed, agencies do not always complete 
adequate background checks, possibly due to unprofessional organizational cul-
ture or resource constraints. The Cleveland Police Department, for instance, 
“never reviewed [the] personnel file” for Tim Loehmann, who shot and killed 
 
258. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text. 
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Tamir Rice.
259
 In addition, some candidates may deliberately conceal their pro-
fessional history. Much of the small academic literature on wandering officers 
emphasizes this explanation for the ability of wandering officers to find work.
260
 
The favored solution here is to build a robust national decertification data-
base. Such a database would record state agency decisions to decertify officers 
and make them available for local agencies in other states to see. A small group 
of academics has been pushing this idea for decades and, in 2015, the President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing lent its imprimatur.
261
 To be sure, a national 
database does already exist—the NDI described in Part I. But its coverage is poor. 
Some states “have decided it’s a drain on resources to contribute to the index 
[and] the state-by-state discrepancies significantly limit the database’s effective-
ness.”
262
 As one reference point, Georgia decertified 562 officers in 2015 but sub-
mitted nothing to the database.
263
 
Our data and findings highlight both the importance and limits of a national 
decertification database as a tool to stop wandering officers. On the one hand, 
our finding that wandering officers are more likely than other officers to be fired, 
including for misconduct, and more likely to be subject to serious misconduct 
complaints, underscores the importance of some kind of national—and manda-
tory—tracking system. Such a tool could help agencies avoid hiring wandering 
officers who saunter in from other states. 
On the other hand, as the Loehmann example demonstrates—along with all 
of our own findings—the focus on interstate movement seems to skip a step. 
Wandering officers frequently move around within a single state. Even before 
we get to any national database, background checks should be standardized and 
 
259. Dewan & Oppel, supra note 1; see CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE FOR THE N. DIST. OF OHIO, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE 
(2014) (detailing systemic and structural deficiencies in the department). On the importance 
of organizational culture more generally, see Armacost, supra note 43. 
260. See, e.g., Atherley & Hickman, supra note 80, at 435-36 (describing impediments to the flow 
of information necessary to vet candidates thoroughly); Bell, supra note 32, at 2137 (explaining 
that “resource constraints make it more difficult” for agencies “to discriminate between good 
and bad officers”); Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548 (“[T]he second department may 
be unaware of the previous misconduct, either because the first department would not dis-
close the officer’s previous misconduct, or because the second department does not conduct a 
thorough background check.”). 
261. See, e.g., Atherley & Hickman, supra note 80, at 435-36; Goldman & Puro, supra note 53, at 76-
78; Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 575-78; see also PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CEN-
TURY POLICING, supra note 41, at 29. 
262. Fisher, supra note 25. 
263. Id. 
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mandatory (as they are in some states, including Florida). There is some sug-
gestion, mentioned earlier, that background checks are taxing on very small or 
resource-strapped departments. If so, states or the federal government should 
consider subsidizing or otherwise assisting local agencies in conducting the nec-
essary investigation of officer candidates. 
In addition, even if the database includes every decertification decision na-
tionwide, it is useful only if states regularly decertify problem officers. But they 
do not.
264
 Recall that five states plus the District of Columbia, employing a sig-
nificant share of all law-enforcement officers nationally, have no decertification 
option at all. Another twenty states require a criminal conviction before an officer 
can be decertified. And according to one study, in 2015, over half of all police 
decertifications reported to the NDI came from Florida and Georgia, while Lou-
isiana, Mississippi, and Wyoming did not decertify a single officer
265
—in fact, 
Louisiana has not decertified anyone in at least a decade.
266
 Even in states that 
do decertify a relatively high number of officers, moreover, decertification is still 
rare. Only a small subset of misconduct will render an officer eligible for decer-
tification.
267
 It is worth pointing out that, to our knowledge, none of the employ-
ment stints in our study—including those of wandering officers—was held by an 
officer who had been decertified in Florida before the stint began.
268
 
The federal government—through an exercise of Congress’s spending 
power—could encourage the states to decertify officers under specified condi-
tions. Short of that, the most productive reform might be to expand the substan-
tive coverage of the national database. Rather than merely cover officer decertifi-
cations, the database ought to record at least all misconduct-related terminations, 
and probably all involuntary terminations or all separations of any kind. This 
would resemble the National Practitioner Databank (NPDB) that tracks medical 
 
264. See, e.g., Puro et al., supra note 85, at 494 (“The decertification authority is available [in most 
states] but may not be implemented in many states owing to factors such as a lack of political 
will by the state legislature, insufficient staffing at the POST, or lack of participation by local 
police chiefs or sheriffs.”). 
265. Fisher, supra note 25. 
266. Kelly et al., supra note 23. 
267. See Fisher, supra note 25 (“I think some people are under the misimpression that if a cop gets 
fired for anything really bad, they’re going to get decertified, and that is not the case. . . . It’s 
a very narrow range of behavior that will cause them to lose their certification.” (quoting Sue 
Rahr, former police chief and member of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Polic-
ing)). 
268. It is possible that some had been decertified and later recertified. It is also possible that some 
had been decertified in another state before moving to Florida. 
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malpractice and fraud.
269
 In fact, the NPDB goes further, requiring reporting of 
not only employment separations but also malpractice payments and certain dis-
ciplinary actions.
270
 In the 1990s, Congress actually considered two bills that 
sought to establish a federal clearinghouse of law-enforcement “employment 
termination data.”
271
 Both died in committee.
272
 Some states have recently taken 
steps in this direction for their in-state databases. A 2016 Illinois law, for exam-
ple, requires local agencies to notify the state POST board of any “final determi-
nation of willful violation of department or agency policy, official misconduct, 
or violation of law” in connection with an officer’s termination or resignation.
273
 
If other states enact similar reforms, an effective national database will be that 
much closer to reality. 
B. Unawareness of Risk 
Some agencies may know they are hiring wandering officers but may not 
know that wandering officers are, in general, risky hires.
274
 After all, plenty of 
wandering officers do not reoffend,
275
 and plenty of officers who have not been 
fired before commit misconduct. In fact, police administrators sometimes make 
the plausible argument that wandering officers should be more conscientious 
than others because they have been reprimanded before—they know, in other 
 
269. National Practitioner Data Bank, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/GCA9-7W7M]; see Goldman & 
Puro, supra note 26, at 575. 
270. See Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malpractice 
Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2006). 
271. Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment Registration Act of 1996, H.R. 
3263, 104th Cong. § 2(5) (1996); Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment 
Registration Act of 1995, S. 484, 104th Cong. § 2(5) (1995). 
272. Fisher, supra note 25. 
273. Illinois Police Training Act, 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705 / 6.2(a) (2019). But see Toner & Rutecki, 
supra note 25 (reporting in 2018 that only twenty-six officers’ names had been submitted and 
that ten of the twenty-six had gone on to find additional police work). 
274. See, e.g., Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (describing a city manager who knowingly hired of-
ficers who had been fired for perjury, excessive force, and making false statements—but not 
decertified—reasoning that, “[i]f the [certifying] commission says they’re good to go, they’re 
good to go”); cf. Egan et al., supra note 129, at 237 (hypothesizing that financial advisers with 
records of misconduct may find work because unsophisticated customers do not know “how 
to interpret” their records). 
275. See, e.g., Shockey-Eckles, supra note 26, at 304-05 (relating the story of a wandering officer 
who “salvaged his career,” was named officer of the year, and was promoted to lieutenant in 
his new agency). 
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words, that they are not invincible.
276
 Very few agencies, we suspect, hire enough 
wandering officers to notice that, in the aggregate, the pattern of their behavior 
actually seems to cut the other way. 
Police administrators are now on notice. Even when well intentioned—as a 
second chance for a hard-working cop—hiring a wandering officer is risky busi-
ness. Wandering officers, we have shown, are fired and subjected to moral-char-
acter complaints more often than other officers. Notably, they are riskier, by our 
measures, than even officers hired as rookies. Our findings are consistent with 
prior studies, using different data and methods, that examined police miscon-
duct without focusing on wandering officers specifically. White and Kane, for 
example, found that New York City officers with “red flags” early in their careers 
were at greatest risk of dismissal later on.
277
 Machine-learning researchers who 
developed an early intervention system to predict adverse events for Charlotte-
Mecklenburg officers found that “[t]he most predictive features of the model 
were those relevant to the prior [internal affairs] history of the officer.”
278
 And 
Kyle Rozema and Max Schanzenbach found that Chicago officers who receive 
more civilian complaints are more likely to be sued later for civil-rights viola-
tions.
279
 
In light of this evidence, law-enforcement agencies should be wary of know-
ingly hiring wandering officers and, when they do make such hires, should be 
realistic about the risk they assume. Agencies should consider enhanced moni-
toring and support of wandering officers as a potential way to manage this risk. 
They might also promulgate recidivist penalties for officers—common in the 
substantive criminal law—designed to deter misconduct by this high-risk pop-
ulation. (Some may have already.) And if given the choice between two wander-
ing-officer candidates, one of whom was just fired and one of whom was fired 
earlier in his career, our evidence suggests that agencies ought to opt for the lat-
ter, all else equal. 
C. Inadequate Alternatives 
Many have assumed that hiring a wandering officer is an obvious manage-
ment blunder. It certainly appears so after the fact, when the public learns that 
 
276. See Cormier & Doig, supra note 25. 
277. Michael D. White & Robert J. Kane, Pathways to Career-Ending Police Misconduct: An Exami-
nation of Patterns, Timing, and Organizational Responses to Officer Malfeasance in the NYPD, 40 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1301, 1316 (2013). 
278. Carton et al., supra note 101, at 72. 
279. Rozema & Schanzenbach, supra note 101, at 251-55. 
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an officer who hurt someone had previously been fired by another agency. But 
these cases alone, tragic as they are, actually tell us little about the wisdom of the 
decision from an ex ante perspective. Even if agencies suspect that, on average, 
wandering officers carry certain risks, they might still be making optimal hiring 
decisions under the circumstances. The wandering officers who are hired might 
be less risky than the available alternative candidates.
280
 That wandering officers 
tend to migrate to agencies with fewer resources is evidence consistent with this 
account. Certainly, if law-enforcement agencies were epistemically sophisti-
cated, profit-driven private entities that internalized the costs of bad hiring de-
cisions, this story would be compelling. As we discuss in Section E below, how-
ever, there are reasons to think most agencies are not like this. 
Fortunately, we were able to do more than speculate in this way. We were 
able, as detailed in Part IV above, to identify, for each wandering officer, a plau-
sible candidate cohort—a group of officers who were hired around the same time 
by nearby, and similarly desirable, agencies. This group roughly approximates 
the type of officers who may have been candidates for the job the wandering 
officer ultimately obtained. As we showed, although this cohort is riskier than 
the general population of officers who have never been fired, the wandering of-
ficers are riskier still. It would be preferable, of course, to compare the wandering 
officers to the actual officers who competed for the same jobs, but that infor-
mation is unavailable. In its absence, our cohort analysis provides some evidence 
that agencies are not always making the optimal hiring decision. 
Nevertheless, it remains possible that a shallow applicant pool does explain 
some wandering-officer hiring. If so, and assuming additional hires are actually 
necessary, the solution may be to improve the pool of candidates by raising com-
pensation or improving outreach and recruitment.
281
 This, of course, is likely far 
easier said than done. Still, to the extent that officials allocating budgets have not 
 
280. See, e.g., Atherley & Hickman, supra note 80, at 421 (explaining that small agencies sometimes 
consciously hire wandering officers when “financial resources are limited and lateral officers 
are simply scarce”); Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548 (“Although it might seem unusual 
for a police department to hire an officer with a past record of misconduct, the second depart-
ment is usually located in a poor community that cannot afford to pay high salaries to its 
police.”); Cohen, supra note 40 (“[I]f it’s not an attractive department, you’d have . . . very 
few applicants, and it’s a matter of getting the best of the worst.” (quoting Vincent del Cas-
tillo)); Kyle Hopkins, The Village Where Every Cop Has Been Convicted of Domestic Violence, 
PROPUBLICA (July 18, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/stebbins-alaska 
-cops-criminal-records-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/TC68-2YFY] (describing small 
Alaskan communities in which all applicants for law-enforcement jobs have criminal records). 
281. Cf., e.g., Johnson, supra note 241 (“L[i]ke the mayor, the chief is concerned about the town’s 
ability to draw candidates to small-town policing ‘when you can make more at McDonalds.’” 
(quoting Roger Dowell, Police Chief, Damascus, Va.)). 
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perceived a problem, our findings might encourage them to reconsider. Locali-
ties that are forced to hire wandering officers might appeal to intergovernmental 
sources of funding, such as the state, for assistance in subsidizing salary en-
hancements. 
Another way to improve the candidate pool may be to reduce barriers to en-
try into the profession. This could include minimizing financial barriers, such as 
the cost of the requisite training or education. Another possibility—although not 
one without risks—is to relax the stringency of hiring requirements. Because re-
search finds that more educated officers, for example, tend to commit less mis-
conduct, many assume that agencies should raise their education require-
ments.
282
 But higher education requirements may screen out some otherwise-
excellent candidates—candidates who might be a superior choice to a better-ed-
ucated wandering officer. More research is warranted on the effects of hiring re-
quirements on the makeup and performance of the police forces they yield. 
D. Countervailing Benefits 
Some agencies may understand that wandering officers are risky—riskier, 
even, than alternative candidates—but hire them because of the benefits, both 
cultural and financial, they’re perceived to bring. The chief, for example, may be 
looking for a “cowboy” officer to work the toughest beat—someone who’s savvy 
and unafraid to do what’s necessary to “clean up the streets.”
283
 Some agency 
leaders may even believe they are doing a service to the profession by helping a 
cast-out comrade find his way. Unlike a new recruit, a wandering officer has 
earned his spot in policing’s “band of brothers”;
284
 that he has been fired may 
signal only that he was unfairly maligned or fell victim to “politics.”
285
 The 
chance to right this perceived wrong may generate for some chiefs a “warm 
 
282. See, e.g., KANE & WHITE, supra note 38, at 105. 
283. See, e.g., Toner & Rutecki, supra note 25 (“Certain officers are more active than other offic-
ers. . . . You have officers that are out there simply looking for the bad elements. They are 
looking for the criminals. They are looking for the drugs. They are looking for the guns out 
there, which is what they should be doing.” (quoting Robert Collins Jr., Police Chief, Dolton, 
Ill.)). 
284. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY V act 4, sc. 3 (MIT ed. 1993) (“We few, we happy 
few, we band of brothers; / For he to-day that sheds his blood with me / Shall be my 
brother . . . .”). 
285. Kelly et al., supra note 23 (“Former New Orleans police superintendent Ronal Serpas said that 
sheriffs and other chiefs often justify rehiring officers by dismissing their problems as ‘politi-
cal.’”). 
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glow” that actually makes a wandering officer more, not less, attractive than a 
nonwandering alternative.
286
  
Alternatively, agencies might hire wandering officers who are riskier than the 
marginal hires if the costs of doing so are lower. Because collective-bargaining 
agreements in many law-enforcement agencies across the country, and in Florida 
specifically, establish scheduled pay raises based primarily on years of service, 
police administrators typically have little discretion over salaries.
287
 It is there-
fore unlikely that an administrator would hire a wandering officer simply be-
cause that officer is willing to accept a lower salary than a similarly experienced 
marginal candidate who has never been fired. But wandering officers might be 
cheaper than rookies. In many jurisdictions, hiring agencies must pay to send 
new recruits to the police academy and fund their salaries during training as 
 
286. See, e.g., Cormier & Doig, supra note 25 (“‘This stuff is supposed to follow you forever? . . . 
Of course I’m going to give somebody a second chance.’” (quoting Roberto Fulgueira, Police 
Chief of the Sweetwater Police Department)); Schaefer & Kaufman, supra note 20 (describing 
police chief who considers his agency “a place where cops can earn a second chance”); cf. Maya 
Lau & Matt Stiles, L.A. County Sheriff Alex Villanueva Reinstates Four More Fired Deputies,  
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-sheriff-more 
-reinstatements-20190405-story.html [https://perma.cc/4L8C-4MNV] (describing a sheriff 
who “argued that previous sheriffs were too harsh in punishing deputies and he wants to be 
fairer” and who campaigned “on a promise to correct the wrongs of the past, including . . . 
addressing the cases of deputies who’d been unfairly disciplined through a ‘truth and recon-
ciliation’ panel”). On the concept of “warm glow,” see James Andreoni, Giving with Impure 
Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1447 (1989). 
287. See, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2205 
(2014) (describing the New York Police Department’s wage schedule, in which “pay de-
pend[s] on the length of employment, not officer performance”); Agreement Between the City 
of Boca Raton and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #35, CITY OF BOCA RATON 81 (2017), http://
bocaraton.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.php?file=bocaraton_459d440a463643240879
eb6b939e5406.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRH6-QDBP]; Agreement Between the City of St. Peters-
burg and Sun Coast Police Benevolent Association for Police Officers and Technicians, CITY OF ST. 
PETERSBURG 35, 42 (2016), https://www.stpete.org/city_departments/human_resources
/docs/PBA%20Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NCN-6P8G]; City of Orlando Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement with Fraternal Order of Police, Orlando Lodge #25, CITY OF ORLANDO  
85-87 (2016), https://orlando.novusagenda.com/AgendaPublic/AttachmentViewer.ashx 
?AttachmentID=69269&ItemID=41183 [https://perma.cc/S3P2-KW9X]. 
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well.
288
 Training also creates delay; wandering officers join the agency ready to 
deploy.
289
 
While not easy, it may be possible to diminish the influence of these per-
ceived benefits on agencies’ hiring decisions. With respect to the cultural factors, 
scholars and even some police leaders are increasingly challenging the notion 
that high crime—even violent crime—demands a militaristic response.
290
 The 
idea is that Guardian Officers, not Warrior Cops, may best accomplish the aspi-
rational aim of law enforcement: “protecting civilians from unnecessary indig-
nity and harm.”
291
 “[R]ethinking the professional self-image of policing and 
changing some of the core values that inform officers’ actions and decisions” will 
not be easy,
292
 but instructive examples do exist.
293
 By foregrounding the service 
 
288. See, e.g., Goldman & Puro, supra note 26, at 548 (explaining that, when they hire wandering 
officers, “[d]epartments need not pay for the costs of a training academy or the salary of the 
trainee while he is in training”); Williams, supra note 21 (“[S]maller departments and those 
that lack sufficient funding or are understaffed are most likely to hire applicants with prob-
lematic pasts if they have completed state-mandated training, which allows departments to 
avoid the cost of sending them to the police academy.”). In Florida, for example, local agencies 
are authorized, though not legally required, to pay police-academy tuition. See FLA. STAT. 
§ 943.16 (2019). Most do: according to CJAP data, in both 2008 and 2016, 70% of the re-
sponding police departments and sheriffs’ offices reimbursed tuition costs. As a point of ref-
erence, tuition at one program in 2019 ran roughly $3,400 for Florida residents and $10,000 
for out-of-state residents. Law Enforcement Officer, GA. STONE TECH. COLL., https:// 
gstc-ecsd-fl.schoolloop.com/pf4/cms2/view_page?d=x&group_id=1356612364276&vdid
=i31g1yerxd3mb [https://perma.cc/VT2Z-HWT8]. Given that so many agencies pay these 
costs, it may be extremely difficult for agencies that do not to hire new recruits. 
289. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 21 (explaining that wandering officers “can start work almost 
immediately”); Yoder, supra note 25 (“Given the opportunity to hire a licensed officer who can 
start immediately and for whom the hiring agency doesn’t need to pay training costs, [a small 
department] may decide to ignore their history.”). 
290. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 41, at 11; Seth W. 
Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
611, 626-27 (2016); Kate Mather, LAPD Urges Officers to Be Community Guardians, Not War-
riors on Crime, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/crime
/la-me-warrior-guardians-20150821-story.html [https://perma.cc/A8BW-F94Z]; Nick  
Morgan, From Warriors to Guardians, MAIL TRIB. (Medford, Or.) (Mar. 4, 2016), 
http://www.mailtribune.com/article/20160304/NEWS/160309853 [https://perma.cc
/ZN3F-4Z36]. 
291. Stoughton, supra note 290, at 614. 
292. Id. at 612. 
293. See, e.g., Sue Rahr & Stephen K. Rice, From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American 
Police Culture to Democratic Ideals, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING BULL., Apr. 2015, at 7-11, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248654.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX5L-4NV5] (describ-
ing training curriculum reforms in Washington designed to cultivate a guardian mentality by 
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aspects of the job, these same reforms might help temper the “band of brothers” 
mentality that may lead chiefs to pity, or at least identify with, wandering offic-
ers. Litigation targeting legal rules that reinforce a self-protective, insular mind-
set might, over time, gradually erode that mentality as well.
294
 
The perceived financial benefits—that wandering officers are cheaper to hire 
than new recruits—may be more straightforward to neutralize. If agencies are 
hiring officers with troubled histories to avoid the startup costs of educating and 
training new recruits, then they should not be asked to pay these costs. If the 
locality itself cannot allot more money to the police department’s budget, state 
and federal authorities may need to intervene. The idea is not a fanciful one—
the federal government, for example, already supports local policing with tens 
of billions of dollars. Rachel Harmon has argued that much of this money goes 
to programs that are ineffective or that may do more harm than good.
295
 If that 
is right, the suggestion here is simply to repurpose some of these funds to pay 
for training rather than tanks.
296
 To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that 
agencies are correct to think that a wandering officer is cheaper than a rookie in 
the long run. Even if a wandering officer is less costly upfront, what he gives 
with one hand he may take away with the other, later, in the form of attrition 
and potential civil liability. All told, the best approach may be to ensure that 
agencies are internalizing these countervailing costs, a point to which we now 
turn. 
E. Cost Externalization 
Finally, agencies may hire wandering officers because they externalize, and 
therefore discount, the costs of doing so—in other words, they know it’s risky 
but they don’t care.
297
 Agencies’ principal financial exposure comes from law-
suits against officers for the harms their misconduct inflicts. Although these ac-
tions technically run against the defendant officers as individuals, officers are 
 
emphasizing the nobility of policing, procedural justice, crisis intervention, tactical social in-
teraction, and respect). 
294. See Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge 
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213. 
295. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 
876, 883-84 (2015). 
296. See id. at 918-29 (describing federal grant programs that finance the acquisition of militaristic 
equipment). 
297. See, e.g., Dill, supra note 19 (“You have some agencies that take the approach, we need warm 
bodies, so they will hire that [wandering] individual . . . .” (quoting Union County, South 
Carolina Sheriff David Taylor)). 
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virtually always indemnified by the employing locality.
298
 Yet, even setting aside 
the fact that many civilians wronged by the police will never sue, the locality 
itself bears relatively limited exposure due to robust qualified immunity protec-
tions that immunize “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.”
299
 
Moreover, even when the locality does incur liability on behalf of an officer, 
there are additional impediments to the generation of effective behavioral incen-
tives for those who run the agency. Roughly half of the agencies covered by one 
recent study contribute nothing to the satisfaction of lawsuits brought against 
them; central government funds are used to pay the bills.
300
 Not all of the agen-
cies that do contribute, moreover, actually experience financial pressures; some, 
for example, pay from funds that were earmarked for litigation costs alone.
301
 
All told, because of these complexities in the way localities finance liability costs, 
the majority of agencies suffer no financial consequences when liability costs in-
crease—they do not “feel the burn,” so to speak.
302
 And though political pres-
sures may increase with liability, most agencies do not track or analyze infor-
mation about police litigation in a way that could facilitate learning and 
improvement.
303
 
Municipalities are also exposed to direct liability for faulty hiring deci-
sions.
304
 But the opening for plaintiffs is narrow, limited to situations in which 
an officer’s misconduct was a “plainly obvious consequence of the decision to 
hire” the officer.
305
 That said, courts have upheld claims “where there is a close 
connection between information a municipality did or should have learned about 
an employee in the hiring process and the constitutional violation that ultimately 
occurred.”
306
 In one recent case, an officer who had previously been fired from 
 
298. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014). 
299. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see, e.g., Carbado, supra note 47, at 1519-24. But cf. 
Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9-10 (2017) (finding that 
qualified immunity rarely ends civil rights cases, although allowing that it may discourage 
people from ever filing suit). 
300. Schwartz, supra note 49, at 1148. 
301. Id. at 1149. 
302. See id. at 1203. 
303. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in 
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010) (finding that officials do not 
typically learn from civil-rights lawsuits to make informed decisions about how to modify 
agency policy). 
304. Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). 
305. Id. at 411. 
306. AVERY ET AL., supra note 48, at 606; see id. at 607 n.15 (collecting cases). 
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four separate law-enforcement agencies shot and killed the former mayor of a 
small town in South Carolina. Shortly after the incident, the town’s police chief 
noted that, despite the officer’s rocky past, he had “proven himself” at his current 
job: “He’s done a good job, so I guess he got a second chance.”
307
 The decedent’s 
family sued, alleging, among other theories, negligent hiring by the town. A jury 
awarded the family almost one hundred million dollars, including sixty million 
in punitive damages against the town.
308
 
Given our evidence about the risks wandering officers pose, the jury in a case 
like this—or a court deciding a dispositive motion—is justified in deeming an 
agency’s decision to hire a wandering officer (or failure to conduct an adequate 
background investigation) to be probative of fault. The more serious the officer’s 
past misconduct, the more probative the evidence is. Nevertheless, wandering-
officer status remains but one risk factor among many and rarely should be dis-
positive.
309
 
Increased judicial willingness to entertain negligent-hiring suits concerning 
wandering officers might, on the margins, affect the frequency with which wan-
dering officers are hired. Yet the impediments just discussed—to translating fi-
nancial liability into constructive behavioral incentives—are every bit as power-
ful here as in the case of individual officer liability. To the extent these 
impediments contribute to the hiring of wandering officers, the appropriate re-
sponse would be to improve the system’s mechanisms of accountability so that 
agencies internalize the costs of their hiring decisions. But this is hardly a novel 
suggestion; indeed, it is clear by now there is no straightforward solution. Po-
lice-liability insurers might pitch in by converting the “large but improbable po-
tential liabilities” of negligent hiring into more salient premium dollars.
310
 By 
raising premiums for agencies that hire wandering officers, for example, insurers 
would force local governments to pay for the incremental increase in risk that 
 
307. Harve Jacobs, Cop Accused of Shooting Ex-Mayor Had Previous Encounter, Chief Says, WCSC 
(June 24, 2011, 3:15 AM), http://www.live5news.com/story/14655413/sled-investigate-officer
-involved-shooting-in-cottageville [https://perma.cc/UYD8-VLHL]. 
308. See Heath Hamacher, A Matter of Force: $97.5M Jury Award Trains a Spotlight on the Issue of Law 
Enforcement Hiring, S.C. LAW. WKLY. (Oct. 27, 2014), https://sclawyersweekly.com/news
/2014/10/27/a-matter-of-force-97-5m-jury-award-trains-a-spotlight-on-the-issue-of-law 
-enforcement-hiring [https://perma.cc/3RZG-3U69]. The parties later settled for $10 mil-
lion. South Carolina Mayor’s Death Settlement Reduced to $10M, INS. J. (Mar. 16, 2015), https://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/03/16/360555.htm [https://perma.cc
/9QVN-5MD3]. 
309. See supra Part II (reviewing research on other officer-level correlates of misconduct). 
310. John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1607 
(2017). 
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wandering officers present regardless whether that risk ultimately material-
ized.
311
 Here, too, however, according special treatment to wandering-officer 
status may make most sense if other officer-level risk factors are also considered. 
Of course, many costs of wrongful policing are nonpecuniary in nature. Po-
lice misconduct humiliates and degrades its subjects, creates racial disparities in 
criminal-justice outcomes, causes negative health consequences, and breeds cyn-
icism toward the police—which, in turn, can “stymie or hinder public safety ef-
forts and, instead, keep crime rates higher in the same communities where fair 
and just policing practices are most needed.”
312
 Agencies externalize many of 
these nonpecuniary costs as well.
313
 Improving transparency ought to allow the 
public to monitor the police more effectively and thus to exert pressure on polit-
ical actors to account for these neglected costs of policing.
314
 In the meantime, 
federal pattern-or-practice lawsuits might help to achieve organizational change 
where financial penalties do not. The federal government could consider the hir-
ing of wandering officers, for example, when determining whether and how to 
target particular agencies under 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
315
 
Barring successful general-accountability reforms, and if future research cor-
roborates our findings, states could consider the “nuclear option” that Connect-
icut invoked in 2015. Connecticut law now prohibits any local agency from hiring 
 
311. See id.; see also id. at 1555 (describing “feature rating” of insurance policies, the practice of 
“charging more to riskier customers . . . based on the presence of traits correlated with riski-
ness”). 
312. Marie Ouellet et al., Network Exposure and Excessive Use of Force: Investigating the Social Trans-
mission of Police Misconduct, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 675 (2019); see Harmon, supra note 
295, at 901-05. As Harmon points out, lawful policing can impose many of these costs as well. 
Harmon, supra note 295, at 904. 
313. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 295, at 939 (explaining that, “[f]or local governments to func-
tion as a check on the nonbudgetary costs of policing, the public must be able to monitor and 
attribute responsibility for the harm the police do, and political actors must be able to influ-
ence police conduct,” and highlighting ways that federal policing programs “undermine these 
preconditions for local accountability”). 
314. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 
1838 (2015) (“The people must be able to see what their agents are doing so they can evaluate 
those actions and exercise control as necessary.”). 
315. Some of the important sources on § 14141 include Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights 
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009); Debra Livingston, Police Reform 
and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815 (1999); 
Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189 (2014); and 
Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department Pattern 
or Practice Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3 (2003). For more information, see 
also CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND 
PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT (2017). 
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an officer who was previously employed by another Connecticut agency and who 
“(1) was dismissed for malfeasance or other serious misconduct calling into 
question such person’s fitness to serve as a police officer; or (2) resigned or re-
tired from such officer’s position while under investigation for such malfeasance 
or other serious misconduct.”
316
 We are not prepared, on the basis of our evi-
dence alone, to offer a full-throated defense of the nuclear option, but it is cer-
tainly a plausible backstop, and it could be useful to study Connecticut’s experi-
ence to develop a better sense of the costs and benefits of going down this road. 
conclusion 
Not all those who wander are lost, but in policing, many are. In any given 
year over the last three decades, an average of roughly 1,100 full-time law-en-
forcement officers in Florida walk the streets having been fired in the past, and 
almost 800 having been fired for misconduct, not counting the many who were 
fired and reinstated in arbitration. These officers, we have shown, are subse-
quently fired and subjected to “moral character” complaints at elevated rates rel-
ative to both officers hired as rookies and veterans with clean professional histo-
ries. And we likely underestimate the prevalence of the phenomenon nationwide. 
We have, moreover, only a partial understanding of the extent of the problem 
wandering officers pose. Beyond their own misbehavior, wandering officers may 
undermine efforts to improve police culture, as they carry their baggage to new 
locales. Worse yet, wandering officers may “infect” other officers upon arrival,
317
 
causing misconduct to metastasize to the farthest reaches of the law-enforcement 
community. Future research should investigate these possibilities. 
  
 
316. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-291c(a) (2019). 
317. Cf. Ouellet et al., supra note 312 (suggesting that peers influence whether an individual officer 
will engage in misconduct); Edika G. Quispe-Torreblanca & Neil Stewart, Causal Peer Effects 
in Police Misconduct, 3 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 797 (2019) (estimating peer effects in police mis-
conduct); Daria Roithmayr, The Dynamics of Excessive Force, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 407 (argu-
ing that use of excessive force should be thought of as contagious); Thibaut Horel et  
al., The Contagiousness of Police Violence (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law 
.uchicago.edu/files/2018-11/chicago_contagiousness_of_violence.pdf [https://perma.cc
/FX67-9XJ6] (studying whether police shootings are “contagious”). 
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appendix 
FIGURE A1. 
proportion of separations in which officer obtains subsequent employment 
within three years, by professional history of firing for misconduct, 1988-
2013 
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TABLE A1.  
frequency distribution of raw separation codes, 1988-2016 
Separation Code 
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
io
n
 
F
ir
e
d
 
F
ir
e
d
 f
o
r
 
M
is
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
 
Administrative - Unfavorable  
(Historical Use Only) 
928 0.009 Yes Yes
Misconduct  
(Historical Use Only) 
584 0.006 Yes Yes
No Cause for Decertification 
(Historical Use Only) 
90 0.001 Yes Yes
Resigned - Would Not Rehire  
(Historical Use Only) 
7 0 Yes Yes
Resigned/Retired in Lieu of Separation for 
Violating Agency/Training Center Policy 
270 0.003 Yes Yes
Resigned/Retired in Lieu of Separation for 
Violating Moral Character Standards 
216 0.002 Yes Yes
Resigned/Retired While Being Investigated 
for Violating Moral Character Standards 
1,027 0.01 Yes Yes
Resigned/Retired While Being Investigated 
for Violating Agency Policy 
1,039 0.01 Yes Yes
Terminated for Violating Agency Policy 
(No Moral Character Violation) 
1,143 0.011 Yes Yes
Terminated for Violating Ch. 943.13(4), 
FS or Moral Character Standards 
1,048 0.01 Yes Yes
Under Investigation  
(Historical Use Only) 
304 0.003 Yes Yes
Failure to Complete Basic 
Recruit Training 
476 0.005 Yes
Failure to Complete Elder  
Abuse Training 
114 0.001 Yes
Failure to Meet Mandatory  
Retraining Requirement 
438 0.004 Yes
Failure to Pass State 
Certification Examination 
70 0.001 Yes
Failure to Perform Assigned 
Tasks Satisfactorily 
283 0.003 Yes
Failure to Qualify with Firearm 225 0.002 Yes 
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Failure to Satisfactorily Complete Agency 
Field-Training Program 
1,083 0.011 Yes 
 
Involuntary Separation  
(Historical Use Only) 
2 0 Yes 
 
Other - Excessive Absence, Fail Report for 
Duty, Sleep on Duty, Etc. 
141 0.001 Yes 
 
Staff Termination  
(Historical Use Only) 
106 0.001 Yes 
 
Administrative Separation  
(Not Involving Misconduct) 
1,087 0.011 
  
Budgetary Constraints 86 0.001 
  
Deceased 707 0.007 
  
Extended Leave of Absence 17 0 
  
Extended Leave of Absence or Suspension 
(Historical Use Only) 
135 0.001 
  
Leave of Absence  
(Historical Use Only) 
10 0 
  
Military Leave of Absence 138 0.001 
  
Not Separated 39,344 0.39 
  
Processed Fingerprints Not Received 
Within One Year 
364 0.004 
  
Resigned/Retired  
(Historical Use Only) 
19 0 
  
Retired  
(Not Involving Misconduct) 
7,845 0.078 
  
Special Elected or Appointed Position 28 0 
  
Suspension 13 0 
  
Temporary Employment Authorization 
(Period Exceeded) 
48 0 
  
Transfer Within Agency  
(No Break in Service) 
5,658 0.056 
  
Voluntary Separation  
(Not Involving Misconduct) 
35,675 0.354 
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TABLE A2.  
descriptive statistics of cjap hiring requirements, 1997-2016 
  Mean SD Min Max n 
Age 
18 0.01 0.12 0 1 6,539 
19 0.64 0.48 0 1 6,539 
20 0.02 0.13 0 1 6,539 
21 0.33 0.47 0 1 6,539 
?22 0 0.07 0 1 6,539 
Education 
High School/ 
GED 
0.9 0.3 0 1 6,581 
Associate’s/ 
Some College 
0.09 0.29 0 1 6,581 
Bachelor’s 0.01 0.08 0 1 6,581 
Criminal-Justice  
Experience 
 
0.07 0.26 0 1 6,575 
Tobacco  
Requirement 
 
0.26 0.44 0 1 6,575 
Driving Test 
 
0.79 0.41 0 1 5,252 
Interview 
 
0.92 0.27 0 1 6,585 
Physical-Ability  
Test 
 
0.49 0.5 0 1 6,570 
Polygraph Test 
 
0.5 0.5 0 1 6,564 
Psychological  
Test 
 
0.75 0.43 0 1 6,562 
Selection Exam 
 
0.54 0.5 0 1 6,575 
Swimming Test 
 
0.09 0.29 0 1 6,254 
Vision Test 
 
0.61 0.49 0 1 6,570 
Voice Test 
 
0.23 0.42 0 1 5,906 
Probation Period  
(In Months) 
 
11.5 2.72 0 24 5,811 
Composite  
Requirement Score 
 
4.61 1.96 0 9 6,469 
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TABLE A3.  
descriptive statistics of cjap training variables, 1997-2016 
  Mean SD Min Max n 
Chemical 
Agents  
  Not Required 0.43 0.49 0 1 6,207 
  Every 24-48 Months 0.21 0.41 0 1 6,207 
  Every 6-12 Months 0.36 0.48 0 1 6,207 
Self- 
Defense 
  Not Required 0.39 0.49 0 1 6,530 
  Every 24-48 Months 0.17 0.38 0 1 6,530 
  Every 6-12 Months 0.44 0.50 0 1 6,530 
Driving  
  Not Required 0.59 0.49 0 1 6,521 
  Every 24-48 Months 0.20 0.40 0 1 6,521 
  Every 6-12 Months 0.20 0.40 0 1 6,521 
Firearm  
  Not Required 0.01 0.09 0 1 6,550 
  Every 12-48 Months 0.89 0.31 0 1 6,550 
  Every 6 Months 0.10 0.30 0 1 6,550 
In-Service  
  Not Required 0.85 0.36 0 1 5,192 
  Every 24-48 Months 0.02 0.14 0 1 5,192 
  Every 6-12 Months 0.13 0.34 0 1 5,192 
Medical  
  Not Required 0.31 0.46 0 1 6,527 
  Every 24-48 Months 0.49 0.50 0 1 6,527 
  Every 6-12 Months 0.21 0.40 0 1 6,527 
FTO 
 
11.96 5.91 0 52 6,486 
Continued 
 
0.68 0.47 0 1 5,887 
Composite  
Training Score 
 
2.91 1.44 0 6 6,094 
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TABLE A4. 
median time to new employment by demographic groups and professional 
history, 1988-2013 
  
Panel A: Fired Panel B: Fired for Misconduct 
  
Never 
Fired 
Fired, 
Last Job 
Fired, 
Earlier 
Job 
Never 
Fired 
Fired, 
Last Job 
Fired, 
Earlier 
Job 
R
a
c
e
 
White 
 
19 
(19,280) 
318 
(1,175) 
57 
(1,024) 
21 
(19,977) 
427 
(800) 
70 
(702) 
Black 
14 
(2,049) 
401 
(210) 
9 
(198) 
17 
(2,224) 
457 
(129) 
6 
(104) 
Hispanic 
11 
(2,519) 
470 
(212) 
14 
(154) 
12 
(2,649) 
553 
(137) 
21 
(99) 
G
e
n
d
e
r
 
Male 
15 
(21,451) 
335 
(1,441) 
27 
(1,288) 
17 
(22,327) 
442 
(986) 
46 
(867) 
Female 
61 
(2,750) 
406 
(180) 
55 
(98) 
75 
(2,892) 
692 
(92) 
36 
(44) 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
High School 
18 
(937) 
509 
(55) 
158 
(36) 
26 
(977) 
664 
(30) 
269 
(21) 
Associate’s 
16 
(3,401) 
322 
(247) 
42 
(179) 
18 
(3,538) 
498 
(162) 
70 
(127) 
Bachelor’s 
12 
(6,982) 
327 
(347) 
11 
(270) 
13 
(7,236) 
404 
(210) 
15 
(153) 
Master’s 
18 
(1,436) 
376 
(58) 
75 
(69) 
19  
(1,491) 
642 
(33) 
90 
(39) 
A
l
l
  17 
(24,205) 
350 
(1,621) 
28 
(1,386) 
18 
(25,223) 
450 
(1,078) 
46 
(911)  
TABLE A5.  
subsequent firing by professional history, 1996-2013 
   Fired Fired for Misconduct 
  
n Ever 3 Years Ever 3 Years 
Panel A: Firings 
Never 21,693 7.6% 4.0% 5.3% 2.3% 
Fired, last job 1,200 16.8% 10.8% 11.3% 6.7% 
Fired, earlier job 1,143 13.9% 7.0% 10.1% 5.0% 
Panel B: Firings 
for Misconduct 
Never 22,603 7.8% 4.1% 5.4% 2.4% 
Fired, last job 761 18.1% 11.3% 12.6% 7.2% 
Fired, earlier job 672 14.4% 7.4% 10.1% 5.4% 
Panel C: Rookie 
 
39,007 9.4% 5.4% 6.0% 2.5% 
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TABLE A6.  
subsequent firing by professional history with one-, three-, and five-year 
time windows, 1988-2013318 
  Fired Fired for Misconduct 
  
n 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 
Panel A:  
Firings 
Never 29,888 2.7% 4.5% 6.0% 1.5% 3.0% 4.3% 
Fired,  
last job 
1,969 7.3% 11.2% 13.7% 4.8% 7.9% 9.8% 
Fired,  
earlier job 
1,631 4.6% 7.5% 9.9% 3.2% 5.6% 7.5% 
Panel B:  
Firings 
for Mis-
conduct 
Never 31,182 2.8% 4.7% 6.1% 1.6% 3.1% 4.4% 
Fired,  
last job 
1,297 7.7% 12.2% 14.8% 5.4% 9.0% 11.2% 
Fired,  
earlier job 
1,009 5.2% 8.1% 10.7% 3.6% 6.2% 8.1% 
Panel C: 
Rookie 
 
54,476 3.8% 5.8% 7.3% 1.6% 3.2% 4.5% 
TABLE A7. 
subsequent firing by professional history for matched comparators based 
on timing, geography, and agency desirability, 1996-2013 
   
Fired Fired for Misconduct 
   
Ever 3 Years Ever 3 Years 
P
a
n
e
l 
A
:
 F
ir
in
g
s
 Never 
 
10% 5.4% 7.1 3.3 
Fired, last job 
Wanderer 16.7% 10.3% 11.3% 6.2% 
Comparator 9.03% 5.3% 6.2% 2.9% 
Fired, earlier job 
Wanderer 13.8% 6.7% 10.1% 5.0% 
Comparator 9.8% 5.4% 6.4% 2.7% 
P
a
n
e
l 
B
:
 F
ir
in
g
s
 
f
o
r
 M
is
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
 Never 
 
10.1% 5.5% 7.2% 3.3% 
Fired, last job 
Wanderer 17.5% 10.8% 12.2% 6.7% 
Comparator 9% 5.3% 6.0% 2.9% 
Fired, earlier job 
Wanderer 14.5% 7.2% 10.2% 5.4% 
Comparator 9.6% 5.3% 6% 2.6% 
 
318. For the 5-year time window, we exclude all job stints beginning after 2011 to ensure that we 
have at least 5 years of follow-up for each observation. The sample sizes are thus slightly 
smaller for these estimates. 
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TABLE A8.  
number of complaints by professional history with one-, three-, and five-
year time windows, 1993-2013 
 
  
n 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 
A
ll
 C
o
m
p
la
in
t
s
 
Panel A: Firings 
Never 24,711 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Fired, last job 1,394 0.02 0.07 0.09 
Fired, earlier job 1,295 0.02 0.05 0.06 
Panel B: Firings 
for Misconduct 
Never 25,686 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Fired, last job 934 0.03 0.08 0.10 
Fired, earlier job 780 0.02 0.05 0.07 
Panel C: Rookie Panel C: Rookie 44,584 0.01 0.03 0.04 
V
io
le
n
t
 a
n
d
 
S
e
x
u
a
l 
C
o
m
p
la
in
t
s
 
Panel A: Firings 
Never 24,711 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Fired, last job 1,394 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Fired, earlier job 1,295 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Panel B: Firings 
for Misconduct 
Never 25,686 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Fired, last job 934 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Fired, earlier job 780 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Panel C: Rookie Panel C: Rookie 44,584 0.00 0.01 0.01 
I
n
t
e
g
r
it
y
 C
o
m
p
la
in
t
s
 Panel A: Firings 
Never 24,711 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Fired, last job 1,394 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Fired, earlier job 1,295 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Panel B: Firings 
for Misconduct 
Never 25,686 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Fired, last job 934 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Fired, earlier job 780 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Panel C: Rookie Panel C: Rookie 44,584 0.00 0.01 0.01 
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TABLE A9.  
number of complaints by professional history for matched comparators 
based on timing, geography, and agency desirability, 1996-2013 
   
All 
Violent/ 
Sexual 
Integrity 
   
Ever 
3 
Years 
Ever 
3 
Years 
Ever 
3 
Years 
P
a
n
e
l 
A
:
 
F
ir
in
g
s
 
Never 
 
0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Fired,  
last job 
Wanderer 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 
Comparator 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Fired,  
earlier job 
Wanderer 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 
Comparator 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
P
a
n
e
l 
B
:
 
F
ir
in
g
s
 f
o
r
 
M
is
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
 
Never 
 
0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Fired,  
last job 
Wanderer 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 
Comparator 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Fired,  
earlier job 
Wanderer 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 
Comparator 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
TABLE A10.  
predicting if wandering officers are fired for misconduct again, 1988-2013 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
 
0.062** 
[0.008] 
0.060† 
[0.030] 
0.011 
[0.056] 
0.114* 
[0.054] 
Fired from 
Last Job 
 
0.029* 
[0.011] 
0.036* 
[0.015] 
0.063* 
[0.026] 
0.021 
[0.022] 
Job  
Number 
2 
 
0 
[0.023] 
-0.021 
[0.049] 
-0.03 
[0.037] 
3 
 
0.007 
[0.023] 
-0.009 
[0.049] 
-0.002 
[0.038] 
≥ 4  0.023 
[0.026] 
0.016 
[0.053] 
-0.012 
[0.039] 
Age  
(At Start) 
 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
Male 
 
0.007 
[0.021] 
-0.005 
[0.034] 
-0.031 
[0.036] 
Any Past 
Complaints 
 
-0.002 
[0.013] 
-0.011 
[0.020] 
-0.006 
[0.017] 
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Education 
Associate’s 
  
0.033 
[0.024] 
 
Bachelor’s 
  
0.051* 
[0.024] 
 
Master’s/Doctorate 
  
0.047 
[0.034] 
 
Hiring 
Agency 
Proportion Black 
   
-0.086 
[0.062] 
Proportion Hispanic 
   
-0.043 
[0.039] 
Violent-Crime Rate  
(Per 100,000) 
   
0 
[0.000] 
Property-Crime Rate  
(Per 100,000) 
   
0 
[0.000] 
County-Level  
Unemployment Rate 
   
0.129 
[0.365] 
Expenditures Per Officer 
(2008) 
   
0 
[0.000] 
Hiring Requirement 
Score 
   
-0.001 
[0.004] 
Training Requirement 
Score 
   
-0.001 
[0.007] 
Number of Officers 
 
-0.002 
[0.001] 
Separating 
Agency 
Number of Officers 
   -0.001 
[0.001]    
n 
 
2,272 2,272 848 882 
TABLE A11.  
number of fdle-initiated complaints by professional history, 1993-2013 
  n Ever 3 Years 
Panel A: Firings 
Never 24,711 0.02 0.01 
Fired, last job 1,394 0.04 0.02 
Fired, earlier job 1,295 0.05 0.02 
Panel B: Firings 
for Misconduct 
Never 25,686 0.03 0.01 
Fired, last job 934 0.05 0.02 
Fired, earlier job 780 0.06 0.02 
Panel C: Rookies  44,584 0.03 0.01 
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TABLE A12.  
subsequent firings and number of complaints by professional history and 
agency size, 1988-2013319 
   Firings 
Firings for  
Misconduct 
 Complaints 
Size 
 
n Ever 3 Yr. Ever 3 Yr. n Ever 3 Yr. 
≤1
5
 
O
f
f
i
c
e
r
s
 
Never 2,295 10% 6% 7% 4% 1,822 0.07 0.04 
Fired, last job 413 21% 12% 15% 9% 314 0.12 0.09 
Fired, earlier job 268 19% 10% 15% 9% 210 0.12 0.06 
Rookie 2,001 12% 7% 9% 5% 1,554 0.07 0.03 
>
1
5
 
O
f
f
i
c
e
r
s
 
Never 27,593 9% 4% 7% 3% 22,889 0.07 0.02 
Fired, last job 1,556 18% 11% 13% 8% 1,080 0.14 0.06 
Fired, earlier job 1,363 14% 7% 10% 5% 1,085 0.12 0.04 
Rookie 52,475 10% 6% 7% 3% 43,030 0.08 0.03 
TABLE A13.  
subsequent firings and number of complaints by professional history and 
timing, 1993-2009320 
   Firing 
Firing for 
Misconduct 
 Complaints 
  
n 
Years 
1-3 
Years 
4-7 
Years 
1-3 
Years 
4-7 
n 
Years 
1-3 
Years 
4-7 
Panel A:  
Firings 
Never 26,346 4.6% 2.3% 3.2% 2.0% 21,169 0.024 0.024 
Fired,  
last job 
1,811 11.2% 4% 8% 3.4% 1,236 0.070 0.038 
Fired,  
earlier job 
1,487 7.5% 4% 5. 9% 2.8% 1,151 0.050 0.042 
Panel B:  
Firings 
for Mis-
conduct 
Never 27,516 4.8% 2.4% 3.3% 2.0% 22,020 0.025 0.024 
Fired,  
last job 
1,198 12.1% 4.4% 9.1% 3.7% 835 0.079 0.044 
Fired,  
earlier job 
930 8.3% 4% 6.6% 2.6% 701 0.056 0.054 
Panel C: 
Rookie 
 
47,371 5.8% 2.4% 3.3% 2.1% 37,479 0.026 0.033 
 
319. The firing data is based on employment stints beginning between 1988 and 2013, and the 
complaint data is based on stints beginning between 1993 and 2013. 
320. We exclude all employment stints that began after 2009 to ensure that we have a full seven-
year window for each employment stint through which to observe firings and complaints.  
